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Abstract 
 
The aim of the thesis is to provide a social identity account of the politics of 
mobilisation: based on hatred mostly, in contrast with accounts of solidarity. The bulk of 
the thesis concentrates on exploring how and why is prejudice in the form of hatred 
mobilised in inter-group relations. Three studies parse the structure of hate discourse of 
Hindu right-wing groups in India. Study 1 and study 2 are qualitative studies that analyse 
the production of hate in two mediums of communication, while study 3 is an 
experimental study demonstrating the reception of hate. The studies analyse the structure 
of hate discourse with the theoretical lens of a social identity framework to explicate a 
context of categories and category-relations, while colouring in the contents of the 
categories with data from India. The first contention is, if a virtuous in-group can be 
construed as under threat from an out-group, then, the annihilation of the other can be 
justified as the defence of virtue. In the other words, violence becomes virtuous. The 
second contention is, the process that motivates out-group hate discourse derives from 
struggles over intra-group authority. That is, out-group threats are invoked in order to 
condemn political rivals for in-group power as not representing the group and not 
defending group interests. This sets up the foil for the leader to position ‘self’ as the ideal 
leader who protects and represents the in-group, while undermining the credibility of the 
political rival. Study 4 is a qualitative study analysing counter-hegemonic discourse on 
mobilisations against the rhetoric of hatred. Taken together, the first 3 studies argue that 
hatred is not an inherent feature of individuals or a natural fall-out of inter-group 
processes, it is mobilised for specific political aims. The fourth study looks at the 
dimensions with which other leaders counteract the politics of hate; when hatred can be 
mobilised, so can solidarity. The theoretical implications and limitations have been 
discussed.  
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Prologue 
 
Neither a Hindu nor a Muslim will you be, 
A child of a human being you are, and a human being you shall be. 
(Sahir Ludhianvi, peoples' poet) 
 
bove all, avers the poet, humanity must transcend categorisation. India, a country 
with well over a billion people residing in 29 states and 7 Union Territories that 
are largely drawn along linguistic lines, 22 official languages and, at least 7 
recognised religions, is the country of the poet’s contention. Every school-going child is 
taught the basis of the Indian national identity: “Unity in diversity”. The ‘national’ 
narrative is, however, punctuated with group-based religious violence (henceforth, 
referred to as communal violence) when periodically, the linguistic and regional lines of 
differentiation morph into unyielding religious identities: Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs and 
Christians come to the forefront.  
 
The history of brutalities in communal relations unfolds like a mottled travesty of peace 
woven into the larger fabric of a constitutionally secular Indian nation-state. Usually 
restricted to localised occurrences (to a few districts within a State or spilling over to 2 or 
3 States) the severity of the violence ranges from burning a few shops to systematic 
organized killings. The reference point for the ferocity and sheer size of communal 
violence in India is the killings of over a million Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs that 
accompanied the division of the subcontinent into India and Pakistan - the ‘Partition’ of 
1947. It is in this context that Sahir Ludhianvi (the poet of the quote) a Muslim by name 
and a progressive socialist by ideology, who lived through and witnessed the violence of 
Partition, resisted the imposition of religious identities. Consider the verse further with 
the lens of social psychological theories used to frame the thesis (a critical elaboration on 
the theories of social identity and self-categorization), the first part tells us something 
about the nature of the social world and how social identities are the cornerstone with 
which we engage with the world. It is also a statement about changing the world, i.e. the 
act of being defined by social reality (imposed religious categorizations: ‘Hindu’; 
‘Muslim’) as much as it is about a definition to create a different social reality (‘A human 
being you shall be’). At a time when mere belonging to the ‘Other’ group was enough to 
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become a death warrant, a rejection of religious categories altogether is a statement of re-
imagining a different kind of world in which the only category or identity that should 
matter is one of being human. This is a feat of imagination as much as conviction for it 
asks us to go beyond even the ‘nation’, it asks us to be human beings.  
 
There is an assumption implicit in the appeal for humanity about the processes of 
categorisation (in this case into Hindus and Muslims) that is taken for granted. The notion 
seems to be that categorisation in and of itself is the root of the problem. If we do away 
with categorisation, the world would be a better place. Or, if at all, the categorisation 
must be at a higher level – of being humans, and not of anything less that divides us into 
various identities. In a sense, categorisation is conflated with discrimination. A social 
identity approach however, argues that there is nothing inherently evil about the 
processes of group differentiation or of identifying with different groups. Indeed, it is in 
groups alone that people come together to challenge oppressive status-quos. Social 
change is only possible when disadvantaged people come together in a sense of shared 
social identification, of belonging to an in-group whose membership gives us a sense of 
‘we’. It is in how this ‘we’ is defined and the dimension on which the ingroup is 
differentiated from outgroups that determines the behavioural outcome. The action of 
good or evil, arguably, has to do with the way people define their groups and the 
subsequent choices they make, and not in the ‘nature’ of groups itself.  
 
The question then arises how do we come to these versions of understanding? Who 
defines this ‘we’ and decides on the constitution of ‘us’? Since, social identities do not 
merely reflect how we perceive our social world, rather identities and group boundaries 
have the potential to restructure our social world. It is precisely for this reason that 
definitions of identities and group boundaries are fiercely contested, because they have 
important consequences for group behaviour. Social psychologists, Reicher and Hopkins 
coined the term 'entrepreneurs of identity' to describe people who argue over how identity 
is defined in order to influence collective action (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001). While social 
identities are our window to the way the world is organised, it is a project to restructure 
the nature of such relations in the world too. The verse is a call of resistance to the 
violence that such categorisations have led to in India. The poet, as a barometer for 
change and peace would arguably be an example for mobilisation against violence.  
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What about the call for violence? The following is an example of the kind of mobilisation 
used to enable genocidal violence against Muslims in Gujarat of 2002.  
 
“We have woken up to Gujarat now. VHP1 has been working here for last 15 years, 
their leaflets are regular features in newspapers, colleges–hatred for Muslims, 
Christians, secular people, only thing that reaches every home is this and people have 
nothing to counter it…The leaflets say all Muslims have four wives and their population 
is growing, even though polygamy is more prevalent in Hindus than Muslims.”  
[p 29, cited in ‘Threatened Existence’ – a report by the   
International Initiative for Justice] (Abeysekara et al., 2003)  
 
The Vishwa Hindu Parishad is the activist part of the family of Hindu right-wing 
organisations collectively known as the ‘sangh parivar’ (a family), of which the 
fountainhead of ideology is the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS). The ideology that 
they propound is known as “Hindutva”. A fuller account is given in the introductory 
chapter and in the studies. Apart from instigating, conducting and engaging in violence, 
they have also been mobilising opinion by creating literature for dissemination to the 
public (as noted in the excerpt) to mark out ‘enemies’ by putting forward particular 
stereotypes of out-groups. They also conduct spiritual gatherings, organize participation 
in rituals by co-opting and reinterpreting Hindu symbols to celebrate the superiority of 
the Hindu religion, to sacralize the in-group as pious and holy. That the mere presence of 
a Muslim out-group could become a threat strong enough to warrant aggression in the 
form it took in the Gujarat pogrom, takes considerable amount of skill by the 
entrepreneurs of identity to craft as a plausible scenario in a country where the official 
census says 80% are Hindus. I shall argue in the thesis, that this aggression against the 
out-group is sanctioned and even, celebrated. It is the infernal conclusion of a ‘moral 
logic’ based on two interlocked premises i) a sacred in-group under the threat of ii) a 
threatening out-group. This leads to virtuous violence against the out-group (the nuances 
with which this pairing is yoked together shall be explicated in the chapters on hate 
                                                
1 VHP is the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (World Hindu Council) – a group that propounds a virulent right-wing 
Hindu ideology called Hindutva. They were responsible for instigating and leading mass killings in the 
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discourse). This is also borne out in the several investigations that have revealed the 
‘pride’ with which the violence was led and conducted by Hindutva groups.2 
 
The subject of enquiry is the craft itself: the process of categorisation used by 
entrepreneurs of identity to mobilise for or against hatred; about how and why mobilise 
and seek to define social identities in certain ways, investigating how ‘us’ and ‘them’ are 
demarcated and constituted in political discourse. How is the ‘outgroup’ so defined as an 
enemy, and what are the characteristics that are used to colour the stereotype of the 
‘Other’? What makes ‘us’? What and how does the definition of ‘we’ have an impact on 
the ways in which the outgroups are defined? The thesis explores discourses in which 
conditions of exclusion and/ or inclusion are created that determine the versions of social 
identities and the relations that are constructed among the groups. I shall argue that the 
there is a political will at play and reasons for putting forth the availability of this 
information in specific forms of stereotypes. Different entrepreneurs of identity put forth 
different kinds of arguments for the same identity definition leading to fierce 
contestations of meanings (i.e. contents) of social identities. To demonstrate and provide 
an evidence-based bulwark, the thesis presents research work conducted in India 
analysing the rhetorical structure and the construction of categories in the popular and 
elite discourse of the Hindutva ideology. For a flavour of the countervailing processes, 
the thesis also presents a study on speeches that challenge the right-wing discourse. 
Together, the studies aim to provide a social psychological perspective to the study of 
prejudice, anchored in political contexts of mass mobilization and leadership, and to the 
voices that provide counters to the discourse of hate.  
 
In the introduction to his book, A People’s History of the United States, Howard Zinn 
writes of the perils of an unexamined system of writing, and therefore, allowing the 
ideological positions of the various actors to pass without an interrogation. He writes, ‘the 
history of any country, presented as the history of a family, conceals fierce conflicts of 
interest (sometimes exploding, most often repressed) between conquerors and conquered, 
masters and slaves, capitalists and workers, dominators and dominated in race and sex. 
And in such a world of conflict, a world of victims and executioners, it is the job of 
thinking people, as Albert Camus suggested, not to be on the side of the executioners’ 
                                                
2 (Jain, 2007; Ketan, 2007) 
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(Zinn, 2003, p. 10). The words that one chooses to describe an event, the myriad 
descriptions and interpretations that emerge from a supposedly singular event of violence, 
and the labelling of religious identities of the actors as demarcated into perpetrators and 
victims, are indicative of the lens one uses to view the world. Indeed, ‘pseudo-seculars’ is 
quite the preferred brickbat for people who choose to interrogate the saffron ideology. It 
is one of the many epithets that many of us would wear with irritable bemusement earlier, 
and with increasing alarm, henceforth.  
 
When one studies extreme hostilities, writes about the violence and inter-group hatred in 
a country as huge and diverse as India, there will always be questions around the scope of 
the research, especially, on the dimensions of the breadth and depth of the phenomenon. 
Can we really speak of an impact on the general population in a country that has, in spite 
of the internal violence, retained its sovereignty and principles of democratic functioning? 
In 2014, a landslide victory in the national general elections ensured a right-wing 
Government at the centre with the country now firmly being led by Narendra Modi as the 
Prime Minister of India. The uncomfortable answer, therefore, is yes. We are not looking 
at a ‘fringe’ ideology, anymore. The ideologues and the ideology have power gained 
through democratic means. They enjoy the legitimacy, respectability, and celebratory 
acceptance of their positions with an uncomfortably large willing audience.  
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1  Introduction: Theory, Model,  Context & 
Research Strategy 
Chapter Synopsis 
Broadly, this chapter is divided into 4 parts: Theory (1.1); A model of collective hate 
(1.2); The context of India (1.3); Research strategy (1.4) 
 
Theory (1.1) is an introduction to psychological research to find answers to the 
phenomenon of genocide, the development of social psychological theories – group based 
explanations with a consideration of Sherif’s work, and subsequent critique and 
development of the social identity theories by Tajfel and Turner. We develop a critical 
social identity approach of mobilisation with accounts of leadership and the mobilisation 
of prejudice in the form of hatred. The conceptual contours are then drawn upon and 
presented in the next section in the form of a model of collective hate (1.2) drawn from 
the mobilisation perspective is detailed and the elements of the model explained; Section 
(1.3) describes inter-group relations in India with a focus on the communal violence that 
has characterised the relations, a consideration of the labels that are used to describe the 
violence, social psychological research conducted in India and a brief background to the 
ideology of Hindutva. The chapter ends with an explanation of the research strategy 
(Section 1.4) and an overview of the studies conducted.  
1.1 Theory 
Genocidal violence, in which people are killed because of the group they belong to, has 
been one of the disturbing features of human relations in documented form since, 
perhaps, Columbus ‘discovered’ the Arawaks in 1493. A colonialist, Columbus, 
established policies that included the enslavement and extirpation of the Native American 
races (Zinn, 2003, p. 9). The term ‘genocide’, however, was coined much later in the 20th 
Century by a Polish lawyer, Raphael Lemkin to describe the brutalities in terms of the 
“intentional destruction of groups [emphasis added]” in Nazi Germany (Hinton, 2002, p. 
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4). 60 million people were annihilated with mechanical precision in the Holocaust on 
account of their group membership. The Holocaust, as this genocide is known, was not 
conducted by ‘primitive’ people with ‘tribalistic’ urges but was perpetrated in “post-
enlightenment Europe by a people steeped in Western culture and rich in scientific 
knowledge” (Chalk & Johnassohn, 1990) cited in (Billig, 1996). Social psychological 
research was transformed by the incomprehensibility of the scale and intensity with 
which the extermination of European Jews in World War II was planned and executed. 
While, it could fairly be argued that Columbus was a foreign power to begin with, the 
same does not hold true for Nazi Germany. The perpetrators symbolised Nazi Germany 
while the victims were targeted as the ‘Other’, yet both were arguably still German 
citizens. The question was, how did a country ‘steeped in culture and knowledge’ turn on 
its own citizens and proceed to exterminate millions of people identified only by their 
‘Other’ group membership?  
1.1 .1  Personification of Evil 
At the helm of affairs in Nazi Germany stood Adolf Hitler as evil personified (Kuper, 
2002; Staub, 1989, 2003; Waller, 2002). The US Government commissioned two studies 
to analyse Hitler’s motivations and personality. The report officially entitled "A 
Psychological Profile of Adolf Hitler: His Life and Legend", was formulated for the 
Office of the Strategic Services (OSS) which later became the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) and submitted in 1943 by Walter Charles Langer, Professor at Harvard. 
The report is one of two psychoanalytic reports prepared for the OSS during the war in an 
attempt to assess Hitler's personality; the other psychoanalytic report is "Analysis of the 
Personality of Adolf Hitler” by Henry Murray, psychologist and psychoanalyst from the 
Vienna school of thought at the University of Harvard. The reports contain detailed 
information about the physical and psychological make-up of Hitler with interpretive 
analyses of Hitler’s relations with his father (p. 94) and mother, particularly after his 
father died (p. 100). These inter-personal relationships are then explained as the basis for 
his actions as Fuhrer (Praed, 2005). The question of studying a leader who could devise 
and oversee mass-murder was of immediate concern, and the guiding factor was thought 
to do ‘evil’, one must be evil, and therefore, this must be located in the personal make-up 
of the leader. As detailed as the descriptions and analyses were, these accounts of 
personality had not been empirically tested. In 1950, a group of US based researchers 
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Adorno and colleagues empirically tested the assumption that underlying such prejudiced 
beliefs were deep-seated psychological motivations. The study combined a variety of 
techniques seeking to find the personality characteristics that predisposed people to 
favour fascist politics. The findings of these studies were put forward in The 
Authoritarian Personality (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950) that 
stated that people with such a personality would have the following characteristics a) 
rigid beliefs in conventional values b) general hostility towards other groups and c) 
submissive attitudes towards authority figures. This, it was conceived, would explain the 
nature of the perpetrators, and therefore, the prejudice. (Martin, 2001) 
 
While there are a number of studies and accounts that critique the Authoritarian 
Personality approach (Billig, 1976) the most relevant critique for this thesis is that the 
very nature of such theories – explaining prejudice via individual differences among 
people – makes it particularly unsuited to explain how prejudice can become virtually 
consensual in certain societies. As noted in the first part, genocide has occurred in 
supposedly ‘primitive’ societies to ‘advanced’ ones as well. Inter-group hatred and 
prejudice also cannot be convincingly explained by cultural differences, given that 
extreme hostilities between groups and genocidal hate are not specific to any particular 
culture. It certainly couldn’t provide an account for why groups of people could kill other 
groups of people on account of group membership.  
1.1 .2  Group & Inter-group studies :  
Unconvinced by individualistic explanations, Muzafer Sherif and colleagues designed 
field experiments to study processes of group behaviour. This marked the beginning of a 
shift to a group-level analysis of inter-group conflict and prejudice (Billig, 1976, 1996; 
Platow & Hunter, 2012; Reicher & Haslam, 2014). The three studies were conducted in 
1949, 1953 and 1954 with schoolboys attending summer camps in various locations in the 
Unites States. Though there are three studies, the best known is the 1954 study, otherwise 
known as the ‘Robbers Cave Boys’ Camp Study’ (Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, & Sherif, 
1961). 
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1.1.2.1  The Robbers Cave Boys ’  Camp Study: 
This particular study of 1954 was organised at an area which was surrounded by the 
Robbers Cave state park in Oklahoma. The study was designed in three stages lasting a 
week each.  
The first stage was in-group formation, where the boys arrived in separately at the camps 
and were divided into two separate groups. The boys bonded over activities of swimming 
and hiking. One group named themselves ‘the rattlers’ while the other group named 
themselves ‘the eagles’. Neither group knew of the existence of the other.  
In the second stage of ‘intergroup conflict’ the boys were made aware of the presence of 
the other group. They were pitted against each other in a series of win-lose (where the 
victory of one group most definitely depended on defeating the other group) games like 
tug of war. The invectives and name-calling went up with things coming to a pass where 
the boys refused to even share meals in the same mess.  
In the third stage of ‘reduction of intergroup conflict’, the experimenters designed 
opportunities with a number of built in reconciliatory stratagems for the two groups like 
watching movies or a bean-collecting competition. However, it was noted that there was 
no lessening of conflict and or any sign of peace and cooperation. Therefore, the 
experimenters introduced a series of ‘superordinate goals’ where the two groups of boys 
had to work together to solve a crisis. Sherif and colleagues noted that this lead to a 
decrease in the conflict between the groups and proceeded towards cooperation. It was 
explained as a functional relationship where competition occurs when there is a conflict 
of resources and hence the theory he proposed came to be known as the realistic conflict 
theory (Platow & Hunter, 2012; Sherif et al., 1961) 
 
To put the importance of the experiments in the larger context, the studies brought the 
focus of study to group behavior and the level of explanation and theorization to groups. 
As opposed to individual behavior, the boys’ acted as group members. The significance 
of Sherif’s studies was the shift from individualistic analyses where he states that 
personality disorders or individual frustrations cannot be held to account for intergroup 
phenomena; to study group processes in terms of distinctive group products and with a 
distinctive level of analysis, i.e., inter-group contexts (Billig, 1976, p. 301) In other 
words, to understand conflict we need a group analysis looking at the relations between 
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groups. Where these are competitive there will be hostility, where these are cooperative, 
these will be harmonious. (Platow & Hunter, 2012) 
 
While appreciating the focus on group-level studies, an extrapolation to the real world, 
however, brings up a crucial question of explaining psychological underpinnings as 
simply functional gains and losses. Among the critiques of the theory, one stands out in 
relevance to the thesis, the problem with the realistic conflict theory is that the theory 
fails to explain instances when violence occurs, with no possible economic benefit in 
sight (Billig, 1976). Wars have been fought in the name of ideology more than any 
economic gain per se (Tajfel, 1972). 
 
There are two points of observation from the Sherif studies that are of importance here, a) 
Turner and colleagues noted from various other studies conducted that “social groups 
seem to be more competitive and perceive their interests more competitively than 
individuals under the same functional conditions” (Turner & Giles, 1981, p. 288); and b) 
a point that (Tajfel, 1982) noted was that “boys who had become friends before the 
official intergroup competition started were placed in opposing groups. Their subsequent 
behavior was affected by intergroup conflict and not by their previous interpersonal 
attachments” (Tajfel, 1982, pp. 14–15).  
 
1.1 .3  Minimal Group Experiments and Social 
Identity Theory:  
 
Tajfel and colleagues designed a series of experiments to determine the minimum condition 
in which inter-group discrimination occurs, ie, what are the minimal conditions that will 
produce negativity towards outgroups?  The minimal group studies aimed at exploring the 
conditions in which individuals display inter-group discrimination (discriminate members of 
other groups in favour of their own groups). The general question they sought to answer 
was at which point would members of a group exhibit signs of “categorisation” and 
“differentiation.” These set of experiments came to be known as the minimal group 
experiments (Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971).  
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In the first study, 14-15 year old schoolboys were divided randomly into two groups after 
being led to believe that the criteria of differentiation was a preference of abstract painters 
(Klee or Kandinsky) or guessing the number of dots. The participants were asked to 
allocate money or penalties to a member of each group (in-group and out-group). In the 
second set of studies (Billig & Tajfel, 1973) it was made explicit that the basis of group 
membership was randomly designed (as opposed to the previous study).  
 
The additional procedures to ensure minimal conditions were: no instructions were given 
to the participants on how to allocate the points, they could not communicate with the 
participants, they were all strangers to each other, i.e. they did not know anything about 
the person they were allocating the money to except for information of group 
membership in the experiment, and there was no personal profit or loss from their 
distribution while portioning points (Tajfel, 1978). In other words, participants were 
assigned to groups randomly, and factors such as history of conflict, personal animosity, 
interdependence, individual self-interest and personal economic gain were all controlled 
for (Haslam, 2001). 
 
The results of the minimal studies suggested that it seemed like merely classifying 
individuals into groups (on the basis of irrelevant criteria) was enough to induce in-group 
favouritism (Tajfel, 1981). 
  
The results ostensibly indicated that trivial criteria were enough to harbour identification 
with an in-group and discriminate against an out-group. One of the major insights of 
these studies was, when people come to see themselves as members of a group, their 
behaviour is fundamentally transformed, with distinct meanings attached to the 
behaviour.  As Tajfel put it, “This meaning was found by them in the adoption of a 
strategy based on the establishment, through action of a distinctiveness between their own 
‘group’ and the other, between the two social categories in a truly minimal ‘social 
system’. Distinction from the ‘other’ category … provided an identity for their own 
group, and thus some kind of meaning to an otherwise empty situation” (Tajfel, 1972, p 
39-40 cited in Haslam, 2001). 
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Tajfel formulated the concept of ‘social identity’ to account for this behaviour which would 
later be defined as “that part of an individual’s self-concept, which derives from his 
knowledge of his membership of a social group (s) together with the value and emotional 
significance attached to that membership” (Tajfel, 1982, p. 255). In other words, group 
behaviour is underscored by a person’s social identity. Social identity then is the pivot 
with which an individual navigates group membership in a world of many groups. It 
helps us come together as group members and act as group members purposefully and 
effectively. 
 
For some, social identity theory has been used to suggest generic processes of 
intergroup discrimination. For others, though one has to take content into account – thus 
the way we differentiate from others depends on the valued dimensions of social identity 
(Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999; Haslam, 2012). “This approach serves to transform 
the understanding of identity in psychology. It stresses the sociality of the construct in at 
least three ways. First, social identity is a relational term, defining who we are as a 
function of our similarities and differences with others. Second, social identity is shared 
with others and provides a basis for shared social action. Third, the meanings associated 
with any social identity are products of our collective history and present. Social identity 
is therefore something that links us to the social world.  It provides the pivot between the 
individual and society.” (Reicher et al., 2010)  
1.1 .4  Self-Categorisation Theory 
 
Self-categorisation theory was developed to specify processes of social identification 
(Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). While the theory of social identity 
sets the framework for understanding processes of social identification, that is, it tells us 
that shared social identification allows people to act together as group members 
purposefully and effectively, it does not tell us the ‘how’ of this process or what makes 
categories salient or who is representative of the categories. The theory, write Reicher 
and colleagues ‘seeks to clarify the distinction between social identity and other aspects 
of the self concept, to explain how the self system is organised and what makes any one 
part of this system psychologically active in a given context’ (Reicher, Spears, & Haslam, 
2010).  
 
 
 
 
19 
Self-categorisation theory draws upon principles of social identity, but while the latter 
was formulated as a theory of inter-group behaviour, self-categorisation is conceptualised 
as a theory of group behaviour. Turner describes the self categorisation theory as a ‘social 
identity theory of the group’ and to specify processes of “how individuals are able to act 
as a group at all” (Turner et al., 1987, p. 42). The theory addresses the questions that 
social identity theory raised, to specify the way in which ‘social identities are defined and 
made salient as a function of social context’ (Reicher, Haslam, Spears, & Reynolds, 
2012; Turner, Oakes, Haslam, & McGarty, 1994).  
 
Self Categorisation Theory helps to expand the Social Identity Theory by arguing that 
social identity underpins all aspect of group behaviour; in particular, when social identity 
is salient, people seek to ascertain group norms/values/beliefs and conform to them. Thus 
the way social identity is defined shapes the way people act together collectively, it 
creates and directs a powerful social force. This makes the question of how social identity 
is defined both socially and psychologically important. Significantly too, this specification 
helps explain not only when and why particular group memberships come to define the self 
but also how particular individuals achieve standing within the group.  
1.1 .5  Critical Social Identity Approach:  
 
In the 1970 paper, ‘Experiments in Intergroup Discrimination’, Tajfel concludes by saying 
“unfortunately it is only too easy to think of examples in real life where fairness would go 
out the window, since “groupness” is often based on criteria more weighty than either 
preferring a painter one has never heard of before or resembling someone else in one’s way 
of counting dots. Socialisation into “groupness” is powerful and unavoidable; it has 
innumerable valuable functions. It also has some odd side effects that may – and do – 
reinforce acute intergroup tensions whose roots lie elsewhere [emphasis added]” (Tajfel, 
1970, p. 187). That we must look to the social world for ‘exploring the roots of inter-group 
relations’ is a point that has also been numerously stated in various papers on the social 
identity framework (Haslam & Reicher, 2006; Haslam, 2012; Reicher & Hopkins, 2004; 
Reicher, 2001; Reicher et al., 2010). Turner made a similar point arguing that “the issue is 
not so much why people behave as they do in any given experiment, but rather whether the 
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models we build to explain that behaviour help us understand what happens outside our 
experiments” cited in (Haslam, Reicher, & Reynolds, 2012).  
 
Psychological studies conducted within the minimal group ‘paradigm’ without 
contextualising the processes of social identity often misstate that the mere categorisation 
of people into different groups, is enough to create prejudice and racism among the 
members of different groups. This confuses an analysis of the ‘minimal conditions’ under 
which processes of discrimination may originate with a fuller explanation of the 
conditions under which a specific type of discrimination may occur.  
 
Firstly, the extrapolation of experimental conclusions of controlled conditions with 
limited options of behavioural choices to explanations of real-world phenomena of 
extreme hostilities between groups is misleading. In the minimal group experiments, the 
alternatives that were presented to the participants were limited and imposed by the 
experimenters. While this was important in the experimental context to pin down the 
specificities of behaviour under controlled conditions, an extrapolation of the 
experimental conditions to the social world undermines the importance of the historical, 
social and political context in which people behave and act in specific ways (Reicher et 
al., 2010).  
 
Secondly, the notion that generic dislike can translate to genocide is a giant leap. For 
example, “I do not like you” cannot explain persecution of an entire group of people 
based on racial, ethnic or religious category. Mere antagonism cannot and should not be 
equated with a systematic annihilation of people belonging to a particular group (Reicher, 
2012). Self-Categorisation Theory adopts a primarily perceptualist approach in saying 
that identities reflect the organisation of social reality, expressed through the principles of 
fit as explained earlier. However, SCT also acknowledges another dimension, perceiver 
readiness, which allows issues of personal history, collective history and ideology to enter 
the argument. More recently, psychological experimental research has started looking at 
the effects of in-group boundaries (Castano, Yzerbyt, Bourguignon, & Eleonore, 2002; 
Leidner, Castano, Zaiser, & Giner-Sorolla, 2010), in-group glorification, moral 
disengagement and out-group threat on prejudice. The starting point of the studies is that 
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prejudice exists as a given. This then, goes back to the idea of prejudice as an inevitable 
consequence of inter-group relations.  
 
Thirdly, and connected to the first two questions, in particular, it fails to address the need 
to look at meaning in relation to social identity raising the question of where content 
comes from. The nature of that content is neither given in advance nor is it a function of 
passive perception. Rather, category content is actively constructed and contested. In 
other words, it is a matter of mobilisation. 
 
There has been extensive research in the social identity tradition on mobilization 
processes and the links with social identity construction, with respect to national identity 
(Reicher & Hopkins, 2001); specifically looking at solidarity literature (Reicher, Cassidy, 
Wolpert, Hopkins, & Levine, 2006); bystander intervention (Levine & Thompson, 2004); 
a comparison of hate and solidarity discourse (Reicher, Hopkins, Levine, & Rath, 2005); 
and setting out a model explaining genocidal processes in social identity tradition 
(Reicher et al, 2008). 
 
1.2 A Social Identity Model of Collective Hate 
 
“…wherever we find prejudice, it has been mobilised, it has been mobilised deliberately, 
and it has been mobilised for gain…They are about collective action not individual 
cognition and they primarily involve those who are the targets of prejudice rather than the 
prejudiced themselves.” (Reicher, 2012) The crux of hostile inter-group relations is that 
hatred is mobilized.  
 
This has two key elements: Firstly, social identity content does not simply reflect existing 
social realities, it is used to create new social realities. That is, there are strategic aspects 
to the ways in which identities are sought to be defined. To cite an example from India, 
an Indian identity encompasses a different vision of India, than a Hindutva defined Hindu 
identity would (as we shall in the subsequent chapters). While, the former emphasizes on 
the cultural diversity of India, the latter insists on the superiority of the ‘Hindu’ religion. 
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This, in turn would have different implications for the rest of India. 
Secondly, versions of identity do not arise from a lone contemplation of the world. It is 
not something that one comes to just like that, rather communication and social influence 
from all sides impact on us with various people telling us what to think. Opinions, 
discussions, conversations, popular cinema, advertisements, books and newspapers, 
social interactions and even subtle behaviour gives us clues about how the social world is 
organized, what our position (privileges and disadvantages) in this world are, and how are 
other people or groups categorized. To paraphrase Tajfel, we do not live in vacuum 
(Tajfel, 1972). What we understand of ourselves is informed by the values and norms of 
the group membership. Staub in his book on ‘The roots of Evil’ talks about how ‘people 
use available information to divide themselves into an in-group and an out-group.’(Staub, 
1989, p. 58) The obviousness with which the label or the operationalisation of  ‘In-group’ 
is used in social science literature is unhelpful since it suggests that the categorization of 
self is an automatic process borne of primordial connections. As a consequence, studies 
posit in-groups as monolithic identities without analysing precisely what are the contents 
of these identities. What does it mean to be a member of a particularly defined ingroup? 
What are the norms and values that dictate the membership of the in-group? There are a 
multitude of voices telling us not just how to think but what to think. Some voices among 
these carry authority and are opinion-makers. Mobilizing opinion for or against with 
nuanced arguments, drawing upon cultural artifacts, mythologizing history and 
historicising mythology (Udayakumar, 1997). In the process, historical ‘facts’ versions 
are also revised and social contexts recreated. For example, in the Indian example, 
statistical manipulations are employed to support these manufactured facts. The contexts 
of mobilizations are not necessarily around the theme of hate, but they are indications of 
the ways in which people want to restructure the world – the system of thought that 
guides these social movements, that is, ideology (Billig, 1982). That is to understand 
hatred or solidarity we have to see it in the context of mobilization. This is explicated in 
the following arguments. 
 
The first argument is about the importance of analysing the ways in which meanings are 
constructed around identities that either lead to genocide or even make it seem to be the 
greater good (Reicher, Haslam, & Rath, 2008). Provided below is a blueprint for the 
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steps, which shall be explicated in detail with examples in the first two studies on hate 
discourse. 
 
Identification: Definition of the in-group: The first step is to delineate boundaries of the 
group, around the questions of who can be members of the group and what does it mean 
to be a member of the in-group? The core issue is to make the group insular, and clearly 
define the criterion for group membership.  
 
Exclusion: excluding the targets: the demarcation of out-groups is necessarily dependent 
on the way the in-group is defined. Opotow and colleagues argue that ‘moral exclusion’ 
occurs when groups are constructed outside the boundary, consequently harming them is 
seen as justifiable (Opotow, Gerson, & Woodside, 2005).  
 
Threat: Seeing targets as an inherent threat: Having zeroed in, on the out-groups as 
targets, it is now important to construe this “other”, as a threat to the in-group. As we 
shall see in the sections using the model to look at data from India, the threats can be 
construed in multiple ways. Symbolic threats where the in-group is seen to be harmed as 
the values and what they hold sacred is under threat and realistic threats comprising 
financial, economic and social harm. The threats are built on the dimensions that are held 
as important to the in-group.  
  
Virtue: Constituting the in-group as virtuous: we argue, that the perception of threat is 
dependent on building it as an attack against the value-system of the in-group. All that is 
held sacred and virtuous to the in-group is projected as being destroyed by the out-group 
members. 
 
Celebration: Aggression becomes self-defence:  In all this, there is a strong moral 
component to this violence. The ways in which people engage with such morality is 
described and analysed in the empirical chapters on hate. For now, it is important to note 
that, far from a moral disengagement perspective, (Leidner et al., 2010), genocidal 
violence is very much a moral project. In this context prejudice is not a by-product of 
distorted perceptions or cognitive processing filters, it becomes a tool that produces 
ideological justifications towards maintaining oppression against out-groups.  
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The above steps or processes described in the 5 step model of evil are not automatic, and 
keeping with the meta-theory of social identity that we have argued, these processes are 
not inherent characteristics of group behaviour or inter-group relations either. The four 
elements leading to the conviction of morality is not a spontaneous thought of group 
members, but is very much stoked by would-be leaders who have an interest at stake. 
Claudia Koonz in her book, the Nazi Conscience warns that ‘the potential for racial 
hatred lurks whenever political leaders appeal to the exalted virtue of their own ethnic 
community’ (Koonz, 2003, p. 274).  
 
Leadership:  
Self Categorisation Theory posits a relationship between social reality and social 
categorisation. The relationship is construed to be perceptual, however, Reicher and 
colleagues have argued that this would be misstating the core of the theory.  
(Reicher, Haslam, & Hopkins, 2005) They propose an approach to the definition of 
‘social categories’ that allow for a focus on the rhetorical categories that are employed in 
discourse and how this in turn influences the shape of the action. “It is argued that the 
ways in which categories are defined (their inclusiveness, their content and 
prototypicality) will shape collective mobilizations (their breadth, their direction and who 
will influence them). It is also argued that context and categorization will be 
interdependent such that definitions of the frame of reference (who is included within it 
and what their respective positions are) will affect category definitions. However, rather 
than the frame of reference being a given and the categories being consequences, all the 
relevant terms are seen as open to argument” (Reicher & Hopkins, 1996b).  
 
In their book, “The new psychology of leadership: Identity, influence and power” Haslam, 
Reicher and Platow provide an overview of the Social Identity approach to Leadership. They 
explicate principles of self categorisation theory to show that to be able to influence people, 
leaders must show themselves to be a) prototypical of the group, b) as representing the 
group’s interests, c) entrepreneurs of identity and therefore, be able to mobilise the group 
(Haslam, Reicher, & Platow, 2011). The analytic structure that we provide in the chapter 
explicates these principles in sections 3.4.4.1, 3.4.4.2 and 3.4.4.3 of this thesis. We show 
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how these are put in play in chapter 3 with an analysis of speeches by ideologues and by a 
particular political leader.  
 
Versions of definitions are contested, and debated upon, by different people. It follows 
then, that the entrepreneurs must project and convince group members of themselves as 
prototypical of in-group values (Platow, van Knippenberg, Haslam, van Knippenberg, & 
Spears, 2006) More so, they must project their version of group-values as the only way to 
be. To do this, they must also contend with in-group rivals who are pitching contesting 
meanings of group values, membership and prototypicality. Hence, it is essential to 
discredit the projected “prototypicality” argument of rivals (Reicher, Haslam, & Hopkins, 
2005). The way to do this, as we find in the study on political speeches in this thesis is by 
defining the rivals as essentially betraying the in-group, by invoking the out-group threat. 
In some cases, shown as colluding with the out-group to attack in-group values (further 
explained in chapter 2 and chapter 3). Much of the arguments outlined in the critical 
perspective have been developed with research work that was conducted in India. The 
next section outlines the context of inter-group relations in India, and an introduction to 
the ideology of the right-wing Hindu nationalism in India.  
 
1.3 Context: India 
This section outlines the context of inter-group relations in India, and an introduction to 
the ideology of the right-wing Hindu nationalism in India. The divergences in India 
provide a rich context for political mobilization of social identities. In the following sub-
sections, the context of India is presented from the time of Partition (when the country 
came to exist independently with the geographical boundaries of the present-day nation), 
consideration of the prevailing conditions of the various inter-group relations; a 
consideration of the labels that scholars chose to describe the events of inter-group 
violence section and a brief background to the ideology of Hindutva that is explored in 
the analytic chapters. 
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1.3.1  Partition, prejudice ,  and Inter-group 
Relations: 
Partition:  
In 1947, as British colonial rule came to an end in the subcontinent, India and Pakistan 
were accorded the status of two independent countries. The sub-continent’s Partition  
came at a cost of the killings of over 100,000 people and the migration of another million 
to produce the nation-states of India and Pakistan. The division was ostensibly on the 
basis of religion (Brass, 2003a; Chatterjee, 1988; Lapierre & Collins, 1975; Pandey & 
Samad, 2007). A mutilation took place on the maps, with a large stretch of India in the 
middle of East (which eventually emerged as an independent country of Bangladesh in 
1971) and West Pakistan (now simply, Pakistan). This mutilation was not just 
cartographic; it claimed many lives in the bloodshed. In India there were minorities 
(Muslims) who chose to stay back, as they were Hindus who chose to stay back in 
Pakistan. Though the violence was largely in the north-western region of Punjab and the 
north-eastern region of Bengal, the impact of the hatred that accompanied the actual 
killings reverberated all over India (Brass, 1994, 2003a; Jaffrelot, 2013; Pandey & 
Samad, 2007; Pandey, 2001, 2006a, 2006c).  
 
Prejudice: 
Pandey (2001, p. 16) describes the ramifications of partition in the development of 
religious prejudice in the following quote, “Sikhs, Muslims and Hindus were all redefined 
by the process of Partition: as butchers, or as devious others; as untrustworthy and anti-
national; but perhaps fundamentally, as Sikhs and Muslims and Hindus alone. All over 
the subcontinent, for extended periods, at many times since 1947, men, women and 
children belonging to these communities – yet belonging to different castes, classes, 
occupations linguistic and cultural backgrounds – have been seen in terms of little but 
their Sikh-ness, their Muslims-ness or their Hindu-ness. And periodically, Christians have 
been treated in a similar way.” There are two things of importance in the excerpt, firstly, 
no matter how fluid social identities are, at a given point of time, (in this case, the process 
of partition) they may crystallised into a solely religious group identity. Secondly, the 
characteristics of the groups are usually sketched in terms of villainous personality traits 
 
 
 
27 
that are used interchangeably with the group identity; call them ‘butchers’ or call them 
‘Muslims’, the two terms come to be seen as one and the same (Alam, 2008; Anand, 
2007; Kakar & Kakar, 2007; Kakar, 1996; Varshney, 2002). This essentialisation of 
prejudiced characteristics comes to be understood as the core-value of the group.   
 
Inter-group relations:  
The impact of Partition was a lasting wedge in India-Pakistan relations such that Muslims 
in India have remained under perpetual suspicion of secretly carrying loyalties for 
Pakistan. Their loyalty to India is one that needs to be proved every time there is a tension 
in India-Pakistan relations, like the Kargil war in 1999, or the terror attacks on Mumbai in 
2008 or often reportedly even during a cricket match (Harris, 2014) between the two 
countries. Secular India though enshrined in the Constitution; in popular consciousness 
became the religious mirror (India for Hindus) for a Pakistan for Muslims. One slogan, 
circulated frequently among right-wing Hindu parties goes, “there are only two places for 
the Mussalman: either Pakistan or the graveyard.”3 Compounded by the global discourse 
of ‘war on terror’ (Roy, 2003), the international relations between India and Pakistan 
forms a foil for the many arguments that are made in favour of or against in the Hindu-
Muslim relations in India. 
 
Political Parties:  
The detailed history of the political parties in India is beyond the scope of this thesis (see 
(Chaterjee, 1993; Chatterjee, 1988; Johnson, 1973; Lapierre & Collins, 1975; Pandey, 
2004; Pandey & Samad, 2007; Pandey, 2006b; Reddy, 2005; Wilkinson, 2005) However, 
a brief description of the two major parties – Congress party and the Bharatiya Janata 
Party are of importance to make sense of the studies and the data analysed, in the thesis.  
Congress: When the British left India in 1947, the Indian National Congress (INC) was 
at the forefront of the freedom movement with a mass mobilisation claiming the length 
and breadth of country, with leaders representative of Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs of the 
country. It is both reviled and worshipped as the grand old party of India, almost 
embodying the dreams of a nascent secular constitution in its own foundation (Lapierre & 
Collins, 1975). The Congress party formed the Government of India at the time of data 
collection of all the studies included in the thesis. We have explained in further detail the 
                                                
3 Mussalman ka sthaan, Pakistan ya Qabrastan  
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specific nuances and relevance of the ideology and the policies of the Congress party in 
both chapter 2 and 3 when the rhetoric has alluded to the role of Congress.   
Bharatiya Janata Party: The other National party that is of relevance to the thesis is the 
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). This is the right-wing political party propounding Hindutva 
ideology that currently forms the Government of India.  
1.3.2  Hindutva 
A professed aim of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, the fountainhead of the Hindutva 
ideology is to put “together the various groups within the Hindu Samaj4 and to revitalize 
and rejuvenate the same on the basis of its Dharma5 and its Sanskriti6” [The Constitution 
of the RSS, article 3; cited in (J. Sharma, 2007)]. 
 
Hindutva (literal translation: the essence of Hindu) refers to an ideology that traces its 
first authoritative formulation to the works of Vinayak Damodar Savarkar’s “Hindutva: 
Who is a Hindu?” (1923), and M.S. Golwalker’s “We or Our Nationhood Defined” 
(1936) cited in (Islam, 2006a, 2006b; Powers, 2008; J. Sharma, 2007). As the titles of the 
books suggest, taken together, this forms the basis of the ‘national’ project for their stated 
objectives of a Hindu-rashtra (Hindu nation-state). The books are an exposition on the 
ideological foundations of the Hindutva movement. This was a formulation in 
contradistinction to the stated secularism of the Congress Party. Indeed, it also stands 
against the Indian Constitution that has secularism enshrined in its Preamble. 
 
There are internal contradictions in the way Hindutva has been conceptualized and the 
dissemination of the original thought to the cadres. Scholars have studied and analysed 
the founder’s ideology and formulation of Hindutva and the internal disagreements (see, 
Khan, 2011; Sharma, 2007), the difference in teachings and praxis of women’s wing  and 
the entirely male membership of the RSS (Bacchetta, 2004; Banerjee, 2003; Basu, 1996; 
Sen, 2006) films have been made on the mobilization processes (Patwardhan, 1992) and 
ethnographic documentaries on the training camps organized for young men (Vachani, 
1992, 2002). There are certain themes that emerge, in coherence with the overall aim of 
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consolidating ‘Hindu’ power (Hasan, 2005; Kanungo, 2003; Ludden, 2005; Sarkar, 2005; 
Spodek, 2010; Veer, 2005). It is only in the process and the way this is deemed to play 
out by the various actors that is adjusted. It is in this consolidation of power that Billig 
writes, “the ideology of the dominant group is used to maintain its superiority over 
subordinate groups. In this the dominant group will often contain ideological specialists, 
whose profession is to uphold the material power of the group by formulating ideological 
justifications. Often, claim Marx and Engels, there is conflict between the intellectual and 
practical wings of the dominant group, but these conflicts should not disguise a basic 
commitment to the maintenance of their group’s dominance” (Billig, 1976, p. 253).  
 
In the same vein of identifying an underlying theme that conjoins the different 
organizations together, the writer Arundhati Roy says,  
  
While the parallels between contemporary India and pre-war Germany are chilling, they're not 
surprising. (The founders of the RSS have, in their writings, been frank in their admiration for 
Hitler and his methods.) One difference is that here in India we don't have a Hitler. We have 
instead, a travelling extravaganza, a mobile symphonic orchestra. The hydra-headed, many-
armed Sangh Parivar—with the BJP, the RSS, the VHP and the Bajrang Dal, each playing a 
different instrument. Its utter genius lies in its apparent ability to be all things to all people at all 
times. (Roy, 2009, p. 8) 
 
The Sangh Parivar (or the ‘family’) refers to the family of organisations in the Hindu 
nationalist movement. Roy alludes to these various organisations as the arms of the 
‘Sangh Parivar’. The Hindutva ideology forms the core of this family of the RSS 
(Rashtriya SwayamSevak Sangh), the VHP (Vishwa Hindu Parishad) and the Bajrang 
Dal, whose political arm is the Bharatiya Janata Party (Islam, 2006b; Pardesi & Oetken, 
2008; Sharma, 2007; Vachani, 1992, 2002).  
1.3.3  Inter-group Research in India 
Though far fewer in number than the breadth of the phenomenon demands, there is some 
social psychological research in India with a focus on Hindu-Muslims relations. Within 
the framework of intergroup threat theory (Stephan, Ybarra, & Morrison, 2009), work by 
Tausch and colleagues found that symbolic threat was a predictor of prejudice for Hindus, 
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and that realistic threat is a predictor of prejudice for Muslims in the context of majority-
minority relationships (Tausch, Hewstone, & Roy, 2009). The work of Ghosh and 
colleagues focuses the lens of inter-group relations theories at the Hindu-Muslim 
relationships and review studies in India (Ghosh & Kumar, 1991). Sammyh Khan in his 
PhD thesis on the Hindutva movement presents a social psychological exposition on the 
structure, contents and inter-group impacts of the movement (Khan, 2011). Sudhir 
Kakar’s psychoanalytic exposition of Hindu Muslim relations provides a compelling 
picture of the individuals who were involved in violent acts against the outgroups. The 
study has focussed on exploring the hatred between the groups, either by putting the lens 
of stereotypes on Muslims (ie, is there something in the character of Muslims or the 
Islamic faith that brings about such violence) or of looking at the social conditions of the 
relations as ‘given’, for example – riots and violence over the cow (Kakar, 1996). 
However, much more social psychological research is required to understand the complex 
social context and group dynamics in India. In contrast, the range of scholarship from 
disciplines other than psychology that have based their work on understanding Hindu-
Muslim relations and the advent of Hindutva is fairly large (Brass, 1997, 2003a, 2003b; 
Das, 2008; Ghosh, 2002; Jaffrelot, 2013; Ludden, 2005; Pandey, 2004; Pandey & Samad, 
2007; Pandey, 2006b; Paul R Brass, 2006; Sarkar, 2005; Sen & Wagner, 2005; Sengupta, 
2006; Varshney & Gubler, 2012; Varshney, 2001, 2002, 2003). While the scholars across 
the disciplines generally agree that the Hindutva movement has been accompanied with 
much violence and strained relations between groups, they have argued that the ferocity 
of the communal violence is linked with the rise of a Hindu nationalist ideology in India, 
a rich body of research by scholars of politics who debate the very definition of how the 
violence is represented in both academic and public discourse is considered in the next 
section. This argument has implications for the way in which further theorisation and 
studies are conducted.   
1.3.3.1  The construction of Communal violence: riots ,  
pogroms or ‘spontaneous violence ’?   
Inter-religious group violence in India is called ‘communal’ violence. In the media and 
nationalistic discourse, communal violence has been treated like ‘aberrations’7 in a 
                                                
7 See (Pandey, 2006b, 2006c) 
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largely peaceful nation. But, scholars across disciplines have grappled with the 
phenomena of ‘riot-production’8, and have been increasingly voicing their concerns about 
the role that Hindu nationalism has played. They particularly challenge the idea of a riot 
in which both sides are seen to be more or less equally responsible for the violence. The 
label ‘riot’ gives closure to the event argues, Gyanendra Pandey. He goes on to argue that 
riot theorisation in India is misleading (Gyanendra Pandey, 2006b, 2006c). He questions 
the basis of characterizing the violence as ‘riot’ and argues that the violence of 1984 in 
Delhi, 1992-93 in Mumbai and 2002 in Gujarat is symptomatic of pogroms where one 
group has almost complete dominance over the other group. It is worthwhile to quote the 
entire passage  “As to ‘communal riots’, it is enough to say that the worst examples of 
violence against minority religious communities, over the last two decades and more, fail 
to fit the description in any commonly understood sense of the term.” About the ‘84 anti-
Sikh ‘riots’, 92-93 ‘riots’ and 2002 Gujarat, he further says, “Suffice to recall that, in 
these as in other instances, hundreds if not thousands of people from the majority 
community congregated at will for days (sometimes weeks) on end, to attack and loot the 
persons, property and wealth of the targeted community. The habitations, houses and 
shops, vehicles and machines, fields and hand pumps, that belonged to members of the 
minority community were identified and marked out in advance, with the assistance of 
electoral registers, tax rolls, census data and local informants. The attacks themselves 
took place with the acquiescence (if not the active encouragement) of the police, the 
political leadership and even leading ministers in the government, and with almost no fear 
of counter-attack or loss of life (since the police is ready at hand to ward off and shoot 
any counter-attackers), or indeed of punishment (since the police and existing political 
leadership is on their side, and even the judiciary seems to be mindful of the views of the 
political leadership, if not in agreement with them).” He further states, “These were 
certainly not ‘riots’. They were organized political massacres, feeding on and fanning the 
hatred and prejudices of a growing segment of the majority community” (p 278, Pandey, 
2006c). 
 
An important indication of an almost one-sided attack is the formation of ‘minority’ 
ghettoes in the urban areas after the violence. Meena Menon’s book on the violence in 
Mumbai (then, Bombay) traces the trajectory of the lives of the survivors from the 
                                                
8 See (Brass, 2003) 
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violence against Muslims in Bombay of 1992-1993. While members of the majoritarian 
community (i.e., Hindus) move in relative impunity after the communal violence, 
members of the minority communities (particularly Muslims in this case) if they ever 
return to their places live in fear of retribution. Those who do move out face difficulty in 
finding suitable living accommodation in places where the majoritarian community lives 
(Menon, 2012). It is telling that such prejudice is not restricted to any particular socio-
economic class of the minority community, as evidenced in the experiences of wealthy 
film actors searching for houses in Mumbai (Gaikwad, 2012) to professors in universities 
who unsuccessfully searched for rental houses while relocating to Ahmedabad (Dave, 
2012; Langa, 2012).  
 
The number of people affected and the conditions of exclusion that are created 
overwhelmingly affects the minority communities. How then can we sensibly understand 
the ideological conditions, if we insist that ‘both Hindus and Muslims, or both Hindus 
and Christians communities’ are affected equally in the violence? 
 
Paul Brass in his extensive scholarship on collective violence in India gives considerable 
thought to the kind of label that is used to describe violence (Brass, 1994, 2003, 2006). A 
majoritarian Hindu country where Muslims are the largest minority (and second largest 
population) with Christians, Sikhs and Parsees forming the rest of the prominent minority 
communities, in the narrative of an overall national peaceful coexistence, the localized 
occurrence of periodic ‘riots’ (as the administration likes to characterise the violence) is 
seen as a regrettable but expected consequence of groups with fundamentally different 
values living in such proximity. Brass also notes the struggle over the way in which the 
violence is sought to be represented after the inter-group violence occurs, showing how 
leaders argue that while the violence by the outgroup is always constructed to be 
‘systematic’, the ingroup violence is said to be of a ‘spontaneous’ nature (Brass, 2006, p. 
47)  
 
The case of anti-Muslim Violence in Gujarat: 
On February 27th 2002, the Sabarmati Express carrying Hindu religious-workers caught 
fire near Godhra in Gujarat, a state in western India. It is unclear if the attack was carried 
out by Muslim groups (Dhattiwala & Biggs, 2012; Spodek, 2010). Hindu nationalist 
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groups like the VHP claimed that Muslims had attacked the train. Ostensibly as 
retribution for Godhra, there was an outburst of anger in the Hindu community that 
unleashed brutalities on the Muslim community in several areas of Gujarat. The violence 
that displaced nearly 10000 and killed 2000, which included the burning of an ex- 
Member of Parliament9, continued unabated for the next two months. Describing the 
violence,  
 
Last night a friend from Baroda10 called. Weeping. It took her fifteen minutes to tell me 
what the matter was. It wasn't very complicated. Only that Sayeeda, a friend of hers, 
had been caught by a mob. Only that her stomach had been ripped open and stuffed 
with burning rags. Only that after she died, someone carved 'OM'11 on her forehead.  
 
Precisely which Hindu scripture preaches this? (Roy, 2003, p. 17)12 
 
Perhaps Roy asks a rhetorical question, but in social psychological terms and more 
specifically to our analytic position, it is an important question, for it asks if there is a 
rationale to this seemingly mindless act. Let us take another look at the act. Engraving a 
Hindu insignia on is not a mindless act. Consider the act of violation described in the 
epigraph. If we understand the violation of dead bodies as a battleground, inscribing 
‘Om’ on the forehead is a two-fold message of victory and pride. Victory, as it 
communicates the total dominance and control that the Hindu community has over the 
Muslim community; pride, as the ‘sacred symbol’ is stamped on the forehead of the 
victim. The violence, then, is also a manner of communication to the outgroup.  
  
The pattern of the violence is specific to the context of Hindutva group norms, however 
the general principle of the act of violence is not specific to India or Hindutva. A 
woman’s dead body is used as a communication of dominance between two communities. 
The attackers have left their mark stating that this is not an act that the perpetrators are 
                                                
9 Ehsaan Jaffri, a Member of Parliament from the Congress party was dismembered and burnt alive by 
Hindu rioters. 
10 Baroda is in Gujarat – a state where sustained genocidal violence was unleashed on the Muslim 
community in 2002, ostensibly to avenge the murder of Hindu workers.  
11 Om is a religious incantation used by Hindus to signify the beginning of any ‘auspicious’ work.   
12 Arundhati Roy’s work is controversial in India and many accuse her of taking a ‘license of creativity’ as 
an author of fiction. However this description, excerpted from an article published in a national magazine, 
is also corroborated by another source: a report by a group of feminist scholars published under the 
International Initiative for Justice (IIJ)  
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ashamed of, indeed, it is one that they declare belongs to their community. Questions of 
identity and citizenship are fraught with gendered sexual violence (Franzway, 2016). That 
women’s bodies are seen as repositories of ‘their community’s’ honour is well-researched 
by feminist scholars and that violence between two communities are played out on the 
bodies of women (Sideris, 2003; Zraly & Nyirazinyoye, 2010) Rape and sexual violence 
have been used as weapons against communities in the Nanjing massacre, the Rwandan 
genocide, even during the Holocaust (Henry, Ward, & Hirshberg, 2004; Lentin, 2000; 
Lindsey, 2010; Sideris, 2003; Zraly & Nyirazinyoye, 2010) The violence, scholars have 
argued  signifies, pride. While, the focus of this thesis is not on the specific forms of 
violence, it is worthwhile to note that an analysis of the norms and values of the group 
might indicate the kind of violence that might be unleashed. While, this is particularly 
significant to the arguments made in chapter 2 (p. 40) which we shall return to, it is of 
import also in terms of the model of collective hate that we explicated in the previous 
section. The 5th step of celebration: It can be argued that the burning of the body is 
symbolic of what happened in Godhra. This is an example of the kind of violence that the 
perpetrator community wanted the world to know belonged to them. That they were 
capable of such an action, is a matter of pride to be celebrated, and not one of remorse. In 
terms of the model of collective hate, this is the culmination of the defence of virtue.  
 
Though the causes and implications of the riots and the nature of the analysis itself has 
been debated; among scholars of politics, sociology, economics and history, it is 
generally agreed upon that the ideology of the Hindu right-wing plays a dominant role in 
fomenting violence (Hasan, 2005; Khan, 2011; Pandey, 2006b; Sarkar, 2005; Veer, 
1987). While scholars of politics have done tremendous work in providing nuanced 
backgrounds and contexts to the occurrence of violence, with regard to state complicity 
about ‘riot production’ and inter-religious violence with a definite focus on the 
perpetrators of the Hindutva ideology, the accounts can not speak about the psychological 
engagement of the people who adhere to the ideology and of people who would have a 
psychological stake in identifying with the construction of the category of the ingroup in 
such terms. In other words, we require a social psychological framework drawn heavily 
from the principles of social identity to make sense of the possible psychological 
engagement of leaders and followers in the production of hatred.  
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1.4  Research Strategy 
The first part of the thesis is about investigating the social psychological conditions that 
create antagonisms between groups. In other words, it is about investigating prejudice as 
a product of mobilisation. Therefore, the research strategy combines methods suitable for 
exploratory research and confirmation of hypothesis in the form of an experimental study. 
Language and images are powerful mediums of communication that affect the ways in 
which we think and act. A ‘radical’ qualitative approach refocuses the lens on this 
discourse of communication (Parker, 2005). As social beings we actively engage in 
making sense of the world around us. A major portion of this is done through the 
discourse that surrounds us and that we engage in and are used by entrepreneurs 
effectively to impact upon our understandings of the world that we live in (Elcheroth & 
Reicher, 2014; Fine & Billig, 1989; Reicher, Cassidy, Wolpert, Hopkins, & Levine, 2006; 
Reicher & Hopkins, 1996; Smith, 2008). This thesis explores mobilisations of hate and 
solidarity (Reicher, Hopkins, Levine, & Rath, 2005), to further develop the social identity 
model of hate (Reicher, Haslam, & Rath, 2008) by analysing two different modes of 
communication and experimentally examine one strand of hypothesis that emerged from 
this model of hate mobilisation. 
 
The nature of the questions and therefore, the varied range of data necessitate both 
qualitative and quantitative research approaches. Accordingly, the thesis employs 
qualitative research approaches drawing from the fields of visual anthropology (Katz, 
2004; MacDougall, 1997; Uberoi, 2002) and communication (Kjeldsen, 2007; Medhurst 
& Desousa, 1981; Werner, 2004) and in conjunction with a) the overarching framework 
of the social identity perspective and in specific, the model of collective hate (Herrera & 
Reicher, 1998; Reicher & Hopkins, 2001; Reicher, Hopkins, Levine, & Rath, 2005; 
Reicher & Hopkins, 1996a) to examine (i) visual data, and (ii) live speeches and 
circulated video recordings of entrepreneurs of identity at mass gatherings. A social 
experiment was also conducted to empirically confirm one of the many potential strands 
of hypotheses emerging from the qualitative studies on hate mobilisation, drawing on 
experimental work by Levine and colleagues with a self-categorisation framework by 
manipulating identity salience (Levine, Prosser, Evans, & Reicher, 2005; Levine & 
Thompson, 2004). 
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A further consideration of the processes of the specific qualitative research, the 
applicability and questions of validity is explained and discussed in the specific chapters 
(2) and (3) of the studies on visual communication and political speeches.   
 
 
Framework:  
The studies aim to analyse and explicate the ways in which primarily, hate is mobilised 
and further delve layers to the model (Reicher, Haslam, & Rath, 2008) that has been 
sketched, formally proposed in and to an extent confirmed in other studies of discourse 
(McKeever, Reed, Pehrson, Storey, & Cohrs, 2013; Verkuyten, 2013). The research on 
rhetoric in the fields of politics and philosophy (Bitzer, 1968; Cameron, Lapinski, & 
Riemann, 2000; Hart, 2005; Smith, 2008) have been used as a background to the 
argument put forth in Billig’s work on rhetorical psychology (Billig, 1985, 1988). While 
the constructs used have been developed from a robust research within the framework of 
social identity and self categorisation theories, an understanding of the cultural concepts 
in the data is a pre-requisite to the arguments that are being made.  
 
In other words, we not only “spell out (y)our assumptions [emphasis in original]” 
(Silverman, 2005, p. 352), we also interrogate these against the model proposed and delve 
for further nuances in the data that we analyse. This necessitates a comprehensive and 
descriptive method of analysis that a qualitative approach accords much more than the 
conventional quantitative approach (Malterud, 2001; Ormston, Spencer, Barnard, & 
Snape, 2013; Polkinghorne, 2005).  
 
Cultural data: 
Before the first study of the PhD was conducted, we had sketched the processes of inter-
group relations that are constructed in rhetoric in a published paper in the section 
‘mobilising hate’ (Reicher, Hopkins, Levine, & Rath, 2005) with examples from Nazi 
Germany to Rwanda and India. This served as a template for further exploratory research, 
specifically contextualised in India. Each study has an explication of the cultural 
relevance of the concepts that are used in both the visual medium and the political 
speeches to make sense of not just the ways in which identities are sought to be 
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constructed but also to underscore the emotional attachment and importance of certain 
symbols as sacred (Anand, 2005; Bhatt, 2000; Das, 2008; Ghosh, 2002; Kakar & Kakar, 
2007; Kakar, 1996; Sarkar, 2005; Sengupta, 2006;  Sharma, 2012).  
 
Category Constructions & Relations: 
For example, in terms of defining the in-group: the Hindu religion follows no specific 
book and is a profoundly divided society on the lines of caste. We look at the definitions 
of what has come to represent Hindu. How is it that a religion (Hinduism) which is best 
known for its lack of cohesion been put together as a monolith unity? How has this 
cohesion been formed? What are the rationales put forward? What emotions are invoked? 
What are the unique cultural artefacts of this society that are put to service in these 
constructions? By whom? How? and why? 
 
Intertwined with the question of the in-group definition is the demarcation of the out-
groups. There is enough research done on inter-group relations in India to point towards 
an obvious construction of a Muslim out-group, and a Christian out-group (Jones, 2007; 
Kakar & Kakar, 2007; Kakar, 1996; Llewellyn, 2010).  
  
The overall research strategy developed progressively in cognisance of the availability of 
a set of rich data in the form of visual communication. Qualitative approaches were used 
in studies 1, 2 and 4. The third study is an experimental confirmation of a hypothesis that 
emerged from the first two studies.  
 
To put it simply, we used the framework of the hate model as a lens to explore the hate 
discourse (i.e, the cultural data) from India. The lens, however, is a reflexive model and 
therefore data was also used back to add layers to the model. This is explicated in details 
in the specific chapters.  
 
1.5.1 .  An overview of the Studies 
There are four studies in the thesis:  
 
The first set of data collected (Chapter 2, Study 1, p 40 of this thesis) follows the tradition 
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of ‘discoveries’ in science replete with messy trajectories and accidental findings. The 
researcher while part of a team exploring among other things, the impact of participation 
(The Preyag Mela Research Group, 2007) in a mass gathering of primarily Hindu 
religious orientation, stumbled upon a fairly prominent tent in the middle of this gathering 
(further details on p 43, of this thesis). The impact of the posters put up within this tent 
was strikingly out of place in a set up that was ostensibly about spirituality. The violence 
and torture data set has, therefore, been collected systematically within the framework of 
opportunistic timing, but without a set notion of what kind of data one was to collect. 
This lent itself very well to a qualitative approach of analysing the data, combining 
research from visual anthropology, communication studies and the social identity model 
of hate. Since the mode of communication was visual and therefore, limited in scope for 
more nuanced understanding of the arguments given, the next study focussed on political 
rhetoric in the form of speeches at another gathering.  
 
The second study on political speeches (chapter 3), collected by the researcher, was this 
time with the specific purpose to follow hate-mobilisers. The data was less accidental and 
more purposive in intent as the site for data collection was selected a couple of days after 
the Magh Mela (the gathering) in Allahabad, India. The next major gathering was 
advertised at the Magh Mela as The Dharm Sansad (religious parliament) and was held a 
couple of days later. The speeches were recorded over a period of three days, and other 
material like political pamphlets and a Compact Disc of the speech delivered by a 
particular leader that was circulated in the place, was also collected and analysed.  
 
The third study (chapter 4) is an experiment designed to confirm a counter-intuitive 
finding: the more virtuous the in-group, the more the threat sanctioned against a 
threatening out-group. While the generic format of the hypothesis is from the paper on 
collective mobilisation of hate (Reicher et al., 2008) and is also a contention of this thesis, 
i.e, ‘virtuous violence’, the specific contents and the cultural artefacts that were chosen to 
be used in the design of the instruments emerged from the two qualitative studies of this 
thesis.  
 
The fourth study (chapter 5) is an examination of mobilisation of solidarity primarily 
organised by civil society actors with self-identified left-liberal leaning. The rally was 
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expressly organised with the motive of raising consciousness about the violence of the 
saffron parties in an anti-Christian pogrom in a place called Kandhamal, in the eastern 
Indian state of Odisha in 2008. The aim of collecting data from a movement of solidarity 
with the victims was to explore the category contents of the kinds of social identities that 
are invoked towards the political aim of solidarity building. This study was primarily 
included to showcase a presence of countervailing voices that mobilise against the hate 
rhetoric in India.  
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2 Study 1: Visual Representations of Hate 
“Imagery is constitutive. It presents differing visions and helps form the minds of human 
subjects. Therefore it is crucial that we begin to examine it carefully and critically.” (p 31) 13  
2.1 Chapter Synopsis 
 
In this chapter, we set out the introduction to the study with a brief review of studies of 
visual culture from the fields of visual anthropology and more recently, communication 
and its impact on influencing people mostly studied in the field of advertisement (section 
2.2). This is followed by the research methods adopted by using the model of hate 
(explained in the previous chapter, section 1.2) in conjunction with methods drawn from 
the field of anthropology, most notably Geertz’s ‘thick description’, to explore the 
discourse of hate put forth by a Hindutva section in the form of visual representations 
(section 2.3). The analysis (section 2.4) is conducted on each poster individually, then 
brought together in an overall narrative with implications of the model (section 2.5). The 
chapter concludes with a discussion (section 2.6) and consideration of the limitations 
(section 2.7).   
2.2 Introduction 
 
The study of visual culture is a prominent field of research in sociological and 
anthropological disciplines. In a book articulating the visual representations of and by the 
Hindutva movement, (Davis, 2007) argues that “visual iconography plays a fundamental 
role in the imagining of nationhood.” He deliberates on “Anderson’s central questions in 
imagined communities: How is it that so many persons have been persuaded to sacrifice 
and die willingly for something so recently imagined into being as the nation?” and 
argues that “a visual imagery places us in a better position” to respond to this question. 
(p. 5).  
 
Though social psychological research is sparse in utilising visual material as data, 
                                                
13 (Davis, 2007) 
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anthropologists have traditionally been interested in the ‘visual’ as a subject of enquiry. 
In the field of anthropology, MacDougall remarks “Anthropology has had no lack of 
interest in the visual; its problem has always been what to do with it” (p 276, 
MacDougall, 1997). Visual Anthropology is now an established sub-field of study that 
includes a range of data such as performance arts, museum artefacts, paintings, posters, 
photographs (MacDougall, 1997). These are described as forms of ‘persuasive’ 
communication. There is a wealth of research on visual representations in the field of 
communication studies, management especially in advertising and also in political 
discourse (Pellegrino, Salvati, & De Meo, 2013). Unsurprisingly, the focus in 
advertisement is in the impact of visual imagery towards attitude change in consumers 
(Rossiter & Percy, 1980; Slade, 2003). These studies analyse not just the contents, but 
also argue about the plausible impact that such visual communication might have on the 
intended audience by analysing the contents of the visual medium. This is worth keeping 
in mind as one traverses the muddied waters of ‘causal’ implications and the question of 
valid interpretations of qualitative data (Cho, 2006; Golfshani, 2003; Whittemore, Chase, 
& Mandle, 2001) in the following piece of work.  
 
Anthropologists have examined discourse and studied visual imagery, particularly in the 
form of editorial and political cartoons. Katz (2004) traces the history of posters as a 
medium of communicating political messages in 1754 when the American President, 
Benjamin Franklin, sketched a snake cut into pieces with the caption “Join, or Die”. This 
was one of the first visual representations of an argument, exhorting the then British 
colonies to either unify or perish. More recently, a set of 13 posters depicting the Prophet 
Mohammed by Danish artists became fiercely contested sites of identity, security and the 
right to free speech (Hakam, 2009; Kuipers, 2011; Laegaard, 2009; Weaver, 2010).  
 
In 2006, when we stumbled across a set of posters in a VHP tent, set up in the middle of a 
largely Hindu religious gathering in India that caught our attention for its narrative 
content of tortured cows and vividly stereotypical caricatures of Muslims as threats, the 
Danish cartoons that evoked almost worldwide polarised reactions were yet to have been 
sketched. However, as an Indian researcher conversant with the rhetoric of banal 
prejudice and of being a part of the community of shared cultural repertoire, the use of 
cows in the set of posters (which could otherwise have been interpreted as part of animal 
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rights discourse) stood out to me as symbolising the sacred Mother Cow of Hindus.14 I 
shall explain the relevance of the cows in further detail in the analysis and discussion 
sections. 
 
In a book chronicling India’s rich history of cartooning, Mushirul Hasan traces and 
analyses the publication of editorial cartoons published in Urdu in the Awadh Punch as a 
social commentary on the colonial times (Hasan, 2007). Later, work by the sociologist 
Patricia Uberoi examining the content of posters produced during the 1940’s and the 
early 1960’s (when Jawaharlal Nehru was the Prime Minister of India) demonstrates that 
the ‘poster’ was an essential tool of mass communication in the visual culture of India 
(Uberoi, 2002). Those were the days of nation-building and bringing together a country 
born out of horrific inter-group violence, still firmly within the shackles of colonialism. 
Building up a secular national identity was of paramount importance to the leaders of the 
fledgling democracy. This is a point worth noting especially in the overall context of this 
thesis that the Hindu right has not had an uncontested ride, and that pluralism has been an 
ideal that was strongly endorsed by the state and populace. Uberoi’s research elucidates 
the contesting ideas of Indian nationalism that find expression in the posters (Uberoi, 
2002). 
 
It is important however, to differentiate between the lampooning of power structures, as 
seen in the analysis of Hasan, and the reinforcement of hate representations of minority 
communities. The social psychologist, Michael Billig, in his study of racist jokes in the 
Ku Klux Klan webpages, argues that a distinction must be drawn between jokes that seek 
to comment on unequal power relations in a society and jokes that seek to derogate 
minority and oppressed communities, i.e., jokes made within the context of extreme 
bigotry (Billig, 2001, 2005). In other words, the ‘context of reproduction’ of the power 
equation of the groups in question, i.e., the group that is being made fun of and the group 
that is making the jokes becomes critical in determining which form of humour the 
cartoons represent. It is within this extreme bigotry of Hindutva ideology (Khan, 2011; D. 
Reddy, 2011) that the following study is analysed. While, racism and prejudice have been 
of central concern in the study of social psychology (Blee, 1996; Miller, 2004; Katz, 
                                                
14 I shall explain the relevance of the cows in further detail in the sections on establishing validity (2.4) and 
analysis (2.5) 
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1991; Reicher, 2001;  Reicher, 2012; González, Verkuyten, Weesie, & Poppe, 2008), 
racist humour as a study of enquiry in social psychology is limited (Billig, 2005), political 
cartoons as subjects of enquiry is rare (Weaver, 2010), and within the framework of 
critical social mobilisation, this study is, perhaps, one of the first.  
 
As argued earlier in the introduction, the emotions that are sought to be maintained within 
and between groups are neither self-sustaining nor do we come to our understanding of 
the world by just ourselves. Communication forms an essential neural system to the body 
of emotions that sustains the group identity in dissent and in consensus (Reicher et al., 
2006). It is therefore, critical that as researchers we look at the variety of ways in which 
people seek to communicate their ideas with one another. Specifically, looking at the 
ways in which entrepreneurs of identity would seek to communicate their messages to 
mobilise people. For social researchers, the medium of communication is as important as 
the contents of ‘what is being said’, or in this case, what is being visualised. It is in this 
regard that these cartoons can be seen as ‘visual arguments’ (Hatfield & Hinck, 2006; 
Shelley, 2001; Slade, 2003; Wekesa, 2012). 
 
2.3 Research Approach 
2.3.1  Objective of Research: 
The objective of this study is to explore the discourse of hate by analysing the 
construction of various social identities and their inter-relationships in the visual 
representation of posters.  
 
2.3.2  Location & Arrangement 
The Mela: The posters were put up in a tent hosted by the Vishwa Hindu Parishad 
in one of the ‘largest religious gathering of Hindus’ – the Prayag Mela. To give a sense of 
the enormousness of the site and number of people, the ‘Mela’ that quite literally 
translates to ‘fair’, is an urban site of tents and facilities, mimicking a town that is set up 
for a month on the banks of the River Ganga and Yamuna at Allahabad, the capital of 
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Uttar Pradesh in India. This fair continues for a period of just under 30 days with various 
stakeholders including the state and central Governments, public commissions, religious 
agencies, the University and the Indian Army involved in the planning, execution and 
management of this temporary township that sees up to millions of people (BBC, 2001; 
MacLean, 2003) on certain dates that are deemed auspicious. Researched as a site for 
managing water, sanitation and hygiene conditions (Baranwal et al., 2015), management 
of health and infectious disease (Cariappa, Singh, Mahen, & Bansal, 2015; David & Roy, 
2016), the experience of living in the Mela (Buzinde, Kalavar, Kohli, & Manuel-
Navarrete, 2014) and the various impacts of collective identity and psychological well-
being (The Preyag Mela Research Group, 2007), the Mela, by sheer size and population 
is undoubtedly a formidable site for public communication and mobilisation.  
 
The Poster Tent: The Vishwa Hindu Parishad tent was situated quite near one of 
the main entrances of the Prayag Mela, next to the tent of the University of Allahabad. 
This location is of import to the overall sense of the location of this tent and posters in 
that it was not found in some obscure part of this huge township, rather it had a sense of 
legitimacy and prominence in the very space it occupied, set up as it were next to the 
University’s tent.  
 
Arrangement of Posters: The tent was designed as a square within a square, and 
posters were put up on all sides of the walls. The outer walls of the inner square (put up 
with saffron cloth) contained this particular series of posters. Since the tent had two ways 
in, which people were using as both entrance and exit, it is not entirely evident from the 
arrangement the direction in which people were going round the tent. However, we will 
subsequently show, that two posters form a mini-narrative only when they are read in one 
particular direction. Having noted that, it is also important to note that the narrative that 
emerges from the posters is not because of the way in which they were set up but because 
of the way in which the analytic interpretation holds together as a story. This is a part of 
the analytic process that shall be explained in the discussion of this chapter (p 104). The 
researcher noted that people browsed through it as the last set of posters, with a set of 
demographic posters and noted the participation of a ‘guide’ at certain points in 
explaining the messages of the posters, especially to people who could not read the text. 
In a sense, the posters though static in presentation, were transformed into a dynamic 
communication medium with people interacting in the interpretation of the text and 
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images. Some of this interaction was recorded in the form of graffiti on the posters, which 
has also been taken into account in the analysis.   
2.3.3  Procedure:  
Medhurst and colleagues, from the field of communication studies, outlined a 
taxonomy framework for analysing editorial cartoons in a seminal paper. The initial 
inspection of the posters are guided by the “relative size of objects within the frame, 
exaggeration/ amplification of physionomical features, placement in the frame, relation of 
text both caption and balloons.” (p 212, Medhurst & Desousa, 1981).  
 
Petersoo (2005) in her PhD thesis on the ‘discursive construction of national identities in 
the Media: Scotland and its Others’ reports that most of the methodologies and 
understandings crop from visual anthropology with no single standardized way of 
analysing the data. Since then, scholars especially in the field of Visual Communication 
have drawn on concepts from Anthropology. From the field of Rhetoric and Visual 
communication, Kjedlsen, argues that ‘context is essential in determining the meaning 
and rhetorical agency of images’ (Kjeldsen, 2014, p. 200). The context not only implies 
the environment in which the individual images occur, but also, as we shall show, it is in 
the way in which the analysis brings together the narrative form in the sequence of 
presentation of the group of images. He further argues that visual argumentation may 
have a greater role in conveying messages that would otherwise lose the richness of 
impact in a verbal communication, “Pictures have the potential for a multiplicity of 
simultaneous codings (transcriptions), allowing them to perform thick representations of 
events and phenomena. This kind of semiotic thickness can provide a fuller 
understanding of an issue, and thereby render the importance and strength of an argument 
salient. Thus, an important rhetorical and argumentative function of pictures, Kjeldsen 
proposes, is to argue for the significance or severity of a certain problem or the urgency 
of a situation. The visual aesthetics of pictures are able to function as an integral part of 
an argumentation we often only reconstruct verbally as thin propositions. However, the 
visual aesthetics are important precisely because their thickness can create presence and 
evoke the importance and urgency of a situation. In this way, visual argumentation may 
help people understand the gravity and importance of the issue at hand” (Kjeldsen, 2015) 
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Cross-referencing to build a narrative:  
 
A 2004 paper by Werner on ‘visual analogies, inter-textuality and cultural memory’, 
explicates the case for inter-textuality in posters and highlights the ways in which the 
creators of cartoons rely on particular understandings of the readers to convey the 
message (Werner, 2004). However, none of the studies have looked at a set of posters that 
come together in a narrative framework. Therefore, the approach we employ is to not just 
look at individual posters but to see how they work together in different ways to present a 
nuanced narrative. We have analysed the posters, one after the other, in the order that 
they were found in the tent. The process of a “thick description” (Geertz, 1973; Kjeldsen, 
2014; Ponterotto, 2006) for each poster was followed as described in the next section. 
 
Deciphering the images and stereotypes:  
 
The characters in the posters and the attributes thereafter were deciphered from popular 
interpretation. This is a technique employed by cartoonists to strike a chord and 
immediate recognition with the audience. Medhurst and colleagues note, “No traits, 
whether physical or psychological in nature can be totally manufactured by the 
cartoonist. The trait must exist to some extent in popular consciousness or graphic 
tradition before it can be amplified and caricatured by the artist” (Medhurst & Desousa, 
1981, p. 202). In particular, to establish the validity of the interpretations of the 
representation of the Muslim figures (Amin, 2004) and the importance of the cow 
(Jaffrelot, 2013; Jones, 2006; Kakar, 1996) Uberoi’s work on posters that divides the 
posters into two categories, one is of secularism where all religions are given almost 
equal treatment and the other set where a ‘Hindu rashtra’ subsumes every other religion 
in its fold. Critically, the representation is either as Mother India or Mother Cow (Uberoi, 
2002) was followed.  
 
Building a narrative:  
 
The analysis of the images and texts has also been cross-referenced in the posters for 
greater internal validity of the analysis, i.e., while each poster has been analysed in depth 
at three levels individually, when similar characters of the images occurs in the other 
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posters, it has been treated as an archetype for the narrative. In a sense, the 16 posters 
have been treated like a narrative with character building and constructing certain kinds 
of relationships amongst the characters as reflective of a microcosm of values of the 
groups that the characters are deemed to represent.  
 
In following a thematic analytic approach (Parker, 2005; Silverman, 2005) much 
emphasis has been given to the number of times a certain element is repeated in the 
series, however, my lens primarily, will be guided by what is going on in the posters, i.e., 
the construction of categories and how they are construed to relate to one another. The 
analytic argumentation of the context is extended in the posters within the guiding 
framework of the model of mobilisation (Reicher et al., 2008). This would mean looking 
at the construction of the in-group, the attributes, the outgroup(s) – the definition of 
which is necessarily dependent on the way the in-group is defined. 
 
The selection of posters:  
 
Out of a corpus of 300 posters, we selected these 16 posters since they were a set of hand-
painted posters (the others were printed) and were put up in a row in the tent. 11 of these 
posters were on one side of the tent, followed with a few posters of demographics (hand-
painted) and then 5 more posters painted on the same pattern of the previous ones. We 
went through several attempts of categorization of posters. The process of ‘layering’ – of 
analysing the text, visuals as separate layers and then bringing it together as a whole was 
followed. Sifting through the data, we selected these posters because of the way they 
were set up in the tent. They formed a narrative interspersed with demographic posters. 
We also did have some information on the impact of these posters on the targeted 
audience by the presence of graffiti on the posters. We used these ‘reactions’ as a mark of 
and also substantiation of our analysis of: 
 
1. Who constituted ‘us’, the in-group? (By an absence of slang on the figures) 
2. Who constituted ‘them’, the out-groups? (By slurs scribbled on the figures) 
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2.3.4  Analytic Lay-out 
 
The posters have been presented in the way they were set up in the tent. The posters are 
analysed individually in three steps, or ‘layers’. 
  
1. The first layer of analysis involves a description of the poster at three levels:  
i) image,  
ii) text; and  
iii) graffiti.  
 
2. The second layer is interpretation involving analytic categories. Within this, we 
identify the categories by using the descriptions of the first layer of analysis (traits 
attributed, caricatures). The next step is an elucidation of the relations constructed among 
these various categories (category-relations). 
2.3.4.1   Categories :   
 
Analytically, different representations have been categorized into the  
o In-group:   
o Out-group(s): 
o Political Rival: 
 
Stereotypical representations of the members of the groups. Characterization of the in-
group members, out-group members and rivals are distinct in the way they have been 
painted. Since the impact of the poster is primarily visual we also looked at the aesthetic 
appeal of the figures representing the various categories, and the various kinds of 
symbolizations used to denote the categories.  
2.3.4.2  Category relations 
 
The way in which the categories are understood in relation to one another, i.e.,  
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Who is with ‘us’? Who is against ‘us’? How are the out-groups depicted in relation to the 
in-group? Do the rivals truly represent the in-group? What relations are shown to exist 
between the rivals and the out-group?  
2.3.4.3  Summary Table 
 
A table that summarizes succinctly all the elements of the individual poster 
comprising of categories, representatives of the category, the nature of the attributes of 
the representatives and the nature of the inter-group relationships.  
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2.4  Analysis: 
 
Poster 1 
 
 
Description 
1. Image: 
The central representation of the poster is of two figures putting a cow to a slaughter-
wheel. The background of the poster is a pastiche of the tri-coloured Indian National 
Flag: with the blue wheel in the centre and the three colours of saffron, white and green in 
the background.  
 
2. Text: 
In bold blue characters (with the saffron background) ‘Either change the national 
symbol,’ followed by ‘or shut down mechanized slaughter-houses and stop meat export.’ 
 
In the green background is the following text: ‘India’s national symbol is a tripartite-
headed lion sculpture beneath which, is a horse on one side and a bull etched on the 
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other. The ‘Ashoka Chakra’ is in the middle of our tri-coloured national flag, which is a 
symbol of ahimsa [non-violence]. Anybody who insults this is punished. But, the 
Government of India by it’s cruel policies is insulting this symbol and committing crimes 
of national treason.’ 
 
3. Graffiti: 
The politician’s figure has  ‘you killing a cow, what? has your wife run away with 
someone?’; ‘send your daughter over to me’ which has then been crossed out with red 
ink, while the Muslim has ‘meet me and I will kill you’ and threats of ‘will kidnap your 
daughter, mother-fucker.’   
 
Interpretation: 
This poster explicitly portrays two threats, one from the Muslim out-group (the figure on 
the left) and the other from the Government of India (the figure on the right), to the Hindu 
in-group (a cow).  
 
1. Categories:  
The centre of the poster depicts two figures holding a cow onto a wheel with jagged 
edges. The figure on the left is a Muslim Arab, and the figure on the right is of a 
politician. The figure on the left is identified as Muslim (out-group) from the chequered 
pattern of the clothes he is wearing (the stereotypical caricature also occurs in posters 3, 
5, 10, 11, 13 on pages 57, 63, 76, 79, 85 of this thesis). In contrast to the other posters 
however, this Muslim is a wealthy Arab depicted by the long flowing tunic and a typical 
head-scarf. The figure on the right wears a white dhoti and kurta typified by Indian 
politicians. In the analytic categories, these figures have been analysed as ‘political rival’ 
(also see poster no. 10, p 76).  
 
While the poster is a copy of the Indian national flag with the saffron at the top portion, 
white in the middle and green at the bottom, the centre-wheel of the Indian national flag 
however has been significantly modified. Indeed, the bold blue headline suggests ‘Either 
change the national symbol...’, with the suggested change being the original wheel of 
justice into a wheel fashioned like a chainsaw blade, a symbol of violence.  The center-
wheel or the Ashoka Chakra symbolizes the wheel of law. By turning a symbol of justice 
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into a slaughter-wheel, a symbol of violence, the poster seeks to portray India as turning 
against itself. This is the sign of betrayal: ‘our own leaders, elected representatives 
chosen to safeguard our country and our values, are murdering us.’ The government of 
India (rival) is putting ‘us’ (Hindu in-group) to the slaughter in collusion with the Muslim 
out-group. The full text of the warning at the top of the poster is ‘Either change the 
national symbol or shut down mechanized slaughter-houses and stop meat export.’ 
 
At the bottom of the poster, is the figure of the national emblem of India, symbolic of 
governmental authority. This is combined with the text at the bottom of the poster on both 
sides of the national emblem, that says, ‘India’s national symbol is a tripartite-headed 
lion sculpture beneath which, is a horse on one side and a bull etched on the other. The 
‘Ashoka Chakra’ is in the middle of our tri-coloured national flag, which is a symbol of 
ahimsa [non-violence]. Anybody who insults this is punished. But, the Government of 
India by it’s cruel policies is insulting this symbol and committing crimes of national 
treason.’ 
 
2. Category relations:  
While the Muslim holds the cow’s front legs, the politician pushes the animal from 
behind. Caught between the pull and push is the cow that the wheel has started to saw 
through. This could possibly mean, the Hindu (symbolised by the cow) is caught between 
this nefarious connection of the Muslim and the Indian politician. The out-group and the 
rival have ganged up against the Hindu (in-group) and are holding the in-group down into 
torture and annihilation. Enemies and traitors surround the Hindu in-group. 
 
The text ‘Either change the national symbol,’ followed by ‘or shut down mechanized 
slaughter-houses and stop meat export reinforces the image of the Indian Government 
facilitating and encouraging the vicious attacks of the Muslim out-group on the cow of 
the Hindu in-group.  
  
Overall message of the poster:  The Government of India (rival) in collusion with the 
out-group has turned against its own people. The Hindu in-group is under threat of 
annihilation and the Government instead of protecting the in-group, facilitates attacks by 
the Muslim out-group.   
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Summary Table 
Categories Members Representation Attributes 
In-group Hindu Indians Cow Surrounded, 
Vulnerable, 
Threatened 
existence  
Out-group Corporate Muslim Arab Rich, conniving  
Rival Government of 
India 
National flag, 
National emblem, 
politician, text 
Treacherous.  
Category Relations 
In-group with rival The people constituting the Government of India (rival) have 
betrayed the Hindu in-group and have aided and abetted in the 
torture and annihilation of the Hindus.  
Out-group with 
rival 
The Muslim Out-group and the Government of India (rival) have 
joined hands.  
Out-group + rival 
with in-group 
The Government actively helps the Muslim out-group in 
destruction of the Hindu in-group. 
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Poster 2 
 
Description 
1. Image: 
In the foreground is a man dressed in a suit taunting a poor, in comparison unclothed, 
person; and on the left side of the poster is another man in a black suit kneeling in front of 
a cow. 
 
2. Text: 
The figure in the black suit‘ You, foolish simpleton Brahmin who reveres this animal as 
mother, eat it’s meat! What’s there in the milk!” 
Today you’d rather enjoy eating butter made from animal-fat and Pepsi made from cow’s 
meat uprooted the English regime and thrown out the white-skinned English because a 
small amount of grease (cow-fat) was smeared on a rifle cartridge’. 
 
3. Graffiti: 
None.  
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Interpretation: 
This poster depicts a shrewd western out-group, manipulating a gullible Hindu in-group 
(depicted as foolish).  
 
1. Categories: 
This poster creates the values of the Hindu Indian around the character of a poor, gullible 
Brahmin. The Brahmin identity of the Hindu figure is made clear by the dress-code of 
typical saffron robes and a shaved head with a little tuft of hair dangling from the back of 
his head. Further, he is also addressed as ‘simple Brahmin fool’ or to use the Hindi term 
‘ponga pandit’.15 It is interesting to note that this poster has used the context of the very 
same play that they had raised objections against, to add sarcastic connotations to the 
expression of ‘ponga pandit’. It is a taunt to the Brahmin’s intellect (or lack of it), and 
construes a simpleton’s gullibility as stupidity instead of innocence. The poster also 
delineates the Hindutva’s stand on the present day Hindu (Indians), mocking them in the 
text at the bottom of the poster, ‘Today you’d rather enjoy eating butter made from 
animal-fat and Pepsi made from cow’s meat’ by contrasting it to the past, when Indians 
(Hindus) had ‘uprooted and thrown out the white-skinned English because a small 
amount of grease (cow-fat) was smeared on a rifle cartridge’.16 The Muslim participation 
and leadership in this uprising against the British has been erased in the Hindu nationalist 
narrative, evident from this poster as well.  
 
The out-group of the white-skin English (English here does not define nationality per se, 
but instead is used as a generic term to include all foreigners who are white and speak in 
English – mostly Americans as representatives of Corporate sectors, in this case Pepsi), is 
represented by a man attired in a black suit (western clothes), jeers the simple indigenous 
Brahmin with ‘you simpleton, you call an animal, mother? Eat the animal’s flesh, what’s 
there in the milk?’ The visual imagery of a civilized man (dressed in suit) taunting a poor, 
in comparison unclothed, Brahmin to commit a profound violation of Hindu faith frames 
                                                
15 Ponga Pandit is a play spoofing the upper caste Brahmins, which incurred the wrath of Hindu 
fundamentalists. 
16 This incident refers to a time when the British ruled India, and Indians were employed as soldiers in the 
Army. In 1857, a new rifle was introduced, in which soldiers had to bite off the cartridge to load the bullet. 
The cartridge was greased with animal-fat of cows and pigs that offended the religious sentiments of Indian 
soldiers. (Cow is sacred to Hindus, and Muslims abhor pigs). This led to the ‘first war of Indian 
independence’ by the Indian nationalist version, or to the ‘Sepoy Mutiny of 1857’ by the British historians’ 
version.   
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the enemy as a shrewd character capable of manipulating the simple Hindu in-group to 
the extent of setting them up against their own mothers.   
 
2. Category relations: 
The meaning of the figure on the left side of the poster kneeling in front of a cow is 
ambiguous. The dress-code of pants and shirt suggests the character is an American 
corporate worker (also seen in posters 3, 12 on p 57, 82). Given that the out-group is 
almost always shown as attacking the cow, one possible reading of this particular image 
is that of the worker shackling the cow. But if the overall message of this poster is taken 
into account, a second possible interpretation is one of the out-group genuflecting to the 
Mother Cow. The poster then visually contrasts the glorious past of bringing the British 
down on their knees for violating Hindu norms (the 1857 conflict) in the background of 
the poster, with the present in the foreground, where the Hindu in-group is caricatured as 
a timid and naïve character.  
 
Summary Table 
Category Members Representation Attributes 
In-group Hindu Indians Brahmin  Simple, weak and 
gullible 
Out-group Western Corporate/ 
foreign government 
White-man in suit.  Conniving, shrewd, 
manipulative 
Category relations: 
In-group with out-
group 
The out-group (western corporate) is seducing the Hindu in-group 
to violate cardinal Hindu values.  
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Poster 3 
 
Description  
1. Image:  
On the left is a butcher holding a calf upside down in one hand and an oversized knife in 
the other, with blood dripping onto the ground near a holy fire in the field. On the right is 
a farmer holding a bunch of grass in one hand and a hoe in the other. 
 
2. Text: 
‘by naming the butcher’s cruel act as ‘farming’ the government [of India] is insulting the 
holy ritual of farming and also the saint-like farmer.’ 
 
3. Graffiti: 
All across the Muslim character: on the face: mother-fucker, near the waist: your 
mother’s. 
 
Interpretation: 
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This poster visually contrasts the character of the Muslim’s (out-group) work of butchery 
to the Hindus (in-group) work of farming, and textually argues that the Government of 
India is insulting the Hindus by lumping both the jobs into one category. 
 
1. Category: 
The slogan at the top of the poster reads, ‘by naming the butcher’s cruel act as ‘farming’ 
the government [of India] is insulting the holy ritual of farming and also the saint-like 
farmer.’ 
 
The Muslim butcher (out-group) on the left side, holding a calf upside down in one hand 
and an oversized knife in the other, contrasts against the saintly noble character of the 
Hindu farmer (in-group) in the right side, holding a bunch of grass in one hand and a hoe 
in the other, makes for a visual contrast of the group members’ characteristics. While the 
Hindu farmer is portrayed with attractive features and a muscular form, the Muslim 
butcher has a salacious grin on his face matched by a protuberant stomach.  
 
The previous poster (no. 7) describes that the blood of the cow falling on the land would 
render it useless for any religious work. In this poster, the calf’s blood drips onto the 
ground, desecrating the sacred Hindu field, perhaps rendering it barren (useless). Farming 
is as holy and sacred as performing rituals or worship. And the government is insulting 
the holy act of farming by lumping it together with the butcher’s act of violence.  
 
2. Category relations:  
This poster sets up relations of opposition between the Hindu in-group and the Muslim 
out-group. The text contrasts the characteristics of the Hindu farmer as saint-like and holy 
against the violence of butchery of the Muslim out-group. The Muslim butcher’s (out-
group) work, portrayed as a cruel act of violence is contrasted against the work of a 
Hindu farmer which is akin to worship (virtue) illustrated by the holy fire in the field. 
 
Overall message: The government of India is with the Muslim out-group and stands 
against the Hindu Indian in-group. 
 
Summary Table 
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Category Members Representations Attributes 
In-group Hindu Indians Farmer, holy fire Saintly, pure, 
virtuous 
Out-group Muslims Butcher, cow with a 
slit neck 
Uncouth, violent, 
defilers 
Rival Government of 
India 
Text Defilers 
Category relations: 
Out-group+Rival The Indian government (rival) equates the Muslim out-group with 
the Hindu in-group 
Out-group against 
In-group 
The Muslim choice of work is antagonistically opposed to the 
Hindus choice of work. They desecrate Hindu values.     
Out-group + Rival 
against In-group 
The Government of India with the Muslim out-group is party to 
the desecration of Hindu land, and Hindu work.  
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Poster 4 
 
Description  
1. Image: 
 The land of India with marked sites of religious significance and depicting incarnations 
of God. 
2. Text:  
In the speech bubble the text reads: gau syllable is a symbol of sanctity, greatness and 
compassion in India. That’s why many holy places in India start with the syllable ‘gau’; 
where gau is hindi for cow.  
The poster is captioned “the essence of Bharat is cow” 
3. Graffiti: None 
 
 Interpretation:  
This poster conflates a religious identity (Hindu) with a national identity (Indian) 
to demarcate the boundaries of the in-group.   
 
The headline in bold says ‘the essence of India is gau’. ‘Gau’ means cow in 
Hindi. At the top right side of the poster is a figure of a person and a cow. The person is 
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Krishna or Gopal (a Hindu God) painted typically in blue and depicted with a peacock 
feather on the back of his head and a flute in his hands. Known as the ‘divine cowherd’, 
Gopal is accompanied by his favourite animal: the cow (gau). Looking down from the 
mountains into the land of India, Gopal’s thoughts are enunciated in a speech bubble at 
the top of the poster ‘gau syllable is a symbol of sanctity, greatness and compassion in 
India. That’s why many holy places in India start with the syllable ‘gau’  [or go].    
  
This poster essentializes the land of India to the land of Hindus by marking sites 
of religious significance and by depicting incarnations (avatars) of God on this holy land, 
as follows: 
Gopal: is another name for God Krishna,. Known as the divine cowherd, Krishna is 
accompanied by his favourite animal: the cow (gau) 
Gaumukh: Ancient temples, where pure water always flows.   
Godavari:  A river that is sacred to the Hindus and has many temples on its banks. 
Govardhan: The hill and surrounding area are believed to be the sites where Krishna and 
performed specific pastimes during his last incarnation on the Earth. 
Gokul: Place where Krishna was brought up.  
Gopuram: This is an intricately carved tower at the entrance of South Indian temples, 
depicting a multitude of themes from Hindu mythology. It is an important feature of 
Hindu temple architecture.  
Gautam: Is the historical founder of Buddhism, and is also worshipped as an avatar of 
God in Hinduism. In this poster Gautam is depicted by a figure meditating under a 
banyan tree. This is the famous moment of ‘enlightenment’, when Gautam became 
Buddha (or the enlightened one).  
 
All of these places have been carefully chosen so that the names begin with the syllable 
‘go’ or ‘gau’, which means cow in hindi. Hindus revere the cow as mother and hence 
provider. The poster posits that the essence of (cow)mother pervades every corner of 
India, from the mountains in the North (painted in the poster) to the gopurams in the 
south.  
 
The poster constitutes holiness and spirituality of the Hindu Indian land from time 
immemorial. The notion of ancient and holy land follows from the depiction of India as 
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the birthplace of Gods like Krishna and of the holy site where Buddha attained 
enlightenment. Hindu Gods have chosen this land to be incarnated. Therefore Hindus are 
the natural citizens of this sacred place. Hence, only the religious identity of Hindu is in 
harmony with the national identity of Indians.   
 
Overall message: India is Hindu, Hindu is India.  
 
Summary Table 
Category Members Representation Attributes 
In-group Hindu India Cow, Gods, Holy 
sites 
Ancient, natural, 
pure, holy, national 
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Poster 5 
 
Description 
1. Image: 
The central image of this poster shows two men forcibly holding down a healthy cow and 
injuring it. 
 
2. Text: 
The text at the top of the poster says ‘The constitution has allowed the slaughter of 
incapacitated animals. Taking advantage of this provision, healthy cattle are maimed 
with cruel equipments openly, and are then chopped to pieces.’ 
 
3. Graffiti: 
‘there is still time, come under control’, ‘or else hindus will also suffer the same fate’ 
 
Interpretation:  
This poster discredits the Government of India (rival) for facilitating the slaughter of the 
cattle of the Hindu in-group by various out-groups.  
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1. Categories:  
The central image of this poster shows two men (out-group) forcibly holding down a 
healthy cow (Hindu in-group) and injuring it. While the figure on the right is clearly 
Muslim with checked clothes and a scruffy beard, the identity of the other figure looks 
similar to the American corporate worker from previous posters 3, 4 on p 57, 60 of this 
thesis. Both of them in partnership forcibly hold down an able-bodied (evident from the 
text) cow. The man on the right has a mask over his face as he directs an instrument to 
wound the cow.  
 
2. Category-relations:  
 
The Muslim and the American out-groups hunt the cattle (a symbol of the Hindu in-
group) slipping by loopholes of the Government of India, and also by manipulation of the 
law. And the Government’s indifference to the issue is also made clear by the claim that 
such acts of violence are carried out ‘openly’ (a sentiment also expressed in poster no.5). 
 
Of particular interest in this poster is the graffiti scribbled on the right side of the poster. 
It says ‘there is still time, come under control’, ‘or else hindus will also suffer the same 
fate’ clearly shows that the association of cow-slaughter with Hindu in-group obliteration 
is not lost on the targeted audience. The first warning is a bit ambiguous, but if put into 
the broader concerns and context of Hindu fundamentalism, it can be argued that it is a 
warning to other Hindus to come in line with the fundamentalists’ agenda if they want to 
escape extermination by the hands of the Muslims.    
 
Overall message of the poster deals with the Government of India’s (rival) facilitation of 
cow torture and slaughter (a Hindu in-group symbol) for the Muslim and American out-
group.  
 
 
Summary Table 
Categories Members Representation Attributes 
In-group Hindu Indians Cow Helpless 
 
 
 
65 
Out-group Muslim, American Butchers Barbaric, shrewd. 
Rival Government of 
India 
Text, constitution Callous, Traitors 
Category Relations 
In-group with out-
group 
The Hindu in-group is under threat of extermination by the 
Muslims and American (out-group). 
Out-group with 
rival 
Out-group Muslims and Americans manipulate loopholes in the 
Government’s policy. The Government of India (rival) also 
watches in silence as the out-group carries out the violence.  
In-group with rival The Government of India (Rival) does not protect the Hindu in-
group and allows for extermination of the in-group openly.   
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Poster 6 
 
Description  
1. Image:  
A person is depicted with an oversized knife slaughtering a cow. 
 
2. Text: 
The text at the top of the poster says ‘international conspiracy to destroy India’s natural 
food resources’. The text at the bottom of the poster (below the image of the cow) says 
‘American Cattle Corporation advising India to slaughter 80% of its cows.’ And the one 
below the sand bag says ‘nation-betraying poison’. 
3. Graffiti:  Writing not legible. 
 
Interpretation: 
This poster illustrates the American out-group as polluting the naturalness of the Hindu 
Indian in-group.  
1. Categories:  
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Posturing belligerently with an over-sized butchers’ knife in his hands is a man with 
‘chemical product’ written across his jacket. The man, therefore, is seen as a 
representative of the American corporation referred to in the text.  The Hindu in-group is 
represented by the cow on the right side. 
 
2. Category- relations:  
 
This poster depicts a symbolic and realistic threat from the American corporate out-
group. The poster achieves in visually creating a dichotomy of natural or pure against 
unnatural or chemical. Posturing belligerently with an over-size butchers’ knife in his 
hands is a man with ‘chemical product’ written across his jacket. The man, therefore, is 
seen as a representative of the stated corporation, thereby positing the American as toxic 
waste that contaminates the natural and hence pure food of India. Next to him, on the left 
side is a bag with the sketch of a maize plant with ‘urea’ labeled across it. Beneath the 
bag of urea is a text that says ‘nation-betrayer poison’.    
 
Overall message: The picture constructs the naturalness and purity of Hindu Indian as 
being poisoned by chemical additives (out-group). The in-groups’ indigenous values are 
pure and natural which is threatened insidiously and contaminated by the enemy.  
Summary Table 
Category Members Representation Attributes 
In-group Hindu Indian Cow, text Pure, natural, 
indigenous 
Out-group America Text, human 
caricature wielding 
a sword 
Unnatural, 
Pollutants, Poison 
Category relations: 
In-group with out-
group 
The out-group is poisoning the in-groups’ food resources, hence 
attacking the very sustainability of Hindus.  
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Poster 7 
 
 
Description 
1. Image: 
The top portion of the poster is painted with saffron, white and green with the blue-
spoked wheel in the centre, known as the Ashok chakra – or wheel of law. This 
constitutes the Indian national flag. In the centre of the poster below the flag is a three 
lion sculpture, which is the national emblem of India, therefore, also an insignia of 
governmental authority. 
2. Text: 
The picture is covered with text all over that together reads ‘Before independence, India 
had 300 slaughterhouses for meat export. In independent India, 36,031 slaughterhouses: 
large-scale meat export. Everyday 3,50,000 animals are killed cruelly.’ 
Interpretation: 
This poster compares statistics of abattoirs before and after Indian Independence, 
indicating with colours and insignia that the Government of India (in-group rival) is 
responsible for the increase in animal slaughter.  
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1. Categories:  
The Government of India is depicted with the national emblem. This is the political rival. 
The Hindu in-group is portrayed as helpless animals, and the Muslim out-group is alluded 
to by the way in which the animals have their necks slit.  
 
2. Category-relations:  
 
Before 1947 (Indian independence), the country was under British rule. The 
overwhelming message is that the Government of India is worse than the foreign 
government rule. The image and text taken together seem to imply that ‘even the British, 
in spite of eating beef controlled the number of slaughters. But our own government, 
which should represent our Hindu value system (of revering the mother-cow) allows for a 
much larger number of cattle slaughter to take place. The Indian Government is neither a 
government for the Hindus nor does it stand by Hindu value systems. In short, the 
government is betraying the Hindus.’  
 
The presence of a Muslim out-group is depicted by the figures of animal heads 
within the zeroes of the number 3,50,000. It is a typical depiction of Islamic ritual 
slaughter (also shown in previous poster nos. 5, 6, 7, 8 on p 63, 66, 68, 71 of this thesis), 
keeping in view also of previous posters that illustrate the cow as a powerful 
representation of the Hindu in-group. 
 
Overall message: Under the aegis of the Indian government (rival), abattoirs (Out-group 
sites) are set up to slaughter cows (Hindu in-group). 
 
Summary Table 
Categories Members Representation Attributes 
In-group Hindu Indians Cows Helpless, innocent 
Out-group Muslim Halaal cattle Invisible enemy 
Rival Government of 
India 
National flag, 
national emblem 
Traitors 
Category Relations 
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Out-group + rival Rival (Government of India) has helped in expanding the number 
out-group (Muslim) business of abattoirs.  
Out-group and in-
group 
Muslim (out-group) abattoirs slaughtering cows (symbol of Hindu 
in-group)  
Rival and in-group Rival (Government of India) does not protect the interest of the 
Hindu in-group.  
 
  
 
 
 
71 
Poster 8 
 
 
Description 
1. Image: 
The foreground of the poster is a stand with incense sticks and a black dome shape 
sculpture mounted on a stand and in the background there is a person sitting next to a fire 
with blood dripping from a slaughtered cow into it. 
 
2. Text: 
The text dominating the top right side of the poster is a quote by a Hindu leader 
brahmalin pujya swami prabhudutt brahmchari ji maharaj who warns ‘All 
spiritual/religious activities carried out on the land where even a drop of cow’s blood has 
been shed, becomes fruitless.’  
 
3. Graffiti: None. 
Interpretation 
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This poster builds the Hindu in-group holiness with various Brahmin Hindu symbols in 
the foreground and contrasts hostility from an out-group (Muslim) in the upper left corner 
symbolized by a cow with a slit neck.   
 
1. Categories: 
 
A holy Hindu in-group characterised by various religious insignia and a Muslim out-
group symbolized by a cow with a slit neck.  
 
2. Category-relations:  
The foreground of the poster is dominated by symbols of Hindu ritual worship. From the 
right is a stand with incense sticks purifying the air around, which is a requirement in 
every worship ritual. Next to it is a black dome shape sculpture mounted on a stand. This 
is called a shiva linga (literally translates to Shiva’s phallus). Ash-smeared three lines 
with a saffron dot and flowers over it, this object is worshipped by Hindus as the 
manifestation of Shiva (The destroyer in Hindu mythology). Next to Shiva’s dome shape 
sculpture mounted on a stand is a Brahmin priest, with his hands positioned in the way of 
chanting mantras. The identity of the Brahmin priest is made evident by the saffron 
colour robes, a smear of saffron on his forehead, and a shaved head with a small portion 
of hair left. The Brahmin in the Hindu caste system (social order) stands at the highest 
level, and has the sole discretion of reading and interpreting sacred texts. And it is only a 
Brahmin who can conduct religious ceremonies using the sacrificial fire. Hence, the 
poster builds the notion of Hindu in-group virtuosity around the characteristics of a 
Brahmin – who is portrayed as a learned person with dedication to the higher calling of 
knowledge and spirituality.  
 
At the top left corner of the poster is an illustration of a cow’s head with blood 
dripping down into the holy fire from its slit neck. The slit on the neck of the cow invokes 
Islamic ritualistic slaughter methods implying that the out-group in this context are 
Muslim. Thus the Muslim out-group wreaks havoc on religious Hindu activities and also 
defiles the holy land of the Hindus. And since the very essence of the Hindu group has 
been portrayed as spiritual/ religious, it in effect means the Muslim out-group is not only 
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curbing the spiritual growth of the Hindu people, it is eventually destroying the Hindu 
people themselves.     
 
The overall message of the poster is of a Muslim out-group vitiating the sanctity of the 
Hindu land and of sacred values.  
 
Summary Table 
Category Members Representation Attributes 
In-group Hindu India Brahmin, sacrificial 
fire, shiva linga, 
incense sticks 
Scholarly, benign, 
religious/ spiritual 
Out-group Muslims Cow with a slit neck Insidious, defilers.  
Category relations: 
In-group with out-
group 
The Hindu in-group religious/spiritual values are under threat 
from the Muslim out-group. 
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Poster 9 
 
 
Description 
1. Image: 
The poster depicts a cow having its gut pulled out by a man holding a blood-stained knife 
in one hand and the cow’s internal organs in the other.  
 
2. Text: 
The text at the top of the poster says ‘before taking the life of the animal, it’s stomach is 
slit open and filled with air… and then is skinned alive’. 
 
3. Graffiti: There is a lot of scribbling on the man’s face and arms.  
 
Interpretation: 
The poster illustrates a cow (symbol of the Hindu in-group) having its gut pulled out by a 
man (out-group) holding a blood-stained knife in one hand and the cow’s internal organs 
in the other.  
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1. Categories:  
 
The figure of the perpetrator is of a man dressed in white pants and shirt, possibly an 
American corporate worker (as illustrated in previous posters 3, 4, 11 on p 57, 60, 79). 
The Hindu in-group symbolized by the helpless cow.  
  
2. Category-relations:  
 
The cow is put through an agonizing process as the man rips apart the stomach 
and pulls the internal organs out. The unmistakable grin on the (out-group) man’s face 
contrasts sharply with the nearly lifeless body of the cow (Hindu), depicted with its 
tongue hanging out. The visual is reinforced by the text in bold blue font, that the animal 
has been kept alive, through this barbaric process, ‘before taking the life of the animal, 
it’s stomach is slit open and filled with air… and then is skinned alive’.  
 
The overall message is incontrovertible: the out-group enjoys torturing the (Hindu 
in-group).  
 
Summary Table 
Categories Members Representation Attributes 
In-group Hindu Indians Cow Helpless 
Out-group Corporate American Butcher Sadistic, killers  
Category Relations 
In-group with out-
group 
The out-group takes sadistic pleasure in a long drawn-out torture 
of the cow (Hindu in-group) before killing it.   
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Poster 10 
 
 
Description 
1. Image: 
This poster depicts a conversation between a father and son over a shackled and upturned 
cow with a lacerated neck.  
 
2. Text: 
The figure on the left says, “Father, if it’s really necessary to slaughter her, please speed 
it up. Look, how the poor thing is writhing in pain. I feel… her (cow) pain.” 
The figure on the right says, “Fool, stop talking like a kaafir [infidel]. If I do not torture 
her before I kill her, then according to Islam, her meat would become haraam [forbidden] 
instead of halaal [permissible].” 
 
3. Graffiti: 
‘Mother-fucker’ written over the paunch of the figure on the right.  
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Interpretation: 
This poster depicts a conversation between a Muslim (out-group) father and son over a 
shackled and upturned cow with a lacerated neck (symbolically the Hindu in-group, 
attacked by the Muslim out-group). 
 
1. Categories:  
 
The relationship between the two characters is made clear from the conversation; the 
figure on the left refers to the figure on the right as ‘abba’ [which means father in Urdu – 
the language spoken by Indian Muslims]. The Muslim identity of both the characters is 
also evident from firstly, the stereotypical checked clothes and secondly, by the scruffy 
beard and skull-cap worn by the father (illustrated in posters - 5, 8, 11, 16 of p 63, 71, 79, 
93), and thirdly, by the depiction of Islamic ritual slaughter of the cow. 
 
The portrayal of the cow as a part of the Hindu in-group, has been depicted in all 
the other posters. 
 
2. Category-relations:  
 
The father is a heavyset figure with a protuberant stomach, brandishing a blood-stained 
oversize knife in one hand, and pointing a finger towards his son with the other hand. In 
contrast to the father’s physically gross image, the son has a rather slim body and 
something akin to concern on his face as he pleads ‘father, if it’s really necessary to 
slaughter her, then please speed it up. Look, how the poor thing is writhing in pain. I can 
feel her pain.’  The ‘her´ refers to the shackled cow lying in a pool of blood, an image of 
helplessness, awaiting its death slowly and painfully. The father answers ‘Fool, stop 
talking like a kaafir [infidel]. If I do not torture her before I kill her, then according to 
Islam, her meat would become haraam [forbidden] instead of halaal [permissible]’. 
 
This poster attempts to posit a nuanced depiction of Muslims, while showing that 
violence is inherent in Islam and consequently, its followers as inherently depraved. Even 
if a Muslim child does have a bit of innocence left in him, the religion itself will force 
him into violence. The poster insinuates that as per the diktats of Islam, the youngster 
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must grow up to torture and slaughter cows, hence against the Hindus. The demands of 
the religion are such that one cannot be a good Muslim and be compassionate at the same 
time, to be a good Muslim one must necessarily take on violence to be true to the faith. 
The poster also establishes an image of an unrestrained appetite for violence and meat of 
an adult Muslim male, visually through gross caricatures of physical features.  
 
Overall message: Even if certain Muslims are concerned, the category norms itself 
violates the Hindu in-group. The Muslim out-group follows a violent religion whose 
values violate Hindu values. They will torture and slaughter cows as part of their 
religious beliefs. Hence, Muslims (are) butchers will always viciously attack the Hindu 
in-group.   
 
Summary Table 
Category Members Representation Attributes 
In-group Hindu India Cow Bound, helpless 
Out-group Muslims Butchers Barbaric, corpulent 
Category relations: 
In-group with 
out-group 
The Muslim out-group is inherently opposed to the Hindu in-
group.  
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Poster 11 
 
Description 
1. Image: 
This poster depicts an Indian king from the past protecting a cow by chopping of the 
hands of the butcher on the left.  
 
2. Text: 
The text at the top of the poster says ‘cow-killer’ deserves to be slain. The text next to the 
coy says ‘brave founder of the Hindu kingdom, who chopped off the hand of the cow-
murderer butcher. 
 
3. Graffiti: None. 
 
Interpretation: 
This poster celebrates a Hindu king (Shivaji) from the past, depicting his power in full 
glory by chopping the hands of the evil Muslim butcher (out-group).  
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1. Categories: 
 
The figure on the right is a handsome, aesthetically proportioned, muscular man dressed 
in a king’s attire. He is described as Shivaji in the text, and hailed as the ‘brave founder of 
the Hindu kingdom, who chopped off the hand of the cow-murderer butcher’. Shivaji is a 
historical figure who organized resistance against the Mughal empire in India in the early 
15th century. The butcher on the right is clearly Muslim, identified by the typical checked 
clothes, a scruffy beard and skull-cap on his head. The Hindu in-group is denoted by a 
cow in the background shielded by Shivaji.  
 
2. Category-relations:  
 
A helpless Hindu cow who would have been subjected to a torturous death by the 
evil Muslim butcher’s knife is saved by Shivaji’s bravery, whilst the butcher himself 
(Muslim out-group) as the multi-coloured headline suggests, gets what he deserves: ‘cow-
killer deserves to be slain’.  
 
According to the discourse, the Muslim asks for the violence. He incurs the wrath 
of the Hindus by the religion he follows and also by his choice of undertaking a violent 
profession. He has the audacity to slaughter cows in Hindu land. In case the audience 
forgets the target of the butcher’s act, the text qualifies the term butcher with the violence 
of murder of the cow. The Muslim out-group has butchered ‘our’ (Hindu) cows. In return, 
the brave Shivaji punished the Muslim by chopping his hands. 
  
This is the poster that depicts the Hindu in an act of violence. As opposed to the 
cruelty of the Muslims, the Hindu act of violence is ‘brave’ and courageous. It is in 
defence of the weak (cow) that the ancient Hindu king takes up his sword hence the act of 
violence is actually an act of virtue. Therefore the past is posited as the ‘ideal’ time when 
Hindu pride was at its zenith, as opposed to the present ‘actual’ time when their own 
elected representatives denigrate Hindus. Analytically, these are the rival Indian 
politicians (see posters 1, 3, 5, 7 on p 50, 57, 63, 68 of this thesis)  
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The poster also attempts to present a fraught vision of the future, hinting at who, 
what and how a true leader of the Hindu in-group should be. Hence, in the present 
context, the present day Shivaji/s are the Hindutva representatives: the true leaders of the 
Hindu in-group who are virtuous and brave enough to resort to violent measures against 
the out-groups that threaten the sacred values of the in-group.  
 
The overall message: Hindu tolerance is replaced with Hindu courage: of being intolerant 
of intolerance. This poster seeks to legitimise violence against the out-group (Muslim), in 
a way that turns the act of violence into an act of virtue.  
 
Summary Table 
Categories Members Representation Attributes 
In-group Hindu 
Indians 
Cow, Shivaji Cow: helpless but protected. 
Shivaji: Brave, fearless, virtuous, 
true leader of the Hindus. 
Out-group Muslim Butcher Corpulent and Guilty.  
Rival Indian 
politicians 
From previous 
posters 
Coward  
Category Relations 
In-group with 
out-group 
The Hindu in-group finally emerges courageous, and strikes back 
the evil Muslim out-group, protecting its cow(mother). 
In-group with 
rival 
The true leader of the Hindu in-group is projected as Shivaji. Only 
someone like Shivaji will do, other leaders are neutralized. 
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Poster 12 
 
 
Description 
 
1. Image: 
This poster also has a pastiche of the Indian flag colours (refer to Posters 1 and 7, on p 
50, 68 of this thesis). In the centre is the depiction of an Indian Rupee coin, juxtaposed on 
a cow and a knife pierces through this amalgamation of the cow and the coin, with a 
smatter of blood.  
 
2. Text: 
The central text in black, blue and pink is, ‘Murder of cattle is the murder of the 
country’s finances’. The smaller text in green is, ‘As the murder of cattle increased, 
simultaneously increased India’s poverty, expenses and debts. India is the highest debt-
ridden country in the world.’ 
 
3. Graffiti: 
None. 
 
 
 
83 
 
Interpretation: 
This poster characterizes a symbolic threat of cow-slaughter with a realistic threat of 
depletion of economic wealth of the country. In this poster the main text in bold reads 
‘Murder of cattle is the murder of the country’s finances’.  
 
1. Categories:  
 
The text is graphically represented in the centre of the poster by a knife that goes through 
a cow and the Indian rupee coin. The blood signifies the depletion of the country’s wealth 
as intimately linked with the murder of cattle. This is also explained in the small print text 
below ‘As the murder of cattle increased, simultaneously increased India’s poverty, 
expenses and debts. India is the highest debt-ridden country in the world.’ The 
background colours of the poster represent the Indian national flag colours of saffron, 
white and green.  
 
2. Category-relations:  
 
The cow is equated with the economic wealth and financial resource of India in this 
poster. Hence, the Hindu Indian in-group is under financial threat. The enemy is 
annihilating the sacred symbol of Hindus: the cow. And this has very real effects on the 
economic and financial stability of the country.  
  
Summary Table 
Categories Members Symbols Attributes 
In-group Hindu India Cow, national 
flag 
Natural resource, 
vulnerable under threat 
of annihilation 
Out-group Unspecified Blood-soaked 
sword 
Dangerous  
Category relations 
In-group with 
out-group 
The Hindu Indian in-group is under threat from an unspecified 
out-group, which slaughters cows and hence depletes India of 
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its economic and financial resources.   
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Poster 13 
 
Description 
1. Image: 
The right side of the poster depicts two Muslim (the analysis is given in the next section) 
figures slicing the neck of a cow. The left side of the picture is dominated by the picture 
of a Hindu God (Krishna) feeding a cow within the map of India.  
 
2. Text: 
The larger text in blue is, “In the country of Gopal….”  
The smaller text in black, which is in speech form from the Muslim figure sitting on top 
of the cow to the Muslim figure slitting the cow’s neck, “Miyaan, she’s the mother of the 
Hindus… with love” 
 
3. Graffiti: 
The two Muslim figures have ‘mother-fucker’ scribbled across their arms.  
 
Interpretation: 
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This poster contrasts Muslims, sadistically butchering a cow (and hence Hinduism) in the 
foreground, to the Hindu value of nurturing of cows, in the background.  
 
1. Categories: 
 
The right foreground is dominated by two figures, one sitting on a cow, the other slitting 
its neck. The cow’s blood flows into the ground and the killers sit in it. Their Muslim 
identity is made clear, first, by their stereotypic dress (checked clothes, vests and cap); 
second, by the amulet on the arm of the butchering figure; third by the fact that the form 
of killing mimics Islamic ritualistic slaughter; fourthly, and most explicitly, that the 
sitting figure addresses the other as ‘Miyaan’, a term used for Muslims. 
 
The full text of what he says is ‘“Miyaan, she’s the mother of the Hindus… with love”. 
Both figures are smiling as he speaks and as the butchery is conducted. The killing, 
therefore, is portrayed as an attack on Hinduism and the killers are portrayed as sadists 
who take clear pleasure in what they are doing. The sketch portrays the characters as 
corpulent and physically gross. 
 
The left of the picture, further in the background, shows a cowherd feeding a cow from 
his hand. The cowherd is portrayed as the God Krishna, identified typically with a 
peacock feather on the back of his head and a flute in his hand. He is sketched as an 
attractive, slim and muscled figure. He is solicitous and nurturant towards the cow. This 
cow has been Hinduized further by two things in particular, saffron smeared across its 
head, and by its saffron garland. 
 
2. Category relations:  
 
This poster represents the in-group and out-group relations as fundamentally nihilistic to 
each other’s existence. This relation is represented by the difference in the way cows are 
treated by the two communities. The cow that is nurtured by the Hindu god himself has a 
saffron garland of flowers around it’s neck, in contrast, the cow in the hands of the 
Muslim butchers has it’s neck slit with two Muslim butchers overpowering the hapless 
creature. This is symbolic of not just irreconcilable differences between the two 
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communities but also, shows that violence that leads to annihilation is an inherent 
characteristic of this inter-group relation.  
 
The profound violation of Hindu ways of life and the threat to Hindu existence that is 
happening within (Hindu) India – is made explicit by the title at top right: “In the country 
of Gopal….” (Gopal being another name for Krishna). 
 
Summary Table 
Category Members Representation Attributes 
In-group Hindu India Cow, map of India, 
Krishna 
Peaceful, sacred, 
nurturant, 
vulnerable 
Out-group Muslims Butchers, killers Murderous, sadistic, 
venal, threatening 
Category relations: 
In-group with 
out-group 
(Hindu) India is violated by Muslims and the very existence of the 
category is under threat. 
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Poster 14 
 
Description  
1. Image: 
In the centre of the poster are two figures, one sitting on a throne and the other standing 
in front of him, interacting in a clearly imbalanced relationship of power. 
 
2. Text: 
The text at the top of the poster in blue says ‘to fight an election, one pot of milk from 
your cowshed will not do. A suitcase full of notes is required. And that I cannot get from 
you, I will get it only from slaughterhouses… so…’. The text at the bottom of the poster 
says ‘the government has given the green signal to major mechanized slaughterhouses in 
the country.’ 
 
3. Graffiti:  None. 
 
 
Interpretation: 
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This poster delineates a money-power nexus between the corporate Muslim out-group 
and Indian politician (rival) against a poor Hindu farmer (in-group).  
 
1. Categories: 
 
In the centre of the poster are two figures, one sitting on a throne and the other standing 
in front of him, interacting in a clearly imbalanced relationship of power. The person on 
the throne is an Indian politician, identified by the dress code of white dhoti, kurta and a 
Nehru cap (so-named because of Jawaharlal Nehru - the first Indian prime minister’s – 
affinity for this kind of cap). The text at the top of the poster is the politician accusing the 
farmer, saying ‘to fight an election, one pot of milk from your cowshed will not do. A 
suitcase full of notes is required. And that I cannot get from you, I will get it only from 
slaughterhouses… so…’. His other hand rests on a black suitcase, presumably full of 
notes. This suitcase has Al-Kabeer (an Arab Multinational corporation with abattoirs 
based in India), and has footsteps leading from it to a figure in the distance, sketched like 
a Muslim wearing checked clothes. The message is visually clear: the money in the 
suitcase is from Al-kabeer, funded by Muslims. Hence, the Muslim out-group is ruthless 
in its pursuit and will employ unethical means (money) to justify the end (slaughter of 
cows.) 
 
The person shaking in front of this politician is a Hindu as illustrated by the dress code in 
poster 8 and by the green field behind him. The poverty of the farmer is made evident by 
his attire of just a dhoti around his waist, and by the politician’s reply to the farmer’s 
gesture of offering him a pot of milk.  
 
The indictment of the Government supporting slaughter of cows is concluded in the text 
at the bottom of the: ‘the government has given the green signal to major mechanized 
slaughterhouses in the country.’  
 
2. Category relations:  
 
The corrupt Government would have the rich Muslims blood money of cattle rather than 
the poor Hindu farmer’s humble offering of a pot of milk. Hence money (Arab out-group) 
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and power (Government of India - rival) join hands to work against poor hardworking 
farmers (the Hindu in-group).  The primary message of this poster is to discredit the 
government of India as true representatives of Hindus. Bribed by the rich Muslim out-
group, the government of India is represented by a greedy spineless politician who is 
ready to put the cow symbolically and realistically the Hindu farmers to the slaughter for 
money. 
 
The overall message of the poster: The government has sold its morals to the Muslim out-
group and now stands against the Hindu in-group.  
 
Summary Table 
Categories Members Representation Attributes 
In-group Hindu Indians Farmer Poor, worried, 
betrayed 
Out-group Arab corporate, 
Muslim 
Butcher, Al-kabeer 
suitcase of money 
Shrewd, moneyed, 
powerful, ruthless 
Rival Government of 
India 
Politician, text Unscrupulous,  
Traitors 
Category Relations 
In-group with 
rival 
The government of India (rival) is against the Hindu (in-group.)     
Out-group with 
rival 
The Muslims (out-group) and the Government of India (rival) 
share a diabolical relationship of money and power.  
Out-group + rival 
with In-group 
The government of India (rival) facilitates the attack of the 
Muslim (out-group) against the Hindu (in-group). 
 
  
 
 
 
91 
Poster 15 
 
Description 
1. Image: 
 A cow with one leg manacled to a pulley, struggling to escape scalding water. 
 
2. Text: 
The bold text in pink at the bottom of the poster reads, ‘Before being killed, animals are’, 
which is followed by the text in blue, ‘Tortured’ 
The text painted in black, ‘Thirsty, hungry & nearly dead animal is thrashed and dragged 
to the machine. The animal is beaten up incessantly with one leg shackled to the pulley. 
Then, boiling water is unleashed so that its blood spreads quickly in the body and softens 
the skin’.  
 
3. Graffiti: None. 
 
Interpretation: 
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The process of torture that a cow (Hindu in-group) is subjected to inside a slaughterhouse 
(the out-group) is depicted in this poster.  
 
1. Categories:  
 
The single picture is of a cow with one leg chained to the pulley, struggling to escape 
scalding hot water. This is described in the text painted in black, ‘The thirsty, hungry & 
nearly dead cow is thrashed and dragged to the machine. The animal is beaten up 
incessantly with one leg shackled to the pulley. Then, boiling water is unleashed onto the 
cow, so that its blood spreads quickly in the body and softens the skin’.  
 
The poster features an unspecified out-group that tortures the Hindu in-group. However, 
by a cross-reference to the other posters, it can be reasonably said that since the site of 
violence is an abattoir, the out-group would either be a Muslim corporate, as depicted in 
posters 10, 15 (p. 76, 91 of this thesis) or an American corporate in posters 3, 4 (p. 57, 60 
of this thesis) operating independently or either of them under the aegis of the Indian 
Government (posters 9,10,13). 
 
2. Category relations: 
 
The purpose of the text is perhaps to show that the out-group applies imagination in its 
scheme to torture the living symbol (cow) of the Hindu in-group, while the use of 
mechanized slaughterhouses speaks of a systematic and ordered process of persecution.    
 
Summary Table 
Category Members Representation Attributes 
In-group Hindu India Cow Shackled, helpless 
Out-group(s) Unspecified Machine in a 
slaughterhouse 
Ambiguous 
Category relations: 
In-group with 
out-group 
The out-groups systematically persecute the Hindu in-group. 
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Poster 16 
 
 
Description 
1. Image: 
This poster is set inside a slaughterhouse with rows of cows hanging upside down with 
blood trickling down from their necks.  
 
2. Text: 
The text at the top of the poster says ‘After this, the pulley moves up and the animal 
hangs down on one leg. The butcher slits the jugular vein of the cow hanging upside 
down, so that the animal does not die and it’s blood drips down slowly.’ The text on the 
right side of the poster says ‘Al-Kabeer, Deonar, slaughterhouses collect thousands of 
litres of blood everyday.’ The text at the bottom of the poster says ‘For votes you make 
policies in favour of cow-killers, oh evil government, you shed cow’s blood…’ 
3. Graffiti: Scribbled at the side, illegible 
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Interpretation: 
This poster is set inside a slaughterhouse with rows of cows (Hindu in-group) hanging 
upside down, run by the Muslim (out-group) and the Government of India (rival). 
 
Categories & Category-relations:  
The poster visually depicts a row of lacerated cows with blood dripping from their necks. 
The text at the top of the poster shows that this is a continuation of the narrative started in 
the previous poster. ‘After this, the pulley moves up and the animal hangs down on one 
leg. The butcher slits the jugular vein of the cow hanging upside down, so that the animal 
does not die and it’s blood drips down slowly.’ Lest, one thinks of the process as 
mechanical and clinical with no human intervention, the text makes sure to place the 
blame on human agency: a butcher slitting the jugular veins of the cows, thereby 
identifying the butcher clearly as Muslim (explicitly illustrated as Islamic ritual slaughter 
in posters 5, 6, 8 (p. 63, 66, 71 of this thesis). 
 
The text on the right side of the poster positions and describes the site of violence in the 
abattoirs of ‘Al-Kabeer, Deonar, slaughterhouses collect thousands of litres of blood 
everyday.’ Al-kabeer is an Arab multi national corporation dealing in frozen food, and it 
has an abattoir near Hyderabad, India. Deonar abattoir is situated near Bombay (now 
called Mumbai) and is run by the Municipal Corporation of Bombay (a governmental 
authority). The Muslim out-group is inside our Hindu country, running their abattoirs and 
slaughtering our cows, but the real villain in this piece is the Government of India, 
emphasized upon in the text at the bottom of the poster ‘For votes you make policies in 
favour of cow-killers, oh evil government, you shed cow’s blood…’. The cow has already 
been shown to be a powerful representation of the Hindu in-group. In this context, the 
Government of India is responsible for enabling the Muslim out-group to set up dedicated 
sites of violence that slaughter cows and bleed the Hindu in-group. The portrayal of the 
government is of power hungry representatives who are bleeding their own people, for 
the sake of votes from the Muslims. It also puts across the deviousness and unethical 
characteristic of a government that will stoop to any level to hold on to power. In one 
stroke, the Government is also stripped of any future credibility since its adherence is to 
power and not to the Hindu in-group. Hence, it follows that to keep this power or votes 
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the Government is more concerned about the out-group, rather than the Hindu in-group: 
the category that the Government should truly represent.  
 
Overall message:  The Muslim out-group is a direct threat to the Hindu (in-group) by 
slaughtering our cows. The real culprit also is the Government of India (rival) for aiding 
and abetting in the crime.   
 
Summary Table 
Category Members Representation Attributes 
In-group Hindu India Lacerated cows. Shackled, helpless, 
tortured, annihilated. 
Out-group Corporate sector: 
Muslims  
Names of the 
abattoirs and 
description of cow- 
slaughter in the 
text. 
Barbaric, violent, 
Butchers.  
Rival Government of 
India 
In the text Evil, power-hungry, 
traitor.  
Category relations: 
In-group with 
rival 
The Government puts power as its primary concern, even before 
the Hindu in-group. Hence the rival is not a true representative of 
the Hindu in-group.  
Out-group + rival The Government of India befriends the enemy (Muslim out-group) 
for votes.  
Out-group +rival 
against In-group  
A mutual cooperation exists between the rival (Government of 
India) and the out-group (Muslim) to bleed the Hindu in-group. 
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2.5 Overall Narrative 
 
Qualitative analysis is an interpretative and iterative process (Augoustinous, Lecouter, & 
Soyland, 2002; Mays & Pope, 1995; Ormston et al., 2013; Polkinghorne, 2005; 
Silverman, 2005). In the process of analysing each poster individually, and further cross-
referencing across the posters for depth of analysis in terms of recurring images, 
reinforcement of the attributes of these various categories, and the nuances of the 
relationships of these categories, the researcher noted a distinctive narrative pattern 
emerging guided by previous research on hate mobilisation.  
2.5.1  Model of Hate 
 
For a brief recap of the steps presented in the model on hate mobilisation: the authors 
(including the researcher) “present an integrative five-step social identity model that 
details the processes through which inhumane acts against other groups can come to be 
celebrated as right. The five steps are: (i) Identification, the construction of an ingroup; 
(ii) Exclusion, the definition of targets as external to the ingroup; (iii) Threat, the 
representation of these targets as endangering ingroup identity; (iv) Virtue, the 
championing of the ingroup as (uniquely) good; and (v) Celebration, embracing the 
eradication of the outgroup as necessary to the defence of virtue” (Reicher et al., 2008).  
 
The model is a general framework for a narrative sequence, and it allows for 
reconfiguration in the elements of the process, as sets of inter-group relations. All the 
elements come together in one particular poster, in the set that we have analysed, where 
there is clear evidence of the incitement, indeed, celebration of violence. This is brought 
together in the analytic framework of the 5 step model of hate, rearranged in a sequence 
that builds up to the poster that brings together the elements of the narrative to one 
‘climactic’, if you will, conclusion. For example, it is possible to construct the narrative 
of the 5-step model of hate, mutatis mutandis, by just 7 posters in the following 
sequential visual presentation: 
 
 
 
97 
  
Ingroup identification & virtue Ingroup virtue, Outgroup Exclusion 
    
In-group Virtue, 
Outgroup Threat  
Ingroup Virtue, 
Outgroup Threat 
Ingroup Virtue, 
Outgroup Threat 
Ingroup Virtue,  
Outgroup Threat 
 
Celebration 
 
There are three points to be made about the decision to analyse the posters in the way 
they occur rather than attempt to fit the posters to the model: 
 
Firstly, the  ‘5 step model of collective hate’ was developed by analysing political 
speeches, i.e., a qualitatively different mode of communication than posters. Therefore, 
while a literal transposition of the steps is untenable since the mode is different, in a 
visual mode of the narrative, conceivably some posters would comprise more than one of 
the steps in each of the individual posters. This is a point that might be misconstrued is 
the occurrence of the 5 steps in a linear and sequential fashion in the way it is analytically 
presented, i.e, a mirror transposition of the analytic categories and steps onto the way it 
would be presented in public discourse.  
 
Secondly, in the light of the social identity framework, this would be a misguided way of 
looking at the analytic claim of distinction of the ‘steps’ in the model for a substantive 
claim. In other words, and it would defeat the contention of what we state in the 
introduction to the thesis, that these are not a) automatic processes that people engage, b) 
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the contents of the categories are argued, debated and presented in particular ways in 
public discourse (Billig, 1985, 1987, 1988, 2003), and, therefore the ways in which 
category definitions are presented and argued about would also necessarily be nuanced, 
creative, and would be done in a multitude of ways (Elcheroth & Reicher, 2014; Herrera 
& Reicher, 1998; S Reicher & Hopkins, 2001; Reicher & Hopkins, 1996b) . The model 
would be stilted and at odds with the meta-theory of the social identity framework that 
argues about the ‘creativity’ of the entrepreneurs and the followers in building a shared 
social identity (Haslam & Reicher, 2006; Reicher, Haslam, & Smith, 2012), if the steps 
are understood to be occurring sequentially in the socio-political public discourse per se.  
 
Therefore, it is important to contend that the culmination of the elements of in-group 
virtue and out-group threat constructed in a way that would lead to a diabolical 
conclusion of killing is implied by the presence of these elements in the discourse, and 
need not necessarily occur as a conclusion in a neat narrative.  
 
Thirdly, as an evolving process, this study as has been analysed in the individual posters 
through the process of iteration, has introduced a further category of analysis – the 
political rivals. The narrative of virtuous violence presents one part of the larger argument 
with an evolution in the model for the potential of leadership tussles (i.e, the intra-group 
dynamics and inter-group violence).  
2.5.2   Placing the model of hate in inter-group 
dynamics & intra-group struggles 
 
The interesting consequence of analysing the posters in the sequence as they occurred 
was in being able to place the model of hate in a larger framework of group processes, 
that made use of the celebration of violence as an important outcome of the narrative 
build-up. We see the dynamic of leadership tussles in the emergence of another analytic 
category in the form of a political rival.  By considering these group processes in 
describing the larger picture the overall analytic story thus is presented in the following 
pattern:  
1. Inter-group dynamics 
a. In-group definitions and character 
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b. Out-group definitions and character 
c. Relationship between the in-group and the out-groups 
2. Intra-group struggles 
a. Political rivals 
 
1. Inter-group dynamics: 
In this section, firstly we present an analysis of the in-group character and 
representation of Hindu India in the posters. Secondly we look at the different 
characterization and representation of the out-group. And thirdly, we build up 
from the first two sections, an analysis of the relationship constructed between the 
groups.  
 
a. In-group definitions and character: 
Constituting the in-group virtue: 
Though only one poster in the series is devoted entirely to painting the virtues and 
sacredness of the land of India, (poster 4, p 60 of this thesis) and thereby the 
inhabitants of this land as Hindu, the rest of the posters also contain elements of this 
fundamental virtuosity of the in-group. The virtue of the “sacred geography” 
(Markowitz, 1996) of the land is woven together with the religious demarcation of the 
Hindu in-group. In every poster, wherever the Hindu human figure is represented, 
special attention is given to the features of the face. The figure is conspicuous in its 
aesthetic appeal as opposed to the other figures in the poster. This positive self-image 
of tolerance and compassion resonates with the idea of Hindus as an essentially 
peace-loving group of people. The symbol used to represent the innocence and 
sacredness of the hindu in-group is predominantly the cow. The sacredness of the cow 
and the elevation of this sacredness as a central tenet of the Hindutva rhetoric has 
been explored by scholars across disciplines (Freitag, 1980; Jones, 2006; Kakar & 
Kakar, 2007; Kakar, 1996; Pandey, 2001, 2006c; Puniyani, 2005; Uberoi, 2002).  
 
b. Out-group definitions and character: 
 
The boundaries of the in-group, demarcates every other group that does not fit 
within the ambit of Hindu values, as an out-group. Theoretically then, there can be 
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multiple out-groups. In this series, there are 13 posters with a specified out-group 
threat. 5 posters depict the Muslims as a religious out-group, 4 posters depict the 
Arab corporate sector backed by Muslims and 3 posters implicate the corporate 
sector backed by Americans.    
 
Table:  
Nature of poster Quantity Poster serial numbers 
Threat discourse 15   (1-3, 5-16) 
• Unspecified (either out-group or 
rival) 
2  (12, 15) 
• Out-group presence 13  (1-3, 5-11, 13,14,16) 
• Only Muslims 
 Butcher 
 Arab corporate 
9 
5 
4 
(1,3,7,8,10,11,13,14,16) 
(3,8,10,11,13) 
(1,7,14,16) 
• Only American corporate 3 (2,6,9) 
• Double out-group threat 
(American corporate + Muslim 
butcher) 
1 (5) 
 
 
The out-group varies, but the overwhelming presence is of the Muslim. Out of the 13 
posters portraying out-group presence, 9 depict Muslims either as butchers or as Arab 
corporates. Given the persistence of the cow image in all the posters, the other religious 
out-group is Christian (Americans). Just by numbers as well, (9 out of 16 posters) the 
figure of the Muslim out-group dominates the discourse of threat. Characterized mostly 
as a butcher (6 out of 10 posters), the figure is unsavoury and pot-bellied, depicting the 
image of a Muslim butcher wearing a checked lungi (a cloth wrapped around the waist) 
and a soiled vest is in sync with the idea of the unhygienic Muslim “other” – of people 
who by virtue of religious dictums do not wash themselves frequently enough, in Hindu 
popular imagination.  
 
c. Inter-group relations: 
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Threat discourse:  
 
In a country as large as India with a predominantly Hindu population, it takes 
considerable skill to craft this majority as victims of oppression, almost under a threat 
of extinction. In this series of pictorial representations, 15 out of 16 posters are 
devoted to threat discourse in some way or the other. One message that is central to 
the overall narrative in these posters is of Hindu India under threat from various out-
groups. The severity of the threat ranges from an attack on sacred values right up to 
annihilation of Hindus. Virtuous, non-violent Hindus are portrayed as victims of the 
salacious out-groups (primarily the religious out-group of Muslims).  
 
The significance of the cow: 
Sudhir Kakar, a psychoanalyst who has studied Hindu-Muslim group relations in the 
context of riots in India, illustrates the narrative surrounding the cow as a symbol in 
Hindu-Muslim riots, “There is thus an unarticulated expectation that an incident 
around a cow, should belong to the account of a Hindu-Muslim riot even if such an 
incident did not actually take place” (Kakar, 1996, p 44). In the present series of 
posters, this unarticulated expectation is built into all 16 of the posters. The symbol 
used to denote the in-group in the posters is the cow. In terms of religious 
significance, the cow is important to both the religious groups, in antagonistically 
different ways. While the Hindus revere the cow as ‘mother’, the Muslims perform 
ritual sacrifices of the cow to purify the meat. To enumerate the significance, 
quantitatively, the cow is painted in 15 out of the 16 posters, and is still referred to in 
poster 14, p. 88 without the figure. As a symbol of the in-group, the cow is portrayed 
as an innocent soul, and as one that was protected and loved by the Hindu God, 
Krishna (depicted by the figure playing a flute), represented in Hindu mythology as 
the divine cowherd. Perhaps the most important of all, is the image of the ‘mother’ - 
loving, caring and feeding its children, the depiction of gau-mata (mata = mother; gau 
= cow). One poster that deals with constituting in-group virtues constructs and builds 
the relationship among all things sacred in the land of India. The name of every 
sacred place starts with the prefix of “gau” in Hindi (poster no. 4), indeed the “very 
essence of India” is “gau”.  
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In popular parlance, the cow is the centre around which Hindu-Muslim hostilities are 
deemed inevitable, sometimes joked about as the divide between cow-worshippers 
versus beefeaters.  
 
Virtuous Violence:  
The poster that exhorts violence against the out-group is a poster where the elements 
of in-group virtuosity, out-group threat and Hindu leadership are marshalled towards 
the message of violence in the name of virtue. Poster 11 on p 79 of this thesis portrays 
Shivaji (Historically, a symbol of Hindu resistance against Muslim dominance) 
chopping off the hands of a Muslim butcher, while defending the life of the cow. The 
Hindu, otherwise depicted as a victim of unscrupulous elements, sometimes with an 
expression of fear on his face or of an inherently moral and upright farmer looking the 
other way, but mostly as a cow subjected to all sorts of brutal torture in the other 
posters; is portrayed as a powerful King capable of defending his people by taking 
violent and extreme measures against the offending out-group in this poster. The 
alternative interpretation in representing the Hindu as tolerant and suffering figure is 
of cowardice. Is the Hindu suffering because of the value of tolerance, or is it because 
of cowardice? This poster of self-defence (poster no. 11) forcefully addresses the 
concern, symbolically it’s a call to Hindu “pride” – to men to take up swords against 
Muslims, in defence of the motherland. Arguably, the very nature of this poster 
signifies a critical moment of transformation in the way the Hindu is visualised and 
exhorted to take action. 
 
2. Intra-group struggles: political rivals A finer analysis revealed people in the 
audience differentiating among religious out-groups and representatives in the 
Government. The graffiti on one of the posters clearly indicts the present Government 
with ‘Do you still feel Manmohan is right for us?’ (Manmohan Singh is the present 
Prime Minister of India, from the rival Congress party). This led to a re-think of the 
first stance of a simple dichotomy of in-group versus the out-group. A discerning 
version of groups came about in the subsequent rounds of analysis with the political 
rival emerging as a third distinctive category. This was integrated into the theoretical 
framework of understanding ‘violence in the name of virtue’, as an intra-group (since 
the entrepreneurs aim to mobilize the same mass of people) dynamic of leadership 
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struggles within the framework of inter-group conflicts (in-group versus the out-
groups), thereby synthesizing the approach of studying inter-group conflicts as an 
epiphenomenon of intra-group dynamics. Within the representation of inter-group 
antagonism, primarily of the Muslim “other” against the Hindu in-group, there is a 
prominent presence of the Government of India in 6 out of 15 threat discourse 
posters.  
 
Nature of Poster Quantity Poster serial numbers 
Threat discourse 15 (1-3, 5-16) 
Unspecified threat (either out-group or rival) 2 (12,15) 
Only out-group threat 7 (2,6,8,9,10,11,13) 
Only rival threat 0 ---- 
Out-group + Rival threat 6 (1,3,5,7,14,16) 
 
Tying into the notion of threat is the government’s role in not protecting the Hindu 
nation, indeed, sometimes colluding with the enemy against Hindus. The discourse 
seeks to render the government corrupt and devoid of moral values, on the lookout 
only for its own interests and money. The government is carved out as a separate 
entity, represented by politicians (explicitly in two posters, nos 1 and 14), and 
symbolized by the national flag and the national emblem (in posters 1,), and referred 
to in the text. One poster (no. 14) in particular, shows a politician with a suitcase of 
money backed by Muslim corporate sector conniving an innocent Hindu farmer. The 
cunning politician is pictured stating explicitly that meat (of the cow) keeps them in 
power, not milk, while the poor suffering farmer is shown offering a pot of milk. 
 
The Government is portrayed as a traitor to Hindu Indians in primarily 2 ways: 
Firstly, by running slaughterhouses and by helping the out-group (Muslim Arabs) set-
up abattoirs on Indian soil. Secondly, by passing policies in favour of the Muslim out-
group, the Indian government colludes with the enemy.  
 
In all of 6 posters, the government of India is painted as an agent of the Muslim out-
groups instead of representing the Hindu in-group.  
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Rival 6 
Facilitates in setting up 
abattoirs 
4 
Policies in favour of the out-
groups 
2 
 
2.6 Discussion & Conclusion 
 
The model that we explored in this study presents several threads for consideration. The 
following points summarize the key findings:  
 
• The definition of the national in-group as religious 
• The positing of in-group virtue – as only the in-group’s prerogative.  
• The out-group(s) threat of annihilating the in-group: The out-groups do vary, 
though primarily it is the Muslim.  
• Legitimising violence against the Muslims and Christians as self-preservation 
of the Hindu Indian in-group.  
• The in-group rivals (generally the political class, and specifically the political 
class in power – the Government) shown as colluding with the out-group in 
annihilation of the in-group. 
 
In a country like India that promotes democratic ideals which has been adopted as a 
common ideal through constitutional provisions, in general, it could be argued that it is a 
tricky proposition to call for outright violence against even threatening outgroups. Indeed, 
Sections 295A17 and 153A18 of the Indian Penal Code deal with the matter of inciting 
hatred and violence “by words, either spoken or written, or by signs or by visible 
representations or otherwise, insults or attempts to insult the religion or the religious 
                                                
17 295A. Deliberate and malicious acts, intended to outrage religious feelings of any class by insulting its 
religion or religious beliefs. Whoever, with deliberate and malicious intention of outraging the religious 
feelings of any class of  [citizens of India], [by words, either spoken or written, or by signs or by visible 
representations or otherwise], insults or attempts to insult the religion or the religious beliefs of that class, 
shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to 4[three years], or 
with fine, or with both. 
18 153A. Promoting enmity between different groups on grounds of religion, race, place of birth, residence, 
language, etc., and doing acts prejudicial to maintenance of harmony. 
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beliefs of that class, shall be punished with imprisonment” (Central Government Act, 
1860). With such Acts in place, it is conceivable that to call for violence must be seen as 
a ‘justifiable’ act of self-defence. The ambiguity built in visual work can lend itself to 
various interpretations and sometimes, can be used as substitutes for language that cannot 
be employed because of various societal and political constraints (Billig, 2001; Hakam, 
2009; Kjeldsen, 2007, 2015). While, that sort of constraint may or may not be a matter of 
concern for the cartoonists in this tent, sometimes, the posters do not have much to do 
with ‘substituting language’ as much as complementing the visual with the text. Hence, 
sometimes they are just slogans or headlines accompanied by an image, with more text as 
footnotes to describe what exactly the Hindutva movement wants to convey to the 
targeted Hindu audience.  
 
Furthermore, one of the interesting results of using “thick description” (Kjeldsen, 2014; 
Ponterotto & Grieger, 2007) as a method in combination with the theoretical guideline of 
scrutinising for all category constructs and category relations in the individual posters, 
was the finding of the political rival as an additional analytic category. Specifically, we 
found that the relationship that is constructed between the rival and the various out-
groups gives a background to the argument of why the model of hate becomes effective 
in the political logic of the struggle for leadership. In a sense, while the model of hate 
conceivably spells out the ‘how’ of the mobilisation based on hate, the leadership tussle 
might indicate part of the ‘why’.  
2.7  Limitations 
 
A set of 16 posters drawn from a specific context of the Magh Mela is limited in the 
generalizability of the findings across the country of India. However, it is evident that the 
set of posters encourage the audience – which would be pre-dominantly Hindu given the 
area where it was set up, to think of themselves as victims of Muslim aggression. This is 
made clear by the graffiti as a level of interaction. It is telling in the way the audience 
receives the particular images. While we can not claim any direct causal impact of the 
ways in which this particular model of hate might lead to extreme violence, it is a 
sobering and indeed, unnerving experience to see in 2016, after two years of BJP 
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Government in power, people of the Christian faith, Muslim faith19 and Dalits face 
extreme violence around issues of beef consumption (alleged and otherwise)20,21.  
 
The strength of the study in using a combination of qualitative approaches like thematic 
and thick descriptions guided by a framework of critical social identity theories also is a 
constraint of the study in that, no one way can be simply ‘replicated’ for other studies.  
 
While it can be contended that what has been provided in the chapter is a robust guideline 
for analysing hate rhetoric in visual representations, it is doing so, cautiously, in that this 
illustrates one possible set of category relations and one of the rhetorical pathways to 
justifying violence against outgroups. As noted, the limitations also extend to the mode of 
communication, i.e, posters, that we seek to explore in a different modality in the next 
chapter on a study on political speeches.  
 
                                                
19
 http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/next-door-to-delhi-mob-kills-50-year-old-injures-son-over-rumours-they-ate-
beef/ 
20
 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-17727379 
21
 http://www.firstpost.com/india/hyderabad-university-suicide-rohith-vemulas-hanging-must-force-us-to-change-campus-politics-
2588448.html 
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3  Study 2: Political Speeches 
“It is useful to remember that no matter where we turn, there is rarely any shortage of elevated 
ideals to accompany the resort to violence.” (Chomsky, 2003, p. 41) 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Noam Chomsky’s book, ‘America’s quest for global dominance’ is a treatise on the 
manner and style in which American political leaders present their arguments to different 
audiences in their project towards ‘global dominance’. In a variety of ways, Chomsky 
shows how American leaders recast military intervention in East Timor, Kosovo and Iraq 
as necessary ‘humanitarian aid intervention’(Chomsky, 2003, p. 45). The ‘elevated 
ideals’ are communicated in a variety of ways, chiefly through political rhetoric and 
speeches. If studies on argumentation through visual imagery are few in the social 
psychological domain, the opposite holds true for studies on political rhetoric. 
 
British social psychological research has a rich resource of the analysis of political 
rhetoric in category constructions, like the rhetorical constructions of outgroup threat and 
the different ways in which the sides can be defined (Herrera & Reicher, 1998), the 
influence of self-categorisation arguments in anti-abortionist rhetoric (Reicher & 
Hopkins, 1996), the ways in which leaders seek to influence their audience by 
representing themselves of the group by putting forth particular interpretations of events 
(Reicher & Hopkins, 1996); the book, ‘Self and Nation’ that deals extensively with 
analysing the ways in which leaders’ categorise and constitute these categories towards 
particular agenda (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001); more recently, a blend of the self 
categorization theory and discursive methods has been used to show the nuanced ways in 
which political leaders use constructions of national identity to account for their success 
or failure in mobilising their given electorates (Burns & Stevenson, 2013); and an 
analysis of political speeches in Scottish Parliament mobilising for and against the 
intervention war in Iraq in 2003 (Elcheroth & Reicher, 2014). The studies quoted in this 
framework that analyse the political speeches (i.e mobilisation rhetoric) all underscore the 
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centrality of category constructions in the arguments and how these are linked to specific 
actions that are then deemed forward.  
 
In 2 different studies the propositional elements of the 5-step model of hate (Reicher et 
al., 2008) has been explored and confirmed by analysing rhetoric against immigrants by 
far-right ideologues. While Maykel Verkuyten uses the model to examine the rhetoric 
against Muslim outgroup in Netherlands (Verkuyten, 2013), McKeever and colleagues 
use the same model to analyse rhetoric against Chinese immigrants in Ireland (McKeever 
et al., 2013). They have confirmed the proposition that an understanding of the ‘Other’ is 
necessarily dependent on how the ‘we’ is constructed. In other words, to understand the 
violence and prejudice against the out-group, we must look at ways in which the in-group 
is constructed in the popular imagination.  
 
As argued earlier, popular imagination and how we come to see ourselves as part of a 
group, i.e, the process of social identification is not a process that one comes to in 
vacuum. ‘Entrepreneurs of identity’ (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001, p. 49) are people who are 
invested in drawing out particular understandings for the ingroup and constituting the 
outgroups with characteristics that serve towards mobilising the in-group towards 
violence.  
3.2 Research Approach 
 After the collection of posters from the Magh Mela (a gathering of a largely 
Hindu audience, but not necessarily one that would associate itself with the Hindutva) we 
went to the Dharm Sansad, a gathering that was solely organized by the Hindutva forces. 
The three reasons for doing this were: a) the audience changes from general Hindu to 
specifically RSS oriented. b) The tone of the meetings, we suspected, would be far more 
political than the Magh Mela. c) It would give us a far more dynamic range of data in the 
form of multiple voices, in exploring and constructing the Hindu identity and associated 
values in the way that the saffron brigade envisages.  
 
There is the written form of persuasion published as newspaper articles, but a more 
forceful measure of leadership strength (or the lack of it) is bound in oratorical skills of 
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the leader (Bligh & Robinson, 2010). However, in this study the oratorical skills are used 
as a secondary confirmation or disconfirmation for places where the meaning of the 
content might not be clear with just the written translation. There are places where the 
audience reactions have been instigated in the speech itself, for example, in Togadia’s 
call for boycotting Muslims, he specifically insists that the audience “repeat after him”. In 
a book outlining the timing of audience responses and the ways in which audience are 
encouraged to join along, John Maxwell Atkinson writes “The strong pressures on 
members of an audience to act in unison, and the fact that it takes very little to interfere 
with their capacity to do so have important practical consequences for the sorts of things 
that can actually be done at public meetings. In particular, people are largely restricted to 
doing only those things that can be easily coordinated in such a way as to be done 
together. To this end, special aids are often used to make it easier for large groups of 
individuals to act as one” (Atkinson, 1984, p. 18). Two of the speakers, Praveen Togadia 
and Narendra Modi make use of techniques to urge a more direct interaction with the 
audience. While Togadia instigates the huge audience in short, punchy call backs 
(described in the analysis), Modi’s audience is smaller in number and therefore the form 
of participation is in applauses and seemingly humorous instances interactions. However, 
we take most cognisance of the speech itself as a modality to discern the contents of the 
speeches and what is being said more than how it is being said. 
 
In the previous chapter, we developed a tentative model from visual representations of the 
hate rhetoric in  
• Firstly, sanctioning extreme hostility against out-groups as an act of virtue by the 
in-group – the model of collective hate 
• Secondly, how leaders use this logic of threat (inter-group relations) to authorize 
their power within the group (intra-group leadership struggles). 
 
We explore these dynamics in further detail in speeches made by various leaders of the 
movement at an event called the ‘Dharm Sansad’ – a religious parliament of the Hindutva 
ideologues and followers.  
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3.3 Procedure 
3.3.1  Method 
The analytic method used as a general approach in analysing the various speeches follows 
from work done by Reicher and Hopkins in their book, Self and Nation (Reicher & 
Hopkins, 2001). Ian Parker’s book on qualitative psychology makes a case for discourse 
analysis. He starts the chapter on discourse analysis by stating that it “provides an ideal 
opportunity for studying ideology in psychology, if we read it right” (Parker, 2005, p. 
88). What constitutes the right way of reading discourse is, as most things qualitative, 
fraught with positions and counter-positions. Discourse analysis “treats the meanings of 
terms as deriving from the way they are articulated into chains of meaning that are 
independent of the speakers” (Parker, 2005, p. 100). 
 
The process of analysis was iterative. We explored the contents of the speeches with the 
sense that there would be far more nuanced and multi-dimensional analysis of the 
components of the 5-step model of hate, given that the medium of communication 
(political speeches with an audience) allows for such expansion. This is worth noting 
because, we analysed the contents with a theoretical eye that followed up on distinctions 
that were only slightly hinted upon in the posters (previous study). For example, the 
quality of the ‘past’ of the in-group is represented as glorious in only one of the posters, 
yet in the speeches this forms a central aspect of the way in which the in-group is 
mobilised. Therefore, the data required a reworking of the analysis from the 5-step model 
in a different way than the previous chapter.  
 
Secondly, since one of the speeches was given by the then Chief Minister of Gujarat, the 
only speaker who held political office and headed the state Government, we have 
focussed much of the analytic lens on the intra-group dynamics of leadership struggles on 
this particular speech. 
3.3.2  Data Corpus: 
 The speeches that we chose to analyse are the following: 
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• Pramila Tai Mende (Head of the Rashtra Sevika Samiti – the women's wing of 
the RSS) 
• Kamlesh Bharti (Speaker from the Matrushakti section of the VHP) 
• Manjulashree (Invited speaker from South India) 
• Narendra Modi (The present Chief Minister of Gujarat) 
• Praveen Togadia (The General Secretary of the Vishwa Hindu Parishad - VHP) 
• Ashok Singhal (The President of the International, Vishwa Hindu Parishad - 
VHP). 
 
3.3.3  Site of Data Collection 
      
This photograph was taken at the gathering. It shows a huge saffron podium with many 
saffron-clad saints who were all invited speakers at this conference. Various images of 
Hindu mythological figures formed the backdrop of this podium. These included an 
aggressively posturing Ram, Hanuman putting Lanka on fire22, Bharatmata (Mother 
                                                
22 Hanuman is also worshipped as a god: the monkey-god. Lanka is the place where Sita, the wife of Ram, 
was held captive by Ravana. To rescue Sita, Hanuman set fire to Lanka. The Bajrang dal of the hindutva 
movement derive their name from Hanuman.   
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India) spearing a demon and the symbol ‘Om’. The slogan in white at the top left corner 
reads thus: 
- Utho jago maa! Durga bankar koti bhujaao mein bal 
bharkar 
Namastak ho phir jag maange, tera ashish bharat maa” 
 
“Arise and awake mother! Become Durga and fill with strength the arms of a crore.  
In deference will the world ask for your blessings, Mother Bharat”   
 
Hanging from this stage is a prominent blue banner that was visible from quite a distance 
proclaiming in red “Bharat is a Hindu nation”. The people on the dais are ideologues all 
dressed in the typical saffron robes, now synonymous with ‘saffron’ ideology as the 
ideology of Hindutva is also otherwise known. The invocation to ‘Durga’ in the text is 
symbolic of righteous violence (Kinsley, 1988). As Bacchetta notes in the title of her 
study of the women’s wing of the RSS “all our goddesses are armed” (Bacchetta, 2004). 
India is personified as Bharatmata (Mother India), and is implored upon to become like 
Durga – the Hindu goddess who saves mankind from demons with her spears. She is 
beseeched upon to ‘give strength’ to 10 million arms; so that the world may defer to India 
for her blessings. People in thousands had gathered for the meetings through the day. 
Specific groups under the RSS fountainhead congregated for the three-day conference. 
These groups came in colourful processions, with banners of their regional saffron 
allegiance. Vigorous dance coupled with chants of ‘Jai Shri Ram’23 and aggressive 
posturing with weapons marked the entry of a number of processions under different 
banners from all corners of India. Weapons like the ‘trishul’24 and swords that are 
symbols of Hindu religious paraphernalia to raise the community consciousness of the 
Hindu in-group. Indeed, the invocation sets the tone, to ‘arise and awake’ [from a stupor, 
ostensibly] to the pride of being India. 
 
The following analysis is of a selection of speeches from the Sansad that were delivered 
from the podium and from one video CD distributed at this Sansad. 
                                                
23 “Jai Shri Ram” roughly translates to ‘hail, the lord Ram’. 
24 Trishul is a traditional weapon in the shape of a trident. In Hindu mythology it is also the favoured 
weapon and therefore, insignia of the god Shiva.  
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3.4 Analysis 
The analytic lay out was structured as responsive to the data set that we analysed. Since, 
this was largely corroborative of the framework developed in the discussion of the 
previous chapter on visual representations of hate, we have followed the structure with 
the analytic categories of in-group, out-group, political rival and leader. These categories 
are then analysed for their contents – ie, boundaries, values, membership, followed by an 
analysis of the category-relations and the ways in which they are bound up to one another 
in the discourse. The excerpts from the data corpus are paragraphs that allow for an in-
depth analysis of the context and the content of the arguments that are put forward, 
allowing enough for an unaccustomed reader to be able to make sense of the except 
without additional descriptive content, and allowing for us to analytically view and 
present category boundaries and contents, category relations, and category prototypes 
(Reicher & Hopkins, 2001; Reicher & Hopkins, 1996b)  
• In-group  
• Boundaries 
• Qualities and Characteristics 
• Ideal in-group 
• Out-group (section 3.2.2) 
• Muslims 
• Christians 
• Traitors within 
• Inter-group relations (section 3.2.3) 
• Threats 
o Symbolic 
o Realistic  
• Aggression against the Outgroup 
• Leadership (section 3.2.4) 
• Self & Rival  
• Constructing the relationship between out-groups and rival 
• Positioning of Self as Ideal Leader 
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3.4.1  In-group: 
 
In this section, we analyse the different ways in which the in-group is constructed. We 
look at the definitions of the Hindu in-group, and the boundaries for inclusion or 
exclusion. This section is divided into three parts: 
• The first section analyses the boundary constructions (3.4.1.1) 
• The second section analyses the qualities and characteristics of the in-group in the 
constructed past history and the present times. (3.4.1.2)  
• The third section analyses the purported qualities for the ideal in-group in the 
future (3.4.1.3) 
3.4.1.1  Boundary Construction: 
 
The way the in-group boundaries are defined is contingent on the audience it is meant for. 
For example, in speeches addressed to the audience at the World Hindu Congregation 
(Vishwa Hindu Sammelan), the meaning of India is blatantly explained in terms of the 
Hindu identity. Consider, the following three excerpts from three different speeches: 
 
This is Bharat – Hindu Nation and it will remain a Hindu nation. (Kamlesh Bharti) 
 
In our constitution, it is stated, ‘India, that is Bharat’. I feel that if we are to have a constitution 
of our Hindu nation, then it should state, ‘Bharat, that is Hindusthan’. And if at all we are to 
write it in English, then, ‘Bharat that is Hindusthan’. (Pramila Mende) 
 
Bharat is the Hindu’s own land, that’s why Hindu society’s duty is to bind all of us in the bonds 
of love, to stand up and defend Bharat’s unity and indivisibility (Proposal 2 – Ashok Singhal) 
 
In the above extracts, the boundaries of the in-group are clearly delineated. The 
national Indian community is defined in terms of a religious in-group: the Hindu. Each of 
the terms of India, Bharat, Hindustan and Hindu are linked in a way so as to become 
interchangeable with one another and yet imply only a narrow definition of the Hindu in-
group. This deliberate conflation of nation with religion serves a dual purpose: while the 
larger populace understands ‘Hindusthan’ to include the entire nation of Indians, it is 
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clear from the above extracts, that the Hindutva brigade means it specifically as a nation 
of Hindus. The official discourse, however, uses the same word, with differing meanings. 
It is this ambiguity in meaning that allows the leaders to use ‘Hindusthan’ and ‘Bharat’ to 
refer to the commonly held view of a larger nation with a larger electorate and yet mean it 
in the narrowest possible sense. Consider, the next excerpt from Modi’s speech that is 
intended for a diverse audience.  
 
I, today, on the soil of Mumbai, have come with a very heavy heart. I cannot imagine why that 
in a country like India, the innocent citizens of India are thrown into the throes of death. What 
is the fault of those youth? What is the fault of those mothers and sisters? Someone’s brother is 
snatched away, someone’s beloved son is snatched away, and a sister’s sindoor is wiped away… 
(Page 1 – Modi) 
 
Ostensibly this provides a clear definition of the ingroup: it is the country of India 
and the ‘innocent citizens of India’ who were the target of the bomb. The idea that the 
country in general has come under attack is then reinforced by invoking a series of 
generic relationships which cover the entire population: youth, mothers and sisters, 
brothers, sons, sisters again. However, this final term in the list is significant since the 
generic sister is decribed as having her sindoor wiped away. A sindoor is the vermillion 
spot worn only by married Hindu women. Through this usage, then, Modi equates the 
members of Indian families as specifically Hindu. The ingroup, those afflicted by the 
Mumbai bomb, is not simply India, but Hindu India. 
 
3.4.1.2  Qualities & Characteristics :  
 
Having established the distinctly Hindu essence of Hindusthan and Bharat when 
quoted by Hindutva leaders, let us look at the ways in which this particular version of the 
nation is visualised.  
 
Family: 
All of us Hindus are a part of one family: For saving every Hindus self-respect, all must stand 
together (Proposal 3 – Ashok Singhal) 
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The mother is the sutradhaar that holds the family. If the mother will think, ‘in my house 
[people] will behave according to the Hindu culture’, then the strength that she has in her, the 
strength that God has given to her, the strength of service and duty, to keep everyone bound by 
her love – on this basis she can build her family as a Hindu family. To build a Hindu nation, 
this is of utmost importance. Women have a very important contribution to this. How will [we] 
create a Hindu family? There is no stated way for it. This home will be created by the emotions 
of the heart.  
 
In this formulation of Bharat, a strong traditional ethos of family is the ideal base 
for the propagation of the Hindu nation. The sutradhaar is not just a word; it is a concept 
in the Hindu culture of a person who ‘brings together the story’, in this case, the mother 
who holds the family together. Importantly, it is the woman as mother who welds the 
Hindu family and consequently the Hindu nation together. This statement figuratively 
establishes Hindu women (mothers) as symbolic bearers of national identity. However, 
there is no detailing of what exactly constitutes such a household. This absence of detail 
helps in consolidating a religious identity which otherwise is intersected by numerous 
castes and a multitude of regions. Building a community around the ‘emotions of the 
heart’ also suggests that the Hindu way of life is offered as a general way of life in Indian 
culture, not restricted to a specific religious community. This constant conflation helps to 
normalise typical Hindu traditions as an identification of Indian culture in general. The 
supposed fluidity, however, is made rigid by deliberations on not by what Hindu culture 
is supposed to be, but rather is based on what the Hindu culture is definitely not, i.e. by 
developing the idea of the presence of out-groups that are different from the Hindu in-
group. Consider, the following extract:  
 
Visibility: 
All right. This is not our culture. Our culture must be reflected in our clothes, in the application 
of tilak25. Wear________, but also make sure that on your face, you have applied kumkum26. 
When we come out, we must be able to recognize each other as our own Hindu people. Not just 
application, but the kumkum must also necessarily be visible. (Manjulashree) 
 
                                                
25  A streak of red or vermillion smeared on the forehead of people who have offered prayers. A distinctly Hindu symbol, 
usually applied on men.   
26  Vermillion worn by Hindu women on their foreheads.   
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The tilak and kumkum are bright marks of saffron, smeared across a person’s forehead 
after offering prayers. The kumkum is usually for women and the tilak for men. In the 
multitude of religious practises, this application of vermillion is appropriated as uniquely 
Hindu. The speaker’s urge to be visible and recognized as distinctly Hindu sharpens the 
boundary of the in-group against a seamless mass. This marking of membership also 
dovetails non-committal practises into a politico-religious Hindutva definition of in-group 
values. The Hindu identity is harnessed to redefine the country of India as a Hindu nation. 
In this formulation of group category, no other identity other than the Hindu identity is 
allowed to exist. If at all, other identities are allowed, they must be subservient to the 
grand fold of the Hindu identity. It also establishes in part, that the Indian national 
identity is essentially Hindu, and conversely only Hindus are (or can be) the nationals (or 
citizens) of this country. We shall demonstrate the implications of this narrow definition 
in the following sections. For now, we turn our analysis to the in-group characteristics 
that are expounded in the session.  
 
Victims:  
Every day, friends, every day from every corner of Hindustan, our youth of 22,25,30 years who 
had gone to the borders to protect our country, become preys to a coward terrorists’ bullet, and 
their dead bodies come back home. Friends, have we ever thought, what crime did those parents 
commit who had sent their beloved son to the borders to protect this country, to find their son 
dead? (Modi) 
 
The point here is that victimhood is ascribed to the parents of soldiers, and while one 
might conceivably ask questions as to the culpability of soldiers in fatal fights, no such 
questions can be asked of parents. By placing the focus on them, the (national) quality of 
innocence is exemplified. Throughout the speeches, victimhood is ascribed in different 
ways to the Hindu in-group, especially in the present circumstances. Other aspects of this 
in-group are built up in the following dimensions:  
 
Spirituality/ Religiosity: 
On this land, God Budhha, God Mahaveer, Adhyashankaracharya, SantBasveshwar, Valmiki, 
Kabir, Ravidas, Kanakdas, Shankardev, GurunanakDev, Namdev, Narayanguru, Chaitanya 
Mahaprabhu, Thiruvalluvar, and holy men like Sur, Tulsi and Ramdas were born. Till today, 
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the entire Bharat sings their songs and prayers as signs of unity, united opinion, and health of 
the society. (Proposal 3 – Ashok Singhal) 
 
That Bharat necessarily indicates a Hindu nation has been demonstrated in the 
previous excerpts. These values are further represented by a string of holy people who 
have lived in India at various points of time. In this particular excerpt, by extension of the 
logic, therefore, each spiritual/ religious leader who has been quoted is appropriated as 
Hindu. Buddha and Mahaveer who started movements opposed to the Hindu caste system 
have also been subsumed in the overarching Hindu fold by elevating them to the status of 
‘God’. This also serves as a unifying factor across the length and breadth of the country. 
Guru Nanak, the leader of the Sikhs (a militant branch of Hinduism, now recognized as a 
separate religion) represents the North of India, while Thiruvalluvar is the God from 
South India. The differences in language and custom, (even the all-important skin-
colour!) of North India and South India are completely obliterated in this paragraph to 
present the Hindu community as a monolithic identity across India. Hence the emphasis 
on entire Bharat singing in unity signifies the health of the Hindu society. This Hindu 
presence is made vivid by the lack of any Islamic or Christian names in the list of 
spiritual/ religious men quoted above.  
 
Consider now, another example, involving generic listing used by Togadia to 
denote India. This time it is a list of places rather than of Holy people.  
 
All of us must think why did Babar destroy Ram Mandir? Did Babar have a fight with Ram? 
Why did Mahmud Ghazni destroy Lord Shankar’s Somnath temple? Did Ghazni have a fight 
with Lord Shankar? Why did Aurangzeb destroy Kashi Vishwanath? Why did Mohammad Ali 
Jinnah and his associated Muslim league mutilate our motherland Bharat? Were the people 
travelling on the Mumbai trains somebody’s enemies? Were the devotees in the Hanuman temple 
of Sankat Mochan at Kashi somebody’s enemies? (Praveen Togadia – 13th February) 
 
He lists a series of targets which represent the country under attack, and each item is a 
specific Hindu site along with the Hindu pilgrims who visit them: Ram’s temple at 
Ayodhya, Somnath temple in Gujarat, Kashi Vishwanath in Gujarat, and also the 
Hanuman temple. Interestingly, the mention of Jinnah and Muslim league also puts the 
landmass of India as one religious whole. This is explained in the next excerpt. The 
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Indian motherland is constructed as sacred, and therefore any attack anywhere on the 
motherland or on its people is seen as not attempt to annihilate but also an attempt to 
desecrate the sacred values/ places of the Hindu in-group. Therefore, the Mumbai train 
bombings is also squeezed in between the questions, following the same logic of a ‘Hindu 
nation constantly under threat.’ 
 
This country has gone in the way the mothers have shown. Mothers should take a resolute 
pledge on this sacred ‘Triveni sangam’. Today we have all gathered to think on these issues 
here. This is no ordinary thing. Mother Ganga resides here, Mother Saraswati resides here, 
Mother Yamuna also resides here – we take our pledges under their guidance. (Kamlesh Bharti) 
 
While country and mother are generic terms, the reference to geographical 
features such as rivers as ‘mother’ is conspicuously Hindu. ‘Triveni Sangam’ which 
translates to ‘tri-river conjunction’ is an allusion to the meeting point of the rivers Ganga, 
Yamuna and the mythical (Hindu) Saraswati. The importance of identifying geographical 
features as Hindu places of worship or Goddesses/ Gods serves two purposes: One it 
helps in building the notion of a continuous historical community. And two, therefore, 
Hindu community as rightful owners of the land (of Bharat/ Hindusthan/ India) comes 
from the principle of precedence. Kamlesh Bharti talks of a country that has followed the 
way of the mothers. As we have already shown this to be only Hindu with rivers as the 
geographical references, this ties into the notion of an ancient community. By the absence 
of Muslim configurations or Christian names, the idea of a continuous historical Hindu 
community is built. The importance of a traditional past, spanning eras is symbolically 
invoked by naming rivers after Hindu Goddesses. This past is an ideal that is sought for:  
  
There has been considerable influence in the cities, but our mothers in the villages have kept our 
culture alive even today. I am proud to state this. Our mothers in the villages have nurtured and 
tended our culture, rather than the mothers in the cities. Even here we see it, our mothers from 
the jungles and villages are in far greater number. It is because; our cultural traditions have 
grown from the villages and jungles. In the cities, slowly our mothers are shying away from 
spirituality as well. (Kamlesh Bharti) 
 
The focus of the afore extract is on dichotomizing the ‘past and present’ around 
one single axis which neatly bifurcates into ‘pure past’ as symbolized by the villages and 
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jungles and the ‘impure present’ as symbolized by the cities. Singhal talks of another 
ideal past, and the way it links to the in-group’s present values: 
 
Humanitarian: 
According to the Veda, the nation was born out of the meditation of Rishis. Inspired by 
humanitarian thoughts, the rishis meditated aggressively and the nation was born out of a 
combination of their strengths. Since the Hindus have stayed here since ancient times, there 
developed a feeling of ‘Us’. This feeling of ‘us’ also extended to the earth, people, culture, 
history, Great men, friends and also enemies. (Proposal 3 - Ashok Singhal) 
 
We have already discussed the linkages of Bharat as a distinct geographical 
location with a Hindu nation. The Hindus are the obvious, the original, the natural 
inhabitants of this land, as the very names Hindu and Hindustan testify. The Hindus are 
pronounced the most ancient and civilized nation in the world, un paralleled in their 
philosophical and spiritual achievements, accommodating, tolerant, united, luxuriant even 
- in a fundamental way – unconquerable. In this particular extract, the speaker presents 
this link as primordial, since ancient times, and anchors in the Hindu culture, and like the 
previous speakers, conflates India with a Hindu nation. Meditation of the Rishis signifies 
brahmanical forms of rituals and related virtues of purity and exclusion. Humanitarian 
values are also assigned to the in-group, since they are born of saints who were spiritually 
pure. The peacefulness of the past, however, translates into ‘tolerance’ in the present. 
Consider, the following excerpt from Modi: 
 
Tolerant: 
In this country, peace is not a new thing. It’s possible that the electronic media have just got to 
know that we keep peace in this country. There were so many attacks on the Amarnath Yatris 
[pilgrims], but no one retaliated with even a stone in this country. There were so many attacks 
on the Amarnath Yatris [pilgrims], but no one retaliated with even a stone in this country. There 
were attacks on Raghunath temple, but nobody’s house was burnt down in this country. In 
Ayodhya, attacks were carried out on Lord Ram’s temple, and also in Varanasi, but not even a 
stone was thrown. Even in Gujarat, terrorists had entered Akshardham, Gujarat had declared 
a bandh [strike], but after Akshardham, in Gujarat not even a stone was thrown. (Page  - 
Narendra Modi) 
 
Though the excerpt tinges the in-group with the status of victims, the quality of tolerance 
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is elaborated upon; Modi describes a ‘we’ who represent the peaceful country. The ‘we’ 
who do not retaliate is therefore, once again, a Hindu we. The extensive geography of a 
country under siege is a Hindu sacred geography. The India being described as ‘this 
country’ is again a Hindu India. And yet, the ‘we’ has remained calm, and peaceful under 
concerted attacks. However, Modi also implies that this tolerance is being taken for a 
ride, and perhaps the times have changed and therefore the qualities of the in-group must 
also change. This is hinted at in the next excerpts at the Mothers’ conference: 
 
Where are we standing today?  Our mother power is at crossroads today. If she looks behind, 
then she is reminded of her traditional values and, if she looks ahead she is tempted by the 
beauty and attractive lifestyle of the Western World. But, our mothers have another 
characteristic. Even after being tempted, our mothers have not been completed besotted/ trapped 
in the enchantment. There has been considerable influence in the cities, but our mothers in the 
villages have kept our culture alive even today. (Pramila Mende) 
 
The in-group characteristic hinted at in the aforementioned extracts is one of ‘untouched 
purity from ancient times’. Rural spaces constitute the real Hindu nation while urban 
spaces are an aberration of it. The speaker talks of the times and circumstances as impure 
but the women have remained intrinsically pure. She also talks of the inherent innocence 
or strength of spirituality of the Hindu woman. This ‘quality’ of the Hindu woman has an 
important meaning in the context of inter-group relations, which we shall come to 
presently. For now, the Hindu community is constructed as an essentially pure people in 
constant struggle against bad external influences (quoted as cultural pollution in the next 
extract). It is also till now, overwhelmingly feminine, and the struggle has been a 
suffering. Manjulashree from the southern region of India also asks about the extent of 
‘mother’s’ role in ‘protecting’ the Hindu culture in the following piece:  
 
How much are we participating in protecting our culture? Please think about it. Maa has 
become mummy and baap27 has become dummy. Mummy, mummy, mummy – this is how we call 
out. Mothers are forcing to their children28, isn’t it? The one who dies, in Egypt they call them 
mummy. So, when the boy or girl calls mummy, it means, “you’re dead, you’re dead, you’re 
                                                
27 Father in hindi.   
28  The speakers words in original.  
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dead”. And yet they are forced by their mothers to call them mummy. What are we doing? 
(Manjulashree) 
 
The speaker takes the idea of external ‘cultural pollution’, extends it a step further by way 
of language, implying that the Hindus render mothers dead when they speak in a different 
language, where mothers are wished dead, and fathers are nothing better than dummies.  
This apparent internalization of pollution is brought into focus as the highest level of 
attack, when one of our own turns against herself, ‘And yet they are forced by their 
mothers to call them mummy.’  
3.4.1.3  Ideal in-group: 
The state of affairs of the present in-group as opposed to the glorious past has 
been described so far. The qualities of the Hindu in-group of tolerance, peacefulness, and 
humanity have also been elaborated. At all times, the links between these qualities and 
the state of victim-hood of the Hindu in-group has also been clearly brought out. To 
change the status quo and bring back the glorious past into the future of the Hindu in-
group, certain qualities need to undergo a change. Consider the following two excerpts:  
 
This sammelan believes that the word Hindu is national and does not describe a particular 
religion. Hindu in Bharat is a nation, Hindu is a culture, is a way of life and is a society. Hindu 
culture is the epitome of unity in diversity. This culture believes in karma, and gives importance 
to re-birth and good karma. Hindu society does not recognize any one God, but rather 
recognizes the spark of the divine in every person, and absorbs every path to the divine within its 
fold. (Proposal 3 – Ashok Singhal) 
 
But we are the soldiers of the Hindu nation. What is difficulty for a soldier? For them, what is 
food? For them, what is convenience? We have come out to fight for the defence of our religious 
principles (dharm): we are the Dharm warriors. We will fight till the end, until every corner of 
Hindusthan will fly the saffron flags. (13th February – Praveen Togadia) 
 
In the overarching ‘national’ fold, no other independent identity except for the Hindu is 
allowed to exist. In the seemingly welcoming stance of recognizing every person as God, 
the speaker also talks of absorbing every path to the divine within its fold. In other words, 
the wide range of divergent communities and religions are in the process homogenized 
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and naturalized into this Hindutva fold. This hindutva is represented as a potential 
national ethos within which all other religions and communities are justly housed. In the 
framework of unity in diversity, the only culture that is suitable to be the overarching 
banyan tree is the Hindu culture. Togadia takes it a step further, since these values of 
tolerance are under threat of annihilation; it is in defence of the Hindu nation, that 
tolerance must be substituted with intolerance. India is envisaged as a Hindu nation, 
marked with saffron flags. 
3.4.2  Out-groups 
By definition of the in-group in the previous section, we have shown groups like 
Jains, Buddhists and Sikhs as being a part of the Hindutva definition of the in-group. We 
have also found mentions of attacks on this in-group by Islamic out-groups over a period 
of time. In the chapter on visual representations, we consistently found, out-groups 
constructed along the lines of threat to the cow, and therefore excluded the Muslims and 
Christians as dangerous out-groups. We show the ways in which out-group constructions 
are made in front of different audiences. The speeches made at the Vishwa Hindu 
Sammelan are based on explicit constructions of the out-groups boundaries and qualities 
while Modi’s references are more implicit since the speech was delivered at a different 
audience, and has also been relayed on national television. This section has been divided 
into three parts: 
• The Muslim out-group: How is the group constituted? What values are ascribed? 
• The Christian out-group: How is the group constituted? What values are ascribed? 
• The threat within: traitors to the in-group.  
 
3.4.2.1  Muslims 
As with the ingroup, so Modi provides an ostensibly clear definition of the 
outgroup – those who are attacking ‘us’. They are, for Modi, self-evidently terrorists – 
something so obvious that the start of it merely needs to be stated. Hence, almost at the 
start of the speech he declares: “This is a fight of humankind. Terrorism is an enemy of 
humankind”. However this does not explain who the terrorists are. Modi’s answer comes 
in two parts. On the one hand he identifies India’s neighbours, Bangladesh and 
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(especially) Pakistan as sponsors of the terrorists. Thus, he reports one of his own 
speeches to an audience in Assam where he states that they are tormented by their 
neighbour, Bangladesh, just as he, coming from Gujarat, is tormented by his Pakistani 
neighbour. He does not limit culpability to the state but rather implies that these entire 
nations are at fault. This is even more explicit in the following extract where Modi 
imagines the reaction when the Indian government revoked the Prevention of Terrorism 
Act (POTA), something he sees as crippling the fight against terrorism: 
 
Tell me friends, the POTA law that was created for the terrorists, the day the Indian 
Government decided to revoke the law, who would have distributed sweets? Who would have 
burst crackers? Friends, all of Pakistan was distributing sweets, all of Pakistan was eating 
sweets. (Page 6 – Modi) 
 
On the other hand, Modi defines the enemy as specifically ‘Jehadi terrorism’ and 
he emphasises the point that not all Muslims are jehadis or terrorist.  
 
Friends, the world faces danger from Jehadi terrorism, and Jehadi terrorism does not imply 
Islam. Every Muslim does not do Jehad. And that is why, knowingly, I am using the term, 
‘jehadi terrorist’…. Friends, Jehadi terrorism has spread to Indonesia and Malaysia. In spite of 
being an Islamic country, the leaders of those countries are also worried about jehadi terrorism. 
The leadership of Indonesia is Muslim, but they are Muslims with liberal thoughts, and even 
there Jehadi terrorism operates. (Page 16 – Modi) 
  
Modi goes further, it is not only that Muslims are not (necessarily) terrorists. It is 
also that terrorists are not (really) Muslims. He states: 
  
“Friends, terrorists have no religion. I believe in this firmly, that terrorists have no religion. 
Terrorists are enemies of humankind” (page 6 – Modi).  
 
However, if in the case of the ingroup, the implied category is narrower than the 
ostensible category, so for the outgroup there is an implied category that is broader than 
the ostensible category.  Indeed the two definitions are clearly interdependent. If the 
ingroup is Hindus in general so, in a number of ways, then, Modi implies that all Muslims 
should be seen as terrorists – or at least suspected as potential terrorists. We can start with 
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those examples already used to illustrate the ingroup definition. For example, he cites a 
number of well-rehearsed examples where Muslims in general were seen as attacking 
Hindu religious sites. The emblematic example is Ayodhya where Hindu nationalists 
sought to destroy a Mosque, which, they claimed, was built on a sacred Hindu site. The 
enemy here is Islam in general. 
 
Or again, we showed above how Hindi terms are used wherever ‘we’ are 
described. The converse is true where attacks on this ‘we’ are invoked. Then Urdu terms 
are used, implying a Muslim community. Indeed even as Modi argues that terrorists have 
no religion, the term he uses is ‘Quom’ which is an Urdu word, that implies religious 
community. Implicitly, the audience attaches Muslim with the word, Quom. Hence, 
though terrorists on the face of it, have no religion, the use of the word Quom implies that 
the community involved are Urdu speakers - the language spoken by Muslims in India.  
 
To use another example, there is a passage where Modi overtly urges restraint and 
supports peaceful action: 
 
I would like to tell you this brothers, the terrorists aim to spread hatred in the country. It is the 
responsibility of the citizens of the country, not to allow hatred to spread under any 
circumstances. Do not allow hatred to spread under any circumstance. This is their aim. (Page 8 
– Modi) 
 
The word Modi uses for ‘aim’ is actually an Urdu word ‘mansuba’. It denotes an implied 
Muslim community and so, once again, the connection between ‘them’, the terrorists, and 
Islam is established. In other places in the speech, he uses a rather different way of 
making such a connection. That is, even if it is true in principle that not every Muslim is a 
terrorist, in practice every Muslim could become a terrorist and hence all Muslims 
become suspect and dangerous. This is most apparent in his account of Ishrat Jehan, a 
young Muslim woman suspected (though not proven) to be a terrorist and shot dead by 
the Gujarat police. He links her to Pakistan by claiming that Pakistanis celebrated her 
acts: 
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And when after three days, the Khwaja times, which is a Lashkar-e-tayeeba mouthpiece, 
published an article in Pakistan, that we are proud of Ishrat Jehan who martyred herself in our 
cause. (Page 9 – Modi) 
 
Then he states that, just like her, the Mumbai bomber may have been a woman 
who was used (presumably by the Pakistanis) to kill. As he puts it: 
 
Friends, just a while ago, a TV reporter was saying that someone saw a girl planting the bomb. 
I do not know what the truth is. Girls have been used. The day, Gujarat killed Ishrat Jehan in 
an encounter, if the police of Maharashtra would have paid heed, then perhaps this girl would 
not have been born to plant the bomb. (Page 10 – Modi) 
 
The point then, is that even the most innocent Muslims – a woman and a child – must be 
suspect, since anyone could be manipulated to be a killer. Betrayal to the nation is 
constructed as intrinsic to the community of Muslims. The theoretical division between 
‘good Muslims’ and ‘bad Muslims’ thereby made redundant and in this discourse, ‘all 
Muslims deserve to be treated as enemies.’ This is not just our interpretation of the text. It 
was clearly that of Modi’s audience. Work by (Atkinson, 1984; Bull & Noordhuizen, 
2000) show how audience reactions in timing the applause can be used towards 
interpreting the tone of the speech and how it is received. At the very point (cited above) 
where he described terrorists as having no religion, and when he went on to state that the 
response to the terrorist should be ‘hard hitting’, the audience responded with whistles, 
claps and a cry of ‘drop bombs on Friday’, which was widely applauded. The significance 
of ‘Friday’ is not lost - Friday is the Muslim day of prayer. Bombs on a Friday do not in 
practice differentiate jehadis from any other Muslim. Modi and his constituency mutually 
recognise who they really see as their enemy. Singhal makes a similar point in his 
proposal: 
 
Everyday, the Hindi-speaking population of Assam are being shot at by the Muslims infiltrators 
absorbed by ULFA, and are being forced to flee Assam. (Proposal 2 – Ashok Singhal) 
 
ULFA is the acronym for United Liberation Front of Assam, an organization that 
has been struggling for a separate identity within the Indian nation. However, this 
violence too is attributed to the Muslims. The ULFA is an out-group not because of the 
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secessionist movement it propagates, but because it apparently co-opts Muslims into it’s 
movement. In the next section on inter-group relations (p. 129), we elaborate how these 
constituted characteristics of Muslims are used to set up vicious animosity between 
groups. For now, here’s an analysis of the construction of other outgroups.  
3.4.2.2  Christians 
Third Vishwa Hindu Sammelan is gravely concerned about the evil conspiracies of magical 
illusions and false miracles hatched by the church to change the opinion of the people. This 
Sammelan, finally also demands that the Central Government takes immediate and effective 
steps to put an end to this conspiracy of opinion-change by the Church, by passing anti-
conversion laws. (Proposal 3 – Ashok Singhal) 
 
The church is designated a wicked conspirator. While the concept of miracle itself 
is supported, the church is shown to be a propagator of false miracles. Essentially, 
implying that the Church uses deception to convince people to change their opinion. The 
speaker alleges that people not only change their opinion, but also their religion on the 
basis of false claims made by the Church. Hence, the call for anti-conversion laws is seen 
as a measure of stopping the influx of Hindu people into the Christian fraternity. This out-
group is characterised as sly and cunning impostors. 
3.4.2.3  Traitors 
For us, one major issue is coming up: that minorities should get reservation. Apparently we 
dominate over the minorities. But why? In 1947, they said, our culture, tradition and rituals do 
not match. That’s why we need a separate nation. And they got their separate nation. By 
creating Pakistan, we have given them 100% reservation. And if they cannot be satisfied with 
even 100% reservation then why are our rights denied? (Kamlesh Bharti) 
 
By definition of the National Minorities Commission in India, ‘minorities’ include 
Christians, Muslims, Parsis, Sikhs, Jains, Buddhists and others. However, it is evident, 
that by minorities, particularly in this extract, the group points to Muslims. Pakistan, the 
neighbouring country, is depicted as a place that is completely reserved for Muslims. In 
other words: India for Hindus and Pakistan for Muslims. Extending this line of thought 
would necessarily put all practitioners of Islam as essentially Pakistanis and not Indians. 
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This analysis is crucial to understanding Hindu-Muslim relations in India. In this 
framework of Pakistan as the place of Muslim reservation, the loyalty of Muslims to the 
Indian nation is always suspect by the majoritarian Hindu community. Later Hindu 
nationalists have been rather more inflexible in their formulation of the meaning of Hindu 
nationhood, precisely because the notion of a separate territory gained ground first as an 
idea and then as a political reality – in Pakistan. For many of these propagandists, the 
Indian nation has come to be coterminous with the Hindu community. Explicitly or 
implicitly, Pakistan has become the place where Indian Muslims belong. Importantly, the 
blame for the creation of Pakistan and therefore the vivisection of the Indian sub-
continent into two nation-states is put squarely on the out-group. We shall discuss the 
impact of such a formulation on inter-group relations in terms of citizenship and rightful 
ownership later. For now, we look at the other marked out-group. 
 
We speak English, eat English, sleep English, and drink English. Very crazy we are for 
English. Everyone/thing, has become English. When the English left, this is exactly what they 
said, ‘we are leaving but we are leaving behind brown-skinned English.’ It is our countrymen 
who follow the English.  They just said, but we are proving them true. We are all striving to 
prove those English right. We wear pants and shirts. (Manjulashree) 
 
Though the out-group here has been identified as Christian (as symbolized by the English 
having ruled India), the message however encompasses a larger group of people. The out-
group is represented as insidiously dangerous since it seduces the in-group to change in 
fundamental ways, in an attempt to assimilate into the Christian out-group. Anybody who 
wears pants/ shirts, talks in English, indeed, ‘eat’, ‘speak’, ‘sleep’, ‘drink’ English are to 
be ostracised as just like the ‘English’ who dominated the Indians. This tussle is brought 
about in the following section of inter-group relations. Though clearly, Muslims and 
Christians constitute the out-group in the Hindutva rhetoric, by their definiton of ‘Hindu 
values’ for a ‘Hindu nation’, any group of people who do not subscribe to their 
definitions fall outside the boundary of the in-group. This would include people who are 
born Hindus but do not agree with the Hindutva’s definition of being a Hindu. Modi’s 
disdain of such people is apparent in the next excerpt: 
 
In Gujarat one Ishrat Jehan, a terrorist girl was encountered by the Gujarat police. And she 
was shot dead. You would be aware, please remember that day. The entire world’s 5 star 
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activists had broken loose on Modi. One female youth was killed. This innocent girl was killed. 
She was riddled with bullets. Not only this, friends, in this state, those 5 star activists and some 
media friends declared her a martyr and had organized a funeral procession for her. They had 
gone to cover her in a sheet! (Page 9 – Modi) 
 
Human rights activists are derided as 5 star activists, implying a frivolous bunch of 
people, shallow in their understanding of matters of national security. The media is also 
maligned. They constitute the traitors of the in-group, and hence enemies of the in-group, 
since they align with the out-groups. 
3.4.3  Inter-group Relations 
This section focuses on the ways in which the in-group relates to the out-group 
and vice-versa. We address these questions:  
• Along what dimensions are the inter-group relations built on?  
• What are the implications of prejudiced representations of the out-group 
for the in-group?  
• In what ways do the boundaries and qualities attributed to the out-group in 
the previous sections affect the in-group?  
• What are the ways in which the in-group is to respond to the out-groups? 
3.4.3.1  Threats 
 
In the previous chapter on visual representations, we argued that the cow and the map of 
India had been used as symbols of the in-group that was brutalized by various out-groups. 
The relation between the groups is consistently characterized by threat. We had also 
shown that the in-group is overwhelmingly characterized by qualities of cowardice, 
naiveté while the out-group is characterized by aggressive qualities. In this section, 
keeping in perspective the relation of violence between the in-group and the out-groups,  
• firstly, we outline the different ways in which the out-groups attack the in-groups. For 
example: historically, socio-culturally, demographically, economically, financially: 
various contexts of threats are described, we analyse an excerpt for each context and 
elaborate the inter-group relations within this context.  
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• In the second part, we analyse the purported ideal response of the in-group to these 
threats.  
• In the third part, we discuss the impact of representing the out-group in particular 
ways on the in-group. 
 
Historicity:  
There was a time when on the meeting point of Ganga and Yamuna, Saraswati there was a 
gathering of the holy-men on this land and on our land of Kumbh Taimur Lang had attacked us 
with the dream [intention] of destroying our Hindu religion forever. (12th February – Praveen 
Togadia) 
 
All of us must think why did Babar destroy Ram Mandir? Did Babar have a fight with Ram? 
Why did Mahmud Ghazni destroy Lord Shankar’s Somnath temple? Did Ghazni have a fight 
with Lord Shankar? Why did Aurangzeb destroy Kashi Vishwanath? Why did Mohammad Ali 
Jinnah and his associated Muslim league mutilate our motherland Bharat? Were the people 
travelling on the Mumbai trains somebody’s enemies? Were the devotees in the Hanuman temple 
of Sankat Mochan at Kashi somebody’s enemies? Until we do not seek the answers to all of these 
questions, neither will the Hindu be safe on this earth, nor will the Hindu nation be safe. (13th 
February – Praveen Togadia) 
 
A continuous storyline of recurrent attacks of out-group against the in-group around 
which only the historical circumstances and actors change, is built. Togadia recounts 
these attacks as a record of salient events in the history of the Hindu in-group. The attacks 
from the out-groups are traced through the ages from 997 to 2007, painting demonised 
images of Muslims. Each of the attacks is presented as an outcome of the ones preceding 
it. Togadia would have us believe that all the attackers through the ages seem to sprout 
from one religious community alone. In the first excerpt, Taimur Lang is accused of 
attacking the Kumbh – which is a Hindu assembly of spiritually inclined devotees and 
‘Holymen’ who gather once very 6-12 years to bathe in the confluence of the rivers 
Ganga, Yamuna and the mythical Saraswati. It is of specific importance here, since all 
these speeches were being made at the very same place where supposedly Taimur Lang 
had attacked years ago, emotionally binding the present Hindu audience to a conjured up 
image of the past. This also sustains the idea of an ancient spiritual docile Hindu in-group 
with an equally belligerent Muslim out-group throughout time. While the Mughals: 
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Babur, Ghazni and Aurangzeb are projected as enemies who plundered and desecrated 
the temples of Ram (in Ayodhya, Uttar Pradesh), Shiva (in Gujarat) and the Hindu temple 
at Kashi (in Uttar Pradesh); Jinnah is accused of vivisecting the sacred body of the 
motherland India, hence, the very existence of Pakistan as an independent nation is a 
rupture to the idea of a unified Hindu nation. People who bombed the Mumbai trains in 
2006 are also traced with the same lineage. The out-group threat is constituted as ancient 
and one that has remained unchanged in its fierceness towards the Hindu in-group. The 
in-group in contrast is feminized as passive victims in the onslaught of persistent 
masculine violence. By invoking places of worship, not only is an image of spirituality 
and religiosity of the in-group built, the lack of reaction in spite of such attacks also helps 
to build the image of a tolerant Hindu people. The places cited that have been attacked by 
the out-group serve two purposes: it underscores the vulnerability and sheer 
defencelessness of the in-group while magnifying the viciousness of the out-group. Thus, 
the out-group is militarized while the in-group is victimized. The events are presented in 
a schematic and one-sided manner to build ‘memories’ of suffering of the helpless Hindu 
in-group, while the chronicity of the assaults builds an image of a monolithic out-group 
that has pillaged the Hindu in-group through the ages with an intention to desecrate and 
kill. Desecration is also envisaged in an insidious way; consider, the next excerpt: 
 
Socio-cultural 
Muslims take away at least 2-3 lakhs of our women to Christianity and Islam every year. If this 
is the rate at which our religious conversion will take place, and Hindu girls become Muslims or 
Christians, what will we do? Do give this a deep thought. If a man is married then it doesn’t 
matter, but if a woman is married off, then not only is the family destroyed, other families are 
also destroyed in the process. Her children will be known as half-breeds. Her children will 
become Muslims, and they will be known as the enemies of our Hindu nation. They do this only 
to increase their numbers. (Kamlesh Bharti) 
 
The one clear message in this excerpt is that intermingling between the in-group and out-
groups, leading to ‘half-breeds’, is unacceptable. The gendering of the relation is clearly 
spelt out: Muslim and Christian men to Hindu women. In this overwhelmingly patriarchal 
set-up of relations, the Muslim male is cast as a seductive kidnapper who has one aim 
alone: to multiply the numerical strength of his group. In doing so, the speaker also 
denies any agency to the Hindu woman in such a relationship. She also negates the 
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possibility of love as the basis of any such relationship. Such relationships are deemed 
sacrilegious to the values of the in-group, and one that must be controlled for. In effect, it 
also implies that the behaviour of Hindu women must also be policed. We discuss this in 
further detail in the third part of this section. For now, it would suffice to say that this 
serves as a warning to Hindu women not to give birth to treacherous children, since they 
then become the ‘threat within:’- One that is born of the Hindu in-group but remains loyal 
to the out-group. It is left unsaid whether Hindu men are supposed to adopt the same 
measures to increase Hindu population. Singhal cites another kind of population threat in 
the following excerpt: 
 
Demographic 
Since the past few years, Muslims have been infiltrating from Western Pakistan and 
Bangladesh. Almost 3.5 crores infiltrators have snaked their way into Bharat. It is for this 
reason that the population balance in Assam has been disturbed. Now, terrorist activities of the 
secessionist movements have increased. Everyday, the Hindi-speaking population of Assam are 
being shot at by the Muslims infiltrators absorbed by ULFA, and are being forced to flee Assam. 
(Proposal 2 – Ashok Singhal) 
 
The question is one of arithmetic: the larger the number, the stronger the group. The out-
group is accused of snaking it’s way into the in-group’s land. Beneath the general 
message of changing the population balance of the ‘Hindus’ in the state, lurks the sinister 
connotation of an out-group that is poisonous and has reptilian qualities of a snake 
slithering into the in-group. The implication of this threat is also one that is done 
insidiously, with no one noticing the steady population imbalance in the state. ULFA is 
the acronym for United Liberation Front of Assam, an organization that has been 
struggling for a separate Assamese identity within the Indian nation. The militancy in the 
state is not from our homeland India, but is infiltrators and outsiders. And by extension, 
the ULFA is also an outsider. This has implications in the battle for leadership, which we 
shall present in the next section. For now, let us focus on another way of constructing 
threat on the in-group:  
 
Economic: 
And Friends, just as this is terrorism, so also another form of terrorism is Narco terrorism. 
Friends this is such a kind of poison that it will destroy the youth power of the country. It is a 
 
 
 
133 
conspiracy hatched by our enemies in the way drugs and narcos are destroying the youth of the 
country. The way youth become drug-addicts; every family needs to be made aware. The mass 
needs to be made aware. Friends, terrorism is carried out not only with guns and pistols but also 
with narco terrorism the future generation is being destroyed. This is a huge conspiracy and a 
planned one. Crores of rupees are invested in this: to destroy the youth, the country’s wealth. 
(Page 16 – Modi) 
 
The youth signify strength and hope for any group. When an attack is constructed on this 
segment of the population, it is not only about the present, it is also an attack to destroy 
the future of the in-group. The in-group will be bereft of a bright and strong future, by the 
drain on its youth power and loss to drugs. Modi categorizes this as narco terrorism. He 
also talks of this as a conspiracy to destroy the in-group, not so much as a business of the 
mafia. The threats to the in-group are outlined at every level. Likewise, another threat: 
 
Financial: 
And likewise friends, another conspiracy in this country is to destroy the financial power of the 
country through fake notes. The Pakistan embassy in Nepal: from there, fakes Indian notes 
were confiscated! (Page 16 – Modi) 
 
 
The out-group conspires and launches attacks on the in-group even in embassies. The 
point about this is embassies are places of foreign countries that enjoy diplomatic 
immunity within host countries. By this, Modi implies that Pakistan abuses its immunity 
and the trust accorded to it to assault the Indian in-group.  
 
Annihilation: 
Who is to be killed? The terrorist decides. Where is the person to be killed? The terrorist decides. 
When is the person to be killed? The terrorist decides. How is the person to be killed? The 
terrorist decides. And how many people were killed, friends. We have lost more soldiers in this 
proxy war of terrorism, than in any of the actual wars that India has fought. (Page 3 – Modi) 
 
We have shown Modi’s characterization of the in-group as representative of entire 
humanity and the Muslim out-group as representative of terrorists in the previous sections 
on in-group and out-groups. In this excerpt, the terrorist represents an out-group, 
 
 
 
134 
overwhelmingly recognized as Muslim by both the speaker and the audience. In terms of 
inter-group hostility, the fate or future of the in-group is contingent on the whims and 
fancies of the out-group. This sort of threat denotes total power of the out-group over the 
in-group. The out-group controls the fate of the in-group. And the fate in this case is 
death. This has resonance in studies on competitive victimhood where groups feel that 
there is harm coming from outgroups and that this harm is unjustified (Bar-Tal, 
Chernyak-Hai, Schori, & Gundar, 2009). The way in which it is constructed here though, 
has implications towards violence against the outgroups as shown in the next section. 
3.4.3.2  Aggression against Out-group: Celebration 
 
The construction of the various ways in which the out-group threatens the very existence 
of the in-group has been described, as has the virtuosity and sanctity of the in-group 
under threat. The threats have not been checked for veracity but for the emotionality that 
they manage to galvanize in the members of targeted in-group. These are conditions that 
create ground for extreme hostilities from the in-group against the out-groups. At best, 
the aggression of the in-group is a righteous act of virtue, at worst; it may be construed as 
self-defence. The specific way in which the in-group is called upon to act against the out-
group is explicated in the next excerpt: 
 
Violence in the name of virtue: 
With the blessings of the holy-men we are going to create such a situation that if in any corner 
of the world a Hindu is insulted, then in lakhs of villages, the Hindu will cause devastation. And 
to create such an armoury for the Hindu society’s safety, the VHP has done its work in 72,000 
Indian villages. In 41000 villages the Bajrang Dal stands for ‘dharm raksha’. In the country’s 
13000 tribal villages, our literacy campaigns by the name of ekal vidyalaya are on. On 18000 
places in the country we are doing our work of trishul daan. Outside India, we are also 
networking with Hindus in different countries. (13th February – Praveen Togadia) 
 
This Sammelan also demands that the Muslim infiltrators be thrown out of the country and to 
start armed war against the terrorist-harbouring country of Bangladesh and teach them a 
lesson for their actions. (Proposal 2 – Ashok Singhal). 
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That is why this Sammelan calls for the Dharma-saviour Hindu society to step forward to save 
their life-values, principles, and to free Bharat and mother Bharat from terrorists and 
secessionists by uniting the Hindu society. (Proposal 2 – Ashok Singhal) 
 
What is the second answer to Jihad? Where do they eat from? Who do they work under? Whose 
cycles do they repair? Whose scooters do they repair?  Whose cars do they repair? In whose 
factories do they work? Tell me, do they work in our places or not? This is why we must expunge 
Islam. (Praveen Togadia – 13th February) 
 
People say that we cannot do anything against the Muslims because of the numbers. But think of 
the day when the British were in power, they had the guns, they had power, they had the police 
and the administration. If we could still agitate and throw them out of the country then why 
can’t we do the same with the Muslims? (Kamlesh Bharti) 
 
The message in the above paragraphs is chillingly clear. This is where the processes and 
consolidation of group identity, attribution of certain qualities to the out-groups, 
constituent qualities of the in-group around the dimensions of threat, come together in a 
potent mix to justify mass scale destruction of the out-group by in-group members. The 
expunging of the out-group is critical to the in-group's safety. The religious symbol of 
trishul (trident) is the weapon of Shiva – the Hindu God of destruction. In mythology, 
Shiva is the God who destroys the evils of this world by unleashing a dance of destruction 
on the enemies. The in-group must become ‘Shiva’ to save the world from destruction. 
This becomes a sacred duty not just for ones own self but also for the preservation of the 
sacredness of the group itself. The 'cause' is more important than the individual members 
of the group. This extract is also interesting because it seeks to consolidate the Hindu 
identity across national boundaries. In the case of out-groups, it was apparently this very 
quality of bonding around the religious identity that made them anti-nationals, and 
therefore not Indians. What is poison for the out-group is virtuous for the in-group. Of 
note, also is the fact that the in-group is uniquely blessed by the holy men. It is a religious 
task that they must embark upon to save all that is sacred and virtuous of the in-group. 
And this can only be done, by annihilating the out-groups. This destruction must cut 
across all other dimensions as just like Hindus have borne their suffering together since 
ancient times, so also, the destruction unleashed must happen in every place Hindus 
reside. 
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3.4.4  Leadership: Self & Rival 
 
In the previous section on inter-group relations, the dimension of threat was unpacked in 
further detail, critically to build the story of aggression of the in-group against out-groups 
as an act of virtue at best and one of self-defence at worst. In the chapter on visual 
representation, against the backdrop of inter-group relations, we saw the beginnings of 
the struggle for leadership, by primarily discrediting the rivals’ position of authority in 
different ways. In this section we set out to explore the centrality of inter-group relations 
around the dimension of threat, for an understanding of intra-group dynamics of power 
struggle in further detail. Overall, we will look at the ways in which the leader and rival is 
characterised and positioned with reference to the in-group and out-groups. In this 
section, we shall primarily be focussing on the speech by Narendra Modi because, out of 
the selection of the speakers, he was the Chief Minister of Gujarat at the time of 
delivering this speech.  While the other speakers are ideologues, Modi held political 
office and it is predicted that there would be a focus on the way an ideal leader should be 
in his speeches far more than the other speakers who were focusing on other ‘cultural’ 
aspects of the VHP’s functioning. 
 
• The first section delineates the group membership of the leader and the 
rival, and then goes on to look at the characteristics of the rival and the 
leader in opposition to one another in specific contexts.   
• The second section describes the rivals’ relationship with the out-group.   
• In the third section the ways in which the leader is projected as the ideal 
leader by drawing on examples of the past is discussed.  
We have primarily focussed on Narendra Modi’s speech, because he is the only elected 
political leader among the several speakers of the conference. 
3.4.4.1  Characteristics 
 
Group membership: Self and Rival  
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To be able to show authority over a group, one must first belong to the group, or at least 
propagate the notion of belonging to the group. We present two excerpts around the 
theme of violence from Modi’s speech to elaborate on this: 
 
Self: Friends and sisters who were martyred, I have not come to see the colour of their blood. 
They are all my brothers. What is his language? What is his community? What is his attire? 
What is his faith? That has no meaning for me. Each martyred brother is my Hindustani 
brother. (Page 2 – Modi) 
 
In a play of language, Modi invokes a series of generic relationships that covers the entire 
population: friends, sisters, and brother. The final term, however, is significant, since he 
qualifies the generic brother as ‘his Hindustani brother’. Every group member thereby is 
tied to him in a familial blood relationship sans communal, regional and religious divide. 
However, as we have shown earlier in the section on in-group, ‘Hindustani’ in the narrow 
definition of the Hindutva brigade refers to Hindu members only, excluding in particular, 
Christians and Muslims. The ambivalence of ‘Hindustani’ allows him to invoke the 
religious/communal category while simultaneously denying accountability for so doing. It 
allows him to be a part of the Indian in-group as much as of the Hindu in-group. For the 
leader then, the in-group is family. The emotionality of the relationship is heightened 
since it is clearly referring to a violence that has ‘martyred’ his family members.   
 
In contrast, consider, the construction of group membership of the rivals, around another 
instance of violence: 
 
Rival: the Gujarat police encountered In Gujarat, one Ishrat Jehan, a terrorist girl. And she 
was shot dead. You would be aware, please remember that day. The entire world’s 5 star 
activists had broken loose on Modi. One female youth was killed. This innocent girl was killed. 
She was riddled with bullets. Not only this, friends, in this state, those 5 star activists and some 
media friends declared her a martyr and had organized a funeral procession for her. They had 
gone to cover her in a sheet! And one party’s leader, had donated 1 lakh rupees to her family 
(Page 9 – Modi). Friends, this is what happens, when such excuses are floated, and this sort of 
funeral processions are taken out, when they are covered in sheets, 1 lakh rupees are sacrificed, 
then the terrorists will power is strengthened. They think, ‘at least some of our relatives are here, 
we will manage a life. (Page 10 – Modi)  
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Modi recounts the murder of a Muslim girl, ostensibly a terrorist, by the Gujarat police. 
He describes the concern and emotions of the rival political party leaders towards the girl. 
It is evident that the emotions he feels for the girl: one of disdain, and the way the rivals 
and social activists: one of concern, are diametrically opposite. Apart from the financial 
help of the rival to the girl’s family, he draws on this to position the rival as part of the 
out-group, to the extent that terrorists apparently have their way since they are assured 
that the rival political party will take care of their concerns, just like family members. The 
rival strengthens the will power of the terrorists. The way Modi feels for his Hindu family 
is the same way the rivals feel for the terrorist Muslim out-group.  
 
This oppositional group membership of the leader versus the rivals is played out in 
different contexts, polarizing the characteristics of the leader against the rival in various 
ways. For example, the commitment required for securing the country against terrorism, 
by rivals and by the leader, is shown in the following excerpt:  
 
Ardent v/s Shallow:  
Friends, what effect POTA has on terrorists is subject to debate, but POTA increases the will 
power of the Indian armed forces. Friends, there was a time when the police forces had a 25 kg 
303 rifle. With a 303 rifle the poor fellow could not even run. When acts of terrorism increased 
in the country, almost every state handed AK 47’s to the police force. I would like to ask the 
Prime Minister, that in this backdrop of terrorism, you are handing AK 47’s instead of 303 rifles 
to the police, but you are not strengthening the authorizing pen. You rescind POTA29? What is 
your logic? I would like to understand. What is your logic? Don’t do it because the BJP is 
demanding it… It’s been fourteen years in this Mumbai; it’s been fourteen years since bomb 
blast cases have been going. And not even one of the perpetrators has so much as a scratch on 
him. Not one of the perpetrators has a scratch on him, but it was possible on Gujarat’s soil, 
because the POTA law provided the means to prosecute them. (Page 4 – Modi) 
 
The rival leadership, which is at the centre of power, is derided as one that takes its 
                                                
29
  POTA – Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002. The act defined what a terrorist act and a terrorist is and grants special powers 
to the investigating authorities described under the act. To ensure certain powers were not misused and human rights violations would 
not take place, specific safeguards were built into the act. Under the new law detention of a suspect for up to 180 days without the 
filing of charges in court was permitted. It also allowed law enforcement agencies to withhold the identities of witnesses and treats a 
confession made to the police as an admission of guilt. Under regular Indian law, a person can deny such confessions in court, but not 
under POTA. The act was misused on several accounts, notably for the arrest of SAR Geelani, a Delhi University lecturer who was 
sentenced to death by POTA (by the BJP-led Government) but was later acquitted of charges by the Delhi High Court (during the 
Congress-led Government)  
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responsibilities lightly. It is not only a lack of concern for the members of the in-group, 
but also implies a refusal to secure the safety of the in-group, and thereby strengthening 
the will power of the terrorists. This argument is made in the context of the POTA law 
(see footnote). In a context of terror, superficiality also implies an inability on the part of 
the rival to understand the tangible danger that the in-group is facing, as described by 
perpetrators still on loose in Mumbai. In contrast, Modi feelingly talks of the 
implementation of the law in Gujarat and his resolve in bringing the perpetrators to 
justice. He also aligns himself with the strengthening of the will of the Indian armed 
forces, thereby ensuring that he is working towards ensuring the security of the in-group, 
in the face of terrorism. The leaders resolve is passionate, while the rivals’ is shallow.   
 
Consider the following excerpt, on the dimension of courage:  
 
Strength v/s Cowardice:  
And as for the country’s leaders… they are scared to speak out against terrorism. And when 
they meet me personally, all these leaders speak the same words that I am speaking. The ones 
that shout outside, when they come home, they pat my back. I can take names, friends. And this 
means, they don’t have the courage, but want at least someone to do it (Page 7 – Modi) 
 
Modi barely hides his contempt and disgust for the rival even as he uses their cowardice 
for validating his position of strength. He hints that the behaviour of the rival is different 
in public and diametrically opposite in personal space. He discredits his rivals as 
pretenders even in the matter of enmity. According to the leader, the rivals do not even 
have the courage to stand up to scrutiny in public life, while he is one who speaks his 
mind honestly, publicly and privately. And yet, he also maintains an integrity that cannot 
be expected of the rivals. To back up his claims, he suggests that he could give out the 
names of the rivals who congratulate him secretly. But the fact that he does not give out 
the names shows Modi as a man who is decent even with rivals. The leader is honest and 
straightforward as much as the rivals are deceitful. He puts this across rather succinctly in 
the next excerpts: 
 
Group serving v/s Self-serving 
Only those are afraid, who die for their pictures,  
I am that person, who dies for India’s picture.  
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I do not care about my picture. (Page 8 – Modi) 
I speak at the right time in the right place with the right words. I don’t have the habit of spoiling 
newspaper space by speaking day and night. There are two kinds of leaders, friends. Some 
leaders believe in siddhi (perfection), and other leaders believe in prasiddhi (fame). (Page 9 – 
Modi) 
 
It is clear, that his devotion to the group overrides his own self-interest. His strength of 
conviction apparently emerges from his singular interest in creating a perfect country for 
his people, and is not interested in the stardom of newspaper space. The rivals on the 
other hand, seem to only live for their pictures to make it to the front page, and popularity 
ratings. Public accountability is replaced by self-serving propaganda. That his dedication 
to duty has brought results, is reflected in the next excerpt: 
 
Victor v/s Victim: 
So I said in that public gathering and said, ‘look brother, Assam’s neighbour is Bangladesh, 
and Gujarat’s neighbour is Pakistan. My situation is the same as yours. They are your next-door 
neighbours, and these are my next-door neighbours. And I said, but there is a slight difference. 
‘You are tormented because of them, they are tormented because of me.’ (Page 12 – Modi) 
 
Assam is ruled by a Congress-led Government while, Gujarat is led by Narendra Modi. 
Both the neighbouring countries of Pakistan and Bangladesh are Muslim-dominated, 
marked as out-groups (as shown in the section on out-groups) in the rhetoric of hate. In 
this scenario, Modi displays his power to dominate over his enemies while the enemy 
dominates over the rival. The people of Gujarat are victors since Modi leads them, while 
the people of Assam are victims of violence since the rivals lead them. Ashok Singhal at 
the Third World Hindu Conference accounts for the reason for such a difference in 
leadership in another speech:  
 
Nationalism v/s Politics:  
This congregation also believes that the terrorist activities in Kashmir, and the increase of 
Muslim orthodoxy in the country are dangerous to the Bharat’s unity and peace. Unfortunately 
the country’s political parties and politicians, inspired by vote-bank politics are appeasing the 
Muslims. It was because of this sort of appeasement that Bharat was partitioned in the past. 
Today, the same sort of question marks the entire country again. Will the patriotic Hindu 
society see the country fragmented again? The time now is not to divide the people by different 
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party-based selfish politics, but for the patriotic Hindu to break the walls created by these 
political parties and speak in one united voice for the sake of saving our ‘Dharma’. (Ashok 
Singhal – proposal 2) 
 
Though the generic political party is mentioned, it is significant that the term 
appeasement is used. Congress is accused of appeasing minorities and of vote-bank 
politics, in BJP rhetoric. Singhal links the partitioning of the sub-continent to such 
appeasement tactics of the rivals past leaders like Gandhi and Nehru. In turn, this is 
linked to Indian Muslims and terrorism destabilizing the country of India. The rivals 
indulge in petty politics over the larger interest of the nation, and allowed the nation to be 
divided. In a nutshell, Nehru and Gandhi come to represent the Muslim traitorous out-
group, while the saffron leaders represent the Hindu society, steeped in patriotism. The 
rivals represent divisiveness and selfishness in the form of politics; the leaders represent 
Unity and selflessness in the form of nationalism.  
 
The rivals’ link with various sorts of out-groups is discussed in the next section.  
 
3.4.4.2  Rivals & Out-groups 
 
In this section, we quote three excerpts to show Modi’s positioning of the rival as 
antagonists to the country’s people.  
 
Rival: Tell me friends! POTA law that was created to protect against the terrorists, the day the 
Indian Government decided to rescind the law, who would have distributed sweets? Who would 
have burst crackers? Friends, the entire Pakistan was distributing sweets, the entire Pakistan 
was eating sweets. Is this the work you are going to do? How are you going to save the country 
from terrorists? And this is why it has become difficult to trust their words. The people of this 
country cannot believe that these people will save them. (Page 6 – Modi) 
 
Modi indicts the rival leaders, who at present form the Government of India, as agents of 
Pakistan. Annulling the law that would have strengthened the Indian in-group against 
terror attacks (described in earlier sections) is linked to far more sinister designs than just 
shoddy responsibility of the previous excerpts. The effect of the rivals’ action is 
demonstrably shown with the consequent celebration in Pakistan. Thus, the rival makes/ 
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amends and revokes laws of the in-group, not for the benefit of the in-group but rather in 
the interest of the out-group (which in this case, is Pakistan). From international concerns, 
the rivals also align with out-groups within the country in the following ways: 
 
Friends, I am shocked. What is the Congress party doing? In Coimbatore, there was a bomb 
blast in 1998. At an election rally, there was a bomb blast. Advani jee was supposed to address 
the crowd. 58 people were killed. 58 people were sent to their death. Innocent people were 
killed. All those people are jailed. But you would be shocked to know, friends, in the Kerala 
assembly, all the political parties united. There are two main parties there – the congress and 
the communists. And the others are their comrades from the coalition. All of them unanimously, 
passed the proposal that the main accused of the ‘98 case, by the name of Madni, the one who is 
in jail, should be released from prison. What? What? What is the message that you want to give 
to the country? This! In the Kerala Assembly, and this was done on the auspicious day of Holi. 
They had called a special session. Friends, a special session! And in this special session, they 
passed this proposal: that any person who has committed an act of terrorism, he/she will be 
released from prison. Why? Because, they want to make him a candidate in the elections! (Page 
10 – Modi)  
 
An incident of bombing against the leader is described. Advani was the de-facto leader of 
the saffron brigade, touted to be the next Prime Minister of the country if BJP won. The 
person who masterminded the bombing was jailed, but according to Modi, the rival 
leadership connived to free this man, and then gave him a ticket to fight the elections 
under the Congress banner. He emphasizes that this decision was taken on Holi – a day 
auspicious for Hindus. In effect, he warns the audience that the rival leadership are in fact 
the terrorists themselves. Therefore they have a complete disregard for Hindu sentiments 
and lives. The identity of this out-group is much clearer in the next excerpt:   
 
ULFA – that indulges in acts of terrorism. The ones who kill innocents, kidnaps them. And 
you… you take them with you in the elections? You gain politically, that’s why you join hands 
with ULFA? With what temerity will you fight against terrorism? Friends, the Bihar election; a 
supporting party of the UPA, in that election, they used to roam around the election polls with a 
certain person. Why? Because, his face was like Bin Laden! He looks like Bin Laden! – and this 
they showed to secure their votes in Bihar! Friends, can you imagine! Even today, even today in 
India, no matter how strong Ravana was, does anyone ask for anything in the name of 
Ravana?! And these people roam with Bin Laden? And with what pride! And our friends in the 
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media also proudly stated that ‘see, he looks like Bin Laden’. I do not know what relationship 
they share from which life… (Page 11 – Modi)  
 
Modi makes it evident that the rival leadership forms close friendships with out-groups 
that are known to attack the Hindu in-group. This out-group in particular is Muslim, 
evidenced by the similarity to Bin Laden. The rivals are proud of this association, 
according to Modi, since they flaunt it as election gimmicks. Bin Laden is equated with 
Ravan (the ruler of Lanka and villain in Ramayana, infamous for kidnapping Sita). He 
goes on to wonder, how closely the rivals are related to Ravan/ Bin Laden.  
 
The rivals are firmly positioned as hostile and perhaps active destroyers of the in-group, 
and hence, clearly not fit for leading the in-group. In the next section, we show how this 
vacuum is filled in with instances of good leadership by the saffron brigade. The 
alternative to the weak, mean, callous, terrorist harbouring rivals is outlined in the 
following ways: 
3.4.4.3  Self as Ideal Leader 
 
The ideal leader is understood in relation to bad leadership of the rivals in the previous 
sections. In this section we focus on the ways in which Modi draws on several 
experiences and characteristics to position himself as the only leader fit to lead the in-
group:  
 
Visionary:  
Friends, I had just gone to Israel. Every person has a dream; of self-respect of their country, to 
fight for their country. Why can we not build this environment for Hindusthan? For the future 
of Bharat’s new generation, can we not give ourselves up? If our pictures are smeared, so be it, 
at least the country will be built! 
 (Page 18 – Modi) 
 
Modi paints his project for Hindustan: imagining the resurgent strength of India with 
Modi as its fountainhead. The craft of leadership lies in visualizing a future that both the 
followers and the leader can imagine as possible. Modi displays his political acumen well 
by citing Israel as an example of a strong country: one that India can emulate under his 
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leadership. For this, he is willing to sacrifice his ‘image’, and is willing to bear any 
ignominy in the cause of the in-group: 
 
Brave: What will I do with this image, friends? For what this image? For garlands of flowers? 
I am ready to be hit with stones, if I can save the life of my country’s citizens (Page 9 – Modi) 
 
The leader leads from the front, and in this case, Modi positions himself before the group. 
His ‘self’ is selfless before the lives of the in-group members. He is humble and brave, 
that the only time he puts himself before the group, is when the group interest lies in 
doing so. This pledge of action is reinforced in the beginning of the speech, in the middle, 
and at the end of it as well: 
 
Emotionality: And that is why I have come with a very heart, a very sad heart. To the 
families who lost their members, to them, I have come to reassure. I have come to reassure those 
families that the blood of your family’s son will bring colour. (Page 1 - Modi) 
Friends, I have promised, till there is life within me, I will search these merchants of death one 
by one and even them out. (Page 7- Modi)  
The country’s future has to be decided by the country’s citizens. It is up to us to end this game 
played by the merchants of death. We must do it. We will have to do it together. (Page 18 – 
Modi)  
 
The leader is emotionally connected with the in-group. He feels their pain, and their loss. 
The context of speech starts with an incident of violence and a promise of retribution. 
Modi’s leadership promises that there will be extreme consequences for the out-groups to 
face, especially for the ones that have dared to attack Modi’s beloved Hindu in-group, 
thereby securing the future of the in-group. 
 
3.5 Summary  
 
In this chapter, we added further layers to the model we developed in the chapter on 
visual representations. The richness of detail in precisely how groups are categorized, 
constituted and then set up in inter-group relations provided the backdrop to the questions 
asked: how are conditions for genocide or extreme hostilities sanctioned? And why are 
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certain stereotypes put forward. To sum up the various strands of arguments generated 
from the qualitative researches:  
1. Particular representations of an out-group are put forth to bolster aggressive 
leadership on the one hand and undermine rival credibility on the other. The 
qualities are usually in opposition to one other, the positives attributed to self as 
leader, and negatives to the rivals. In other words, category prototypicality is 
contested and positioned.  
a. Strong leader/ weak rival 
b. Courageous leader/ Timid rivals 
c. Effective governance of leader/ Mis-governance of rivals 
d. Service before self for leader/ Self before service for rivals 
2. Leaders are shown to be of the in-group, and rivals are progressively shown to be 
of the out-group. This links to the studies showing that category constructions are 
crucial to the ways in which action is solicited. This goes a step further to show 
that only by positioning oneself as prototypical of the group can one then draw the 
comparison to discredit political rivals by showing the self as the strongest 
possible choice, in fact, perhaps the only choice (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001). This 
is done in the following ways 
a. Rivals by their silence at the atrocities directed towards the in-group by the 
out-group, making policies that appease the out-group, allowing the out-
groups to attack the in-group’s sacred places, actively creating 
opportunities for the out-group to outnumber in-group.   
b. Leaders by taking strong authoritarian positions against the out-group, 
recommending and carrying out swift military action in the interests of the 
in-group, urging members of the in-group to be more vigilant, leading 
from the front of this aggression.   
3. Entrepreneurs of identity evoke out-group threats and hateful representations of 
out-group to police the behaviour of the in-group (mostly the codes are set for 
women). 
4. The relationship between the in-group and the out-groups is one of threat. Various 
kinds of threats are constructed:  
a. Sacred – Desecration of temples, attacks on women - symbolized by 
torture discourse on the cow, and partitioning of the mother-land of India. 
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b. Economic, financial, citizenship rights, numerical strength,  
c. Death – control of fate over the in-group members. Family members 
death. Annihilation of in-group values and people.  
5. Under conditions of threat: the more exclusively virtuous the in-group, the greater 
the aggression against an out-group threat. 
 
In the next chapter, we draw on data from the qualitative studies to design an 
experimental manipulation of out-group threat and in group virtue. The position of in-
group virtuousness as a reason for sanctioning and carrying out extreme hostilities against 
out-groups is hypothesised and tested.  
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4  Study 3: Experiment - Virtuous Violence. 
 
The previous chapters used qualitative analyses to explore the nature of hate discourse in 
two mediums – visual representations in posters and mobilizations by political speeches. 
A model that combines intra-group struggles of power within the framework of inter-
group hate rhetoric was proposed from these analyses. Among the many interesting issues 
that emerged, one in particular struck as peculiarly counter-intuitive – the notion that the 
virtue of an in-group is used to warrant/ justify aggression against a threatening out-
group. In this chapter we shall focus on testing the role of in-group virtue in sanctioning 
inter-group violence. 
4.1   Introduction 
 
A key theme that emerged from the previous qualitative studies is that entrepreneurs of 
hate construct inter-group relations in such a way that under certain conditions, extreme 
hostilities or the sanctioning of such violence against ‘enemy’ out-groups are celebrated. 
It has been contended that these exclusionary conditions emerge from a combination of 
two things: a) Out-group threat; and b) A virtuous in-group.  
  
The ways in which this internal moral logic that leads up to such a violent 
conclusion is constructed have been analysed and discussed in the previous chapters. 
Largely, it is exemplified in poster no. 11 of the first qualitative study in this thesis (p. 
66). Recall the poster of a Hindu king chopping off the hands of a Muslim butcher with 
the caption, “cow-killer deserves to be slain”. This is also seen in other forms in the 
exhortation of the political leader’s speech in chapter 3 (the second qualitative study of 
this thesis). Hence, violence becomes virtuous when it is directed against out-groups that 
threaten a virtuous in-group.  
 
 Yet to show that this is how leaders seek to motivate out-group hatred by analysing 
discourse is not the same as demonstrating that such constructions are effective in 
creating out-group hatred in the population, or that such conditions will lead to demands 
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for hostile measures and behaviours against the Muslim out-group. Hence, the aim of this 
study is to provide experimental data for the contention that the worst or the most 
stringent forms of repression and suppression happen when an in-group norm of virtue is 
made salient in conjunction with the presence of out-group threat. In research terms, this 
study aims to experimentally demonstrate that an in-group norm of tolerance would 
predict higher violence under conditions of threat, than when the in-group norm is not of 
tolerance. 
4.1.1  The cultural context for the present study: 
 
Since the experiment was to be conducted in India, a cultural understanding of Hindu 
(Indian) in-group norms and commonly held stereotypical notions of the particular ways 
in which Muslims threaten the in-group was drawn upon to design materials for the two 
Independent factors of the experiment. The Dependent Variables outlining various 
methods for ‘effective’ suppression and repression of Muslim ‘menace’ were also 
developed from themes that emerged from the qualitative studies and from the 
researcher’s cultural experience. Presented below is a background to the development of 
the materials:  
 
Independent factors:  
Virtuous in-group:   
 
“India and Hindu are often equated when defining Indian culture, whose core 
characteristics are most often taken to be Hindu” writes David Ludden in the introduction 
to his incisively titled edited book ‘Making India Hindu’ (Ludden, 2005, p. 4). The Indian 
in-group is constituted as essentially virtuous and pious and is posited with qualities that 
are thought to be uniquely linked with Hinduism (see 3.2.1 of this thesis). In particular, 
‘tolerance’ has been emphasized as the basic strain of Hindu civilization. It is to be noted 
that in the Indian context, ‘tolerance’ is not understood as a negative term but has 
strongly moral and positive connotations reflective of Gandhian principles of respect for 
peaceful coexistence among religious groups informed by the notion that the ‘Hindu 
civilization is basically tolerant’(Veer, 1996). Hence, for this experiment the in-group 
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norm manipulation was designed to appear Indian with tolerance as the distinctively 
Hindu characteristic. 
  
Threat: 
 
Extensive studies have been conducted on the impact of realistic threats and symbolic 
threats, and symbolic threats have consistently been shown to evoke strident reactions as 
opposed to realistic threats (Pereira, Vala, & Leyens, 2009; Riek, Mania, & Gaertner, 
2006; Schneider, 2008; González et al., 2008). However, for the purposes of this 
experiment, we decided to use realistic threat as an independent variable since the 
experiment was to be conducted with an impressionable population that would have been 
directly susceptible to accepting hate discourse without a critical lens. Therefore, we drew 
on realistic threats from the previous qualitative studies to formulate the items.  
 
A common anti-Muslim joke is ‘us five, ours twenty-five’ (Pandey, 2006; Sarkar, 
1996), usually caricatured by a figure of a Muslim man surrounded by 4 wives with 
twenty-five children. This stereotype is rooted in the provisions of the Muslim Personal 
Law in India that allows for polygamy. As noted in the prologue this particular 
construction of numerical strength of out-group threat was also used in the leaflets that 
were distributed in preparation for the Gujarat carnage (see prologue of this thesis). The 
notion that the Muslims are reproducing and increasing their numerical strength 
exponentially is a recurrent theme in the hate rhetoric of Hindutva (see 3.2.3.1 of 
previous chapter). 
 
Also, in a set of posters that were put up in the same tent as the posters that was used for 
data analysis in the first study, a series of the ‘increase in Muslim and Christian numbers’ 
was presented as ‘facts’ that were then reinforced with statistical figures. These posters 
were sprinkled with official-looking figures with one punchy headline, capturing the 
apparent meaning of all those numbers. The numbers were faded prints of district-wise 
data, but only just, to fit the official look of mouldy Government documents. It was 
captioned: Increase in Muslim and Christian population and it’s influence on elections. 
This fear of the purported increase in Muslim population (Bhagat & Praharaj, 2005) is 
linked with the notion of the ‘Muslim’ vote as one consolidated political identity 
 
 
 
150 
(Varshney, 2002) as opposed to the loosely based Hindu identity, deeply divided on caste, 
regional and linguistic lines (Datta, 1993). This idea that the community votes as a single 
bloc of voters is what is referred to as ‘vote bank’ politics.30 That the Muslims with their 
‘vote-bank’ politics will come to ‘influence’ (or, if one is to accept the Hindutva 
propaganda, have already started influencing) core issues with greater political clout than 
the relatively loosely defined majoritarian Hindus is a cause of perpetual panic for most 
Hindu-Indian citizens. Inculcating and mobilizing the fear of this projected influence of 
the ‘Other’ on a range of issues from greater electoral power than Hindus to cultural 
dominance over the Hindus is therefore, central to the threat discourse, and most in India 
would recognize Muslim ‘influence’ as a code for threat.  
 
Dependent Variables:  
Extreme acts of hatred have a strong ‘moral’ component. In the trajectory of combining 
the in-group virtue of tolerance with a fearsome out-group threat, aggression against the 
out-group is defended in terms of  ‘tolerance’ of the in-group. In other words, since the 
very value of tolerance is under threat of annihilation, it is in defence of the Hindu nation 
that tolerance must be substituted with intolerance. Entrepreneurs incite a range of hostile 
behaviours from the in-group members as ‘reasonable reactions’, and a complex mix of 
emotions like anger, frustration, humiliation are mobilized in the service of sanctioning 
hostility against the out-group (see 3.2.3 of this thesis) The one used to justify the anti-
Muslim pogrom in Gujarat of 2002, for instance, was of provoked ‘spontaneous Hindu 
outrage’. The other instances call for direct violence, active repression, and cultural 
suppression. For example, a Hindu ideologues’ call to stop all financial and business 
transactions with the Muslim community (see chapter 3 of this thesis) or a woman 
ideologues’ exhort to curb inter-mixing between Hindu and Muslim communities 
especially Hindu women and Muslim men (see chapter 3 of this thesis). For dependent 
variables, an affect scale measuring anti-Muslim feeling was developed with items culled 
from previous qualitative research and a few from previously tested studies in India 
(Tausch et al., 2009). 12 Action-statement items were put together informed by the 
‘appropriate’ reactions that have been proposed by the Hindutva ideologues. 
                                                
30 The Congress party is usually accused by the BJP for indulging in ‘vote-bank’ politics.  
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4.1.2  Hypothesis :   
An interaction effect (Virtue X Threat) is predicted on the DV’s. In research 
design terms, in the conditions with out-group threat present, there will be more 
(a) negative feelings towards Muslims  
(b) cultural suppression of Muslims  
(c) repressive action against Muslims  
(d) sanctioned violence against Muslims;  
in the condition of  in-group virtue than the condition with no in-group virtue.  
4.2 Methods 
4.2.1   Participants 
95 Undergraduate Engineering students in an age range of 18-22 and registered as 
Hindu (religion) in the College admission records.  
4.2.2   Design 
This is a two factor [2X2] independent subjects design. The first factor is Threat 
with two levels (Absent/ Present). The second factor is Virtue also with two levels 
(Absent/ Present). The participants were almost equally distributed in all four conditions. 
The composition of the four conditions and the manipulations were as follows:  
 
Condition 1 (Appendix 4-b) 
Virtue (Absent) 
Threat (Absent) 
= 25 
Condition 2 (Appendix 4-c) 
Virtue (Present) 
Threat (Absent) 
= 20 
Condition 3 (Appendix 4-d) 
Virtue (Absent) 
Threat (Present) 
= 23 
Condition 4 (Appendix 4-e) 
Virtue (Present) 
Threat (Present) 
= 27 
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4.2.3   Materials :  
The material consisted of an 8-page booklet, tailor-made for each of the four 
conditions: a relevant instruction page followed by the introduction of visual stimuli for 
the Independent factors of 1) Virtue (neutral or manipulated), and 2) Threat (neutral or 
manipulated). The next section of the booklet, (pages 5,6,7 and 8) containing the 
Dependent Variables and demographic questions, was the same for all four conditions.  
4.2.3.1  Independent Factors 
4.2.3.1.1  Virtue: Manipulation of in-group norm 
Virtue was operationalised by getting participants to evaluate visual banners for a 
website that the researcher had been asked to develop.  
 
The Virtue-absent and Virtue-present conditions were introduced as unrelated 
to the actual survey. Participants were informed that the project involved developing a 
webpage for celebrating the Indian way of life focussing on a unique aspect, which was 
textiles for the Virtue-absent condition and tolerance for the Virtue-present condition, 
thus ensuring that tolerance was manipulated as a function of in-group norm, in contrast 
to something neutral as textiles. 
 
In the virtue-absent condition, a neutral theme was chosen – Indian textiles and 
participants saw 3 visual banners stressing how textile production is a timeless feature of 
Indian culture (see appendix 4-b, 4-d). In the Virtue (present) condition the theme was 
Indian tolerance and participants saw 3 visual banners that stresses tolerance as a timeless 
attribute of Indian culture (see appendix 4-c, 4-e). Banners in both conditions were 
designed to keep them as similar as possible with a distinctive Hindu touch, and only the 
text (Textile/ Tolerance) changed.  
 
So for example, in the Virtue-absent condition, the first banner (see appendix 4-
b,4-d) reads “textiles” against a background of the Indian national flag colours. The ‘i’ in 
“textile” is designed to look like a vermillion smear (worn by Hindus on their forehead). 
Similarly the first banner in the Virtue-present condition (see appendix 4-c, 4-e) has the 
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text “tolerance” written across it with the ‘o’ replaced by the Hindu sign for ‘Om’; 
thereby ensuring that both banners retained a distinctively Hindu strain. The manipulation 
was therefore ensured as a change of in-group norm. Furthermore, the following 
different instructions were printed for the two (absent/ present) conditions: 
 
The virtue-absent condition: (Appendix 4-b, 4-d) 
The webpage will showcase the importance of Textiles  in the traditional Indian way of 
l ife. According to the Rig Veda and the Upanishads, the universe is a continuous fabric with a 
grid pattern upon which cycles of life are painted.  
Indian textiles  have evolved with the development of Hindu civilisation and its significance is 
hallowed by tradition. With this ethos, these three banners have been designed to represent our 
Vedic civilization through Indian textiles.  
 
The virtue-present condition: (Appendix 4-c, 4-e)  
The webpage will showcase the importance of Tolerance in the traditional Indian way 
of l ife. According to the Rig Veda and the Upanishads, the universe is a continuous cycle of 
karma, with tolerance being the sacred value upon which hinge the cycles of rebirth.  
Indian tolerance has evolved with the development of Hindu civilisation and its significance 
is hallowed by tradition. With this ethos, these three banners have been designed to represent 
our Vedic civilization through the sacred value of ‘tolerance’.  
  
To make the story about the webpage appear as authentic as possible, the 
participants were also asked to rank the banners on aspects pertaining to 
representativeness and attractiveness of the theme.  
4.2.3.1.2  Threat: Manipulation of Out-group Characteristics 
Given the prevailing context of aggression against Muslims in the Indian 
discourse, it was felt that the tricky part was going to be in successfully inducing a 
positive (threat-absent condition) representation of the Muslim out-group. The conditions 
(threat-absent/ threat-present) were designed as a cover-page for a survey report 
simulating the Sachar Committee Report on Minorities, a published Government of India 
report.31 
 
                                                
31 The Sachar Committee Report is a well-known piece of Government document that surveyed and reported about the socio-
economic, political and educational condition of minorities (in particular the Muslim community) in India.  
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Common to both conditions (Threat-absent and present) was the overall 
framework of a cover-page comprising of a map of India with ten leading personalities 
from various fields, all bearing Islamic names. In the Threat-absent condition (see 
appendix 4-b, 4-c) three figures were different than in the Threat-present Condition (see 
appendix 4-d, 4-e). On the bottom left corner of the map were the words ‘Social, 
Economic and Educational Status of the Muslim Community of India’ replicating the 
Sachar Committee Report. The specific differences in both conditions to introduce 
‘Threat’ are outlined as follows:  
 
In the Threat (Absent) Conditions (refer: Appendix 4-b, 4-c) the top right corner read 
‘The Muslim Contribution in India’.  
 
A brief description followed:  
The Threat-absent Condition:   
The report indicates three important things: 
1. A substantial increase in the contribution of Muslims to India, 
2. Muslim contribution in areas of social, economic, political and cultural life of India 
3. Muslim contribution to India’s pride and prestige in the international arena 
Participants were then asked to rank the level of contribution that they thought the 
personalities had to India’s excellence. 
 
In the Threat (present) Conditions (refer: Appendix 4-d, 4-e) the following changes 
were made: 
The heading of the cover-page read: ‘The Muslim Influence in India’.  
The Threat-present Condition: 
The report indicates three important things: 
 1. A disproportionate emergence of Muslim influence in India, 
2. Muslim authority in areas of social, economic, political and cultural life. 
3. A commitment to reshaping the cultural landscape of India. 
Participants were then asked to rank the level of intent that they thought the personalities 
had to take-over India.  
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4.2.3.2  Dependent Variables 
The Dependent Variables were included in guided by research of the qualitative 
analyses. An Affect Scale and Action-statements followed by a virtue manipulation check 
items and 5 identification questions.    
4.2.3.2.1  Affect Scale: 
15 items were used to measure Affect. Participants were asked to rate what they 
feel when they think about Muslims. They were asked to report the intensity of their 
emotions on a range of 0 (not at all) to 9 (completely). These constructs were primarily 
arrived at from the qualitative analyses of the hate rhetoric. These were the emotions that 
the leaders generated, encouraged and insisted that true Hindus must feel against 
Muslims. The construct of ‘contempt’ however, was introduced by one of the researchers 
as a construct that had been used before to measure anti-feeling towards the out-group 
(Tausch et al., 2011), and was included because of prior usage.  
 
The Affect scale had the following constructs –  
Anger measured by the items Angry, Annoyed, Infuriated 
Anxiety measured by Nervous, Apprehensive, Upset;  
Threatened measured by Intimidated, Frightened, Vulnerable, Cheated  
Happiness measured by Happy, cheerful, relaxed; and  
Contempt measured by Contempt, Disdain.  
 
The construct of happiness was deliberately introduced to balance the overall negative 
affect scale with some positive affect. 
4.2.3.2.2  Action-statements 
The 12-item Action-statements were pieced together informed by themes that 
emerged from the qualitative analysis. Repressive Action, Cultural Suppression, Violence 
against Out-group and Threat manipulation check.  
 
Participants were asked to Strongly disagree signified by four negative signs (- - - -) to 
Strongly agree signified by four plus signs (+ + + +) on a range of decreasing 
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disagreement of 4 degrees and increasing agreement of 4 degrees on either side. There 
was no neutral option available. The themes on which items were included are:  
 
Repressive Action: ‘We need strong anti-terror laws to protect our country 
against Muslim terrorism.’; ‘Since Muslims take advantage of Indian tolerance, 
our aggression against Muslims is an act of self-defence’ and one positively 
worded (reverse coded) item statement ‘For national security, it is not reasonable 
for the Army and Police to use strong methods to interrogate Muslims suspected 
of terrorism’ 
 
Cultural Suppression: Three item-statements were used to measure the construct 
of Cultural Suppression. ‘The Muslim call for prayers (Azaan) through loud-
speakers should be prohibited’; ‘For Indian democracy, Islamic religious 
teachings by Mullahs should not be tolerated’; and one positively worded 
(reverse-coded) item-statement, ‘Islamic educational institutions like Madrassahs 
should be allowed to function’.  
 
Violence against Out-group: Three items that had been scaled reliably in a 
previous study by (Tausch et al, 2011) were used to measure sanctioned violence 
against Muslims. ‘In general, I sympathise when some Indians use violence 
against Muslims, even though I do not condone violence itself.’; ‘I understand the 
reasons given by some Indians for the use of violence, even though I do not 
condone violence itself.’; and ‘I support the reasons given by some Indians for the 
use of violence against Muslims even though I do not condone violence itself.’ 
 
Threat: There were three items that were reverse-coded and put as a threat 
manipulation check. ‘Muslims have contributed positively to Indian culture’; 
‘Most Muslims are willing to live in peace with others Indians’ and ‘Some 
Muslims have contributed greatly to India’s excellence in science and technology 
4.2.3.2.3  Virtue manipulation check and identification:  
Though these items were included in the experiment, they have not been analysed 
in the present study.  
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4.2.4  Procedure: 
4.2.4.1  Pilot: 
Both Independent factors, Virtue and Threat, were piloted as manipulation checks 
with 2 small groups of people (N=20, N=30) in India, and both were found to 
discriminate significantly.  
 
4.2.4.2  Main Study:  
Note: Since it was not possible for the researcher to be present in India at the time 
of running the experiment, a senior psychologist in India was entrusted with the 
responsibility of conducting the experiment in accordance with the academic rigour and 
ethical standards of UTREC. 
 
The study was conducted in an engineering college in Bhubaneshwar, Odisha (an Eastern 
state of India). Prior permission had been taken from a lecturer at the college for her class 
timings for conducting the experiment. This particular class was chosen because all the 
students were registered as Hindu, and because the students were already seated in two 
separate classrooms, as section A and B.  
 
The experiment was introduced to the participants as a survey of Indian attitudes. They 
were told that this survey was part of a research project of a student and their cooperation 
and help was solicited. Participants were free to walk out of the class if they didn’t want 
to participate in the research. None did, and the experiment commenced. They were then 
told that before the survey about the attitudes of Indians (the threat manipulation), there is 
another small visual survey that their participation is requested for. They were asked to 
rate visual banners, (given on the second page of their experimental booklets) for a 
webpage themed around ‘Indian value of the year’. This was the virtue manipulation. 
These instructions were given in both classrooms, one after the other. 
 
All the participants were given stapled experimental booklets specific to the experimental 
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conditions, containing instructions towards a web-page design (Independent Factor -1) 
and a survey (Independent Factor-2) followed with response sheets containing the DV’s. 
 
In condition 1 (Virtue-absent, Threat-absent), participants were given the 
experimental booklet contained in appendix 4-b 
In condition 2 (Virtue-present, Threat-absent), participants were given the 
experimental booklet contained in appendix 4-c 
In condition 3 (Virtue-absent, Threat-present), participants were given the 
experimental booklet contained in appendix 4-d 
In condition 4 (Virtue-present, Threat-present), participants were given the 
experimental booklet contained in appendix 4-e 
 
After about 45 minutes, the psychologist who was conducting the experiment on behalf of 
the researcher requested all the participants from all the four conditions to gather in one 
room for a debriefing and open question-answer session. The debriefing emphasized that 
the manipulations and ‘facts’ that had been given to the participants in the threat-present 
condition were not true facts per se, but stereotypical constructions of Muslims in hate 
propaganda. Each ‘threat’ and dependent variable action-statements were carefully 
explained as ‘constructions’ and not ‘reality’. And counter-arguments and statistical 
information was provided to dismantle the connections, especially of the ‘Muslim-
problem’ of population. The role of in-group virtue was explained, and the actual aim of 
the experiment was disclosed. Participants were also asked to reflect upon the counter-
intuitive notion that ‘tolerance might actually make us nastier under certain conditions.’ 
 
Should they have further questions, they were asked to contact the psychologist who was 
conducting the experiment on his phone number. A debriefing form containing 
information about the study, a short description of how public discourses must be 
scrutinized and the contact information of the researcher and her supervisor (see appendix 
4-f) was also given to the participants to take back with them.  
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4.3   Results 
The analysis was carried out in two phases. A preliminary analysis (4.3.1) followed 
by the Main Analysis (4.3.2) 
4.3.1  Preliminary Analysis :  
A preliminary investigation of the data was conducted, testing for reliability and 
ANOVA, which was later changed to ANCOVA, because of the data screening in 4.3.1.1.  
4.3.1.1  Gender Effect :  
Gender was not conceptualized as a factor in the initial experiment. However, 
after scrutinizing the data, it was analysed using Gender as an independent variable. Since 
the gender constitution of the groups have a disproportionately unequal distribution 
particularly in condition 4 where both the Independent factors Threat and Virtue were 
manipulated  (Males = 21, Females = 6), it was decided to use gender as a covariate to 
partial out the effect if any, from the dependent variables. 
4.3.1.2  Affect Scale: 
The reliability of the scale was calculated with the three happiness items reverse-
coded and it was found at an acceptable value (α=.85) The scale was further analysed in 
the main analysis.   
4.3.1.3  Action-Statements:  
 A reliability analysis of the Action-Statements, (five items reverse-coded), was 
found to be at α=.45  
 
An ANCOVA revealed no significant main effects. However, there was a 
marginally significant32 interaction (Virtue*Threat), F(1,90)=3.37, p=.07. On further 
                                                
32 (p 166; (Aron, Aron, & Coups, 2007) The authors recommend an increase in the level of significance to 
10% (.05 to .1) for exploratory experimental studies conducted within robust theoretical paradigms. Given 
that the experimental hypothesis emerged from rich qualitative studies and was formulated with a predicted 
direction in the exploratory stage, it can be argued that Aron’s proposition is applicable to the present 
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analysis of simple main effects (groups split by threat), it was found that Virtue had no 
effect in the Threat-absent condition. 
 
However, a similar analysis in the Threat (present) condition revealed a marginally 
significant effect of Virtue F(1,47)=3.18, p=.08. The Mean of Condition (Threat-present 
and Virtue-absent) = 3.89 is less than the Mean of Condition (Threat-present and Virtue-
absent) = 4.26. This lends support to the hypothesis that in the Threat-present condition 
an introduction of Virtue leads to an increase in the general demand of curb measures 
towards Muslims.  
 
With the statistical analysis yielding low reliability, but ANCOVA indicating a pattern, 6 
items were re-organised. Items measuring support for violence against the Out-group 
though used in a different study (Tausch et al, 2011) would also be dropped due to the 
complex wordings of the item-statements. The experimenter had also received feedback 
that the participants had difficulty in understanding the meaning and import of those 
particular items. Though this did not improve the reliability of the ‘scale’, the results on 
the ANCOVA showed significant effects and were included in the main analysis. 
4.3.2  Main Analysis 
The main analysis proceeded on two sets of Dependent Variables a) Affect Scale 
and b) Action-statements comprising of 6 items (discarding 6 in the preliminary analysis) 
in two steps:  
i) Interaction effect; and  
ii) Analysis of simple main effects - Each interaction effect was subjected to a 
further analysis to check for direction of the effect, i.e. Simple main effects: 
the overall data were split by threat (into low threat and threat) and analysed 
for effect of tolerance in low threat condition and effect of tolerance in high 
threat condition.  
 
Everything was analysed keeping gender as covariate.  
                                                                                                                                            
analysis 
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4.3.2.1  Affect Scale: 
The reliability of the scale was calculated with the three happiness items reverse-
coded and it was found at an acceptable value (α=.85).  
 
ANCOVA: There was no significant main effect. However, there was a 
significant interaction effect (Virtue*Threat), F(1,90)=7.67, p=.007  
 
On further analysis of simple main effects (groups split by threat), it was found that Virtue 
had a significant effect in Threat-absent condition, F(1,42)=6.83, p=.01. The Mean of 
Condition (Threat-absent and Virtue-absent) = 3.65 is greater than the Mean of Condition 
(Threat-absent and Virtue-present) = 2.60. The direction in the difference of Means 
indicates that introducing Virtue in a Threat-absent condition drops the level of negative 
feelings towards the Muslim out-group. 
 
A similar analysis in the Threat (present) condition reveals no significant effect of Virtue. 
However, the Mean of Condition (Threat-present and Virtue-absent) = 2.97 is less than 
the Mean of Condition (Threat-present and Virtue-present) = 3.33, suggests that in the 
high threat condition, an introduction of Virtue tends to increase the negative affect 
towards the Muslim out-group. The direction of the difference in Means lends some 
support to the hypothesis, even though the difference is not significant. 
4.3.2.2  Cultural Suppression & Active Repression: 
Though combining the Cultural Suppression and the Repressive Action into a 
‘scale’ yielded a low reliability score (α=.37), the items when put together discriminated 
between the conditions. 
 
ANCOVA on the items written for cultural suppression and active repression 
showed an interaction (Virtue*Threat) effect found at F=(1,90), p=.04  
 
An analysis of the simple main effects (groups split by threat), revealed that Virtue  
had no effect in the Threat-absent condition. However, in line with the predicted 
hypothesis, a similar analysis in the Threat (present) condition revealed a significant 
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effect of Virtue F(1,47)=4.57, p=.03. The difference is in the predicted direction since, 
the Mean of Condition (Threat-present and Virtue-absent) = 4.06 is less than the Mean of 
Condition (Threat-present and Virtue-absent) = 4.70.  
4.4  Discussion: 
The hypothesis combined in-group virtue and out-group into a counter-intuitive 
proposition: under conditions of high threat, greater professed in-group tolerance norm 
will lead to greater sanction of more stringent actions against the out-group. The key 
finding is that we do find the expected interactions on the predicted dependent variables, 
although the exact nature of the interaction is different on different measures.  
 
The interaction on the Affect Scale was significant F(1,90)=7.67, p=.007. But a further 
analysis on the simple main effects, revealed that the shape of the interaction was not in 
the predicted direction. Virtue did not increase negative feelings towards Muslims in 
conditions of high threat, however, virtue did decrease negative feelings towards Muslims 
under conditions of no threat F(1,42)=6.83, p=.01 Though the research hypothesis for the 
affect scale was disconfirmed, the interesting part is that tolerance has a positive effect as 
a virtue where out-group threat is absent.  
 
The interaction of virtue and threat on 6 Action-statements analysed together was 
significant at F=(1,90), p=.04 [The Repressive Action action-statement items were: ‘We 
need strong anti-terror laws to protect our country against Muslim terrorism.’; ‘Since 
Muslims take advantage of Indian tolerance, our aggression against Muslims is an act of 
self-defence’ and one positively worded (reverse coded) item statement ‘For national 
security, it is not reasonable for the Army and Police to use strong methods to interrogate 
Muslims suspected of terrorism’. Cultural suppression action-statement items were: ‘The 
Muslim call for prayers (Azaan) through loud-speakers should be prohibited’; ‘For 
Indian democracy, Islamic religious teachings by Mullahs should not be tolerated’; and 
one positively worded (reverse-coded) item-statement, ‘Islamic educational institutions 
like Madrassahs should be allowed to function’.] This was further analysed to determine 
the shape of the interaction. Virtue had no effect in the condition where threat was absent, 
however, virtue worked in the predicted direction in the condition where threat is present 
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at F(1,47)=4.57, p=.03 Therefore the research-hypothesis on the action-statements in a 
particular combination was confirmed.  
 
The final hypothesis of Violence against Out-group measures did not work. A plausible 
explanation could be because of the way that the statements were framed. Apart from the 
complicated sentence structure, while all the other item-statements imply generic support 
for or against suggested actions, these three items invoked a sense of personal 
accountability (‘In general, I sympathise when some Indians use violence against 
Muslims, even though I do not condone violence itself.’; ‘I understand the reasons given 
by some Indians for the use of violence, even though I do not condone violence itself.’; 
and ‘I support the reasons given by some Indians for the use of violence against Muslims 
even though I do not condone violence itself.) The manipulation check of threat did not 
work in the actual experiment.  This is an issue that needs further research. 
 
Understanding Threat: The influential intergroup theory by Stephan and colleagues 
states, “We now believe that in general low power groups are more likely than high 
power groups to experience threats but that high power groups to the extent that they 
actually perceive that they are threatened will react more strongly to threat” (p 70 
Stephan, Ybarra, & Morrison, 2009).  The literature on inter-group threat theory suggests 
that using symbolic threat would have led to a greater possibility of sanctioning violence 
against the outgroup rather than realistic threat (Pereira et al., 2009; González et al., 
2008). Work done by Tausch and colleagues in India, within the framework of intergroup 
threat theory, show that while realistic threat might be a proximal predictor of prejudice, 
the findings are constrained by the particular group identities of majority and minority 
group identities. So for example, for Hindus (majority group) symbolic threat predicted 
prejudice while for Muslims (minority group) it was realistic threat (Tausch et al., 2009)  
This is an important finding for the context in which this experiment was conducted on 
Hindu students. The experiment also carries within it the ethical consideration of ensuring 
that in the process of participation in the experiment, hate discourse is not inadvertently 
endorsed. The manipulation of realistic threat instead of symbolic threat was one that was 
based on an ethical judgment. Since this is not something one can conduct without 
ensuring further follow up in terms of workshops or sustained engagement with the 
participants, the researchers decided that a debrief session of 2 hours would not suffice. In 
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contrast, realistic threat dealing with ‘statistics’ can be countered as made-up data citing 
various other sources. Ethically, this was judged to be a more acceptable process within 
the available time than ending up doing more harm by adding to the discourse of hate 
with symbolic threat manipulations.  
 
Therefore an intensive debriefing session was organised at the end of the experiment for 
participants of all conditions dismantling the ‘facts’ that had been put forward as 
manipulations, especially noting that social scientists in various papers (Phadke, 1993; 
Puniyani, 2005; Rohini, 1993; Thapar, 1989) argue that there is little or no truth to the 
claims of Muslim over-population made by the saffron ideologues. 
 
The results though conservative in significance and effect, shed light on the impact of in-
group virtue and out-group threat on emotion and action-statements. In cases of emotion, 
virtue can lead to decreased negativity for those not threatened, but not for those 
threatened. In the case of action-statements demanding measures to curb typically Islamic 
cultural practises, virtue leads to increased negativity for those who are threatened but not 
those who are not threatened. Interestingly, Stephan and colleagues also note, realistic 
threats would be expected to lead to more ‘pragmatic’ responses to the outgroup, as 
behaviour designed to cope with the threat (Stephan et al., 2009, p. 53).  
4.5   Limitations 
There are a number of methodological limitations of this study and ethical 
considerations that must be kept in view before assessing the potential for further studies.  
 
The reliability conundrum: The Action-statements have very low reliability as sub-scales 
of dimensions of Active Repression, Cultural Suppression, Violence and as an overall 
scale. However, it is to be noted that when the items for the action-statements were 
conceptualised, they weren’t pre-tested for scale reliability because it was not put 
together with the larger research interest of developing a scale or test. The items were 
worded and developed specifically for this experiment. Therefore, culturally embedded 
items were developed with material informed by the two previous qualitative researches, 
(see chapter 2 and 3 of this thesis) to discriminate well amongst the four experimental 
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conditions. For future studies, it would be advisable to fine-tune the measuring 
instruments for a better sensitive index with pre-tested reliable scales.  
 
The specific sample: The participants were undergraduate engineering students, perhaps 
not particularly engaged with the political scenario. The results may have been stronger 
had this been conducted in areas where mobilizations have been active, and perhaps 
would have yielded very different results with students in those Universities. 
 
Compared to the discourses available in the public space (see chapter 2 and 3 of this 
thesis), the manipulations used in the experiment, (especially the threat manipulation) 
was relatively subtle. There is also a considerable distance between the written measures 
and the behaviours that the researchers were interested in. For this study, the measure that 
came closest to sanctioning direct action against the out-group i.e. Violence against Out-
group failed to work altogether. Most obviously the measures need to be addressed and 
revised carefully. However since, there was an interaction effect found on action-
statements in the dimension of cultural suppression and active repression with items that 
included expressions of antagonism against the Muslim out-group (i.e. Since Muslims 
take advantage of Indian tolerance, our aggression against Muslims is an act of self-
defence’) and curb measures disallowing Muslims their right to practise their religion 
(‘The Muslim call for prayers (Azaan) through loud-speakers should be prohibited’; ‘For 
Indian democracy, Islamic religious teachings by Mullahs should not be tolerated’; and 
one positively worded (reverse-coded) item-statement, ‘Islamic educational institutions 
like Madrassahs should be allowed to function’) it does lead one to ponder about the 
significance of how written measures might translate to action, i.e. if they are prepared to 
say this in class to academics, what might they do in normative contexts, which are more 
supportive of anti-Muslim action. 
 
As discussed in the previous section on the responses to realistic and symbolic threats, the 
experiment used realistic threats as dependent variables out of an ethical decision. As 
noted in the discussion, since realistic threat might be expected to lead to ‘realistic’ 
behaviour to cope with threat from the out-group, this might in part also explain the 
subdued results of the experiment (Stephan et al., 2009).  
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Further studies might be experimental while revising the measures, one might also 
analyse actual audiences at rallies and those who see posters – combining our methods 
between the earlier studies and this one in effect.  
4.6  Conclusion: 
 
In conclusion, though, it is fairly acceptable to state that even with subtle manipulations 
of realistic threat, we still find something disturbing and paradoxical: sometimes, 
(notably when the out-group is construed as a threat), in-group virtue leads us to be 
rather supportive of cultural suppression and active repression.  
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5  Study 4: Counter-hegemonic discourse  
 
“The single story creates stereotypes, and the problem with stereotypes is not that they are 
untrue, but that they are incomplete. They make one story become the only story.” 
Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie, TedTalk33  
5.1 Introduction  
So far, the research focus has been on the discourse of hate. But, inter-group 
violence is not the only way in which groups relate to each other or the only way in which 
entrepreneurs of identity seek to mobilize. Political will has also been mobilized in on the 
basis of solidarity. In a study that analysed the rescue of Bulgarian Jews during the period 
of Holocaust, ‘this was the only case where Jews largely survived within a country that 
was in the pro-German camp and where, at the end of the war, there were more Jews 
living than before it started’ (Reicher et al., 2006), show that mobilizations were based on 
solidarity, specifically arguing that the predominant category which was based on 
national identity was defined and constituted in inclusive ways. (i.e. ‘we Bulgarians’). 
India too has had it’s share of fierce resistance and challenge to communal elements by 
groups of concerned citizens (Puniyani, 2005; Saint, 2002). Counter-hegemonic voices, 
perhaps not as politically strong and mobilised as the right-wing presently are, have 
nevertheless persisted in their fight against communal mobilization, sometimes at great 
personal risk (SabrangCommunications; CounterCurrents, 2012).  
 
This study looks at one such rally of solidarity organized for the victims of anti-christian 
violence in an Eastern state of India.    
5.1.1  Context and Site of data-collection : 
In 2008, Kandhamal district in Odisha (an Eastern state of India) was the site of 
anti-Christian violence. The violence was said to be a ‘spontaneous’ revenge of Hindus 
for the murder of their seer, Swami Laxmanand Saraswati. The Swami’s murder was 
carried out by the Maoist party members who had left posters at the site owning up to the 
                                                
33 (Adichie, 2009)  
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murder (Patnaik, 2008). The following anti-Christian violence, according to government 
figures in Kandhamal district alone saw more than ‘600 villages ransacked, 5600 houses 
looted and burnt, 54000 people left homeless, 38 people murdered and 295 churches 
burnt and destroyed’ (Christian Today India, 2011) Fact-finding missions and 
independent social activist enquiries revealed the presence of the same strain of virulent 
right-wing discourse that was found in Gujarat 2002, to be prevalent in the justification of 
the violence in Kandhamal too. What is more, contrary to the claims of ‘spontaneous 
outrage’, the preparation and organisation of the violence pointed towards pre-meditated 
action (for an extensive review see CounterCurrents, 2012). 
 
In 2010, 2 years after the violence, a solidarity forum of concerned citizens organized The 
National People’s Tribunal (NPT) on Kandhamal, in New Delhi 
on 22-24 August 2010. This forum is a ‘countrywide solidarity platform of concerned 
social activists, media persons, researchers, legal experts, film makers, artists, writers, 
scientists and civil society organizations to assist the victims and survivors of the 
Kandhamal violence 2008 to seek justice, accountability and peace and to restore the 
victim-survivors’ right to a dignified life’ (Preliminary Findings And Recommendations 
Of National People’s Tribunal On Kandhamal, 2010). For the purpose of this study, I 
chose this particular gathering of social activists who had come together in Delhi to 
express solidarity and demand justice for the victims of the Kandhamal violence. The 
meeting was for two days, which included a peoples’ tribunal and an exhibition of 
photographs and posters designed by peace activists to promote the message of 
secularism. However, for the purpose of this chapter, I have analysed speeches made by 
various entrepreneurs during a rally of solidarity. 
 
 To scope the present study within the framework of this thesis, I chose a set of 
political speeches that were given in a public rally for expressing solidarity with the 
victims of violence. There are two reasons for doing this: 
i) This set of speeches is specifically counter-hegemonic to the right-wing 
discourse that has been analysed in the previous chapters.  
ii) The site of violence is different. The ‘out-group’ is different. Instead of an 
overwhelmingly Muslim out-group in the hate discourse propagated in 
Northern India, the victims of Kandhamal are Christians.  
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These speeches were a part of the protest march against violence against 
Christians in Kandhamal, Orissa. As is evident from the membership of the speakers, they 
are all ideologically aligned towards the left.  
 
1. AB Bardhan: National General Secretary of the Communist Party of India 
(Marxist) (left wing political party) 
2. Alvina Shakil: Akhil Bharatiya Mahila Janwadi Samiti  
3. Kavita Krishnan, CPI (Marxist-Leninist) – Central committee Member, President 
of AIPWA (All India Progressive Women’s Association) 
4. Durgesh, Secretary AISF (All India Students Federation) 
5. Brinda Karat: Member of Parliament (Rajya Sabha) from Communist Party of 
India (Marxist). First woman member of the Politburo. 
  
5.2 Analysis 
 
The analysis follows the thematic categorical analysis structure of exploring the 
group categories and inter-group relations. We look at the symbolism employed, cultural 
artefacts if any, and the discourse used to build the group categorizations, looking in 
particular for emergent themes of inter-group relations and political actor – rival 
relations. The interpretation of the violence is crucial to the emotive content of the 
speech. It is also crucial to understanding the subsequent relations developed around the 
theme of violence: The victims and the perpetrators (inter-group relations), the people 
who let it happen (political rivals) and the people who took a stand against it (leadership: 
self) 
 
In-group: 
In this section, the analysis focuses on the ways in which the in-group is 
constructed. What are the boundaries and how is the in-group defined.  
 
‘Comrades, remember this Hindustan is made of you, is made of your work, made of your 
commitment. Hindustan is not made of those people who encourage communalism. Hindustan is 
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not made of people who divide brothers, who divide this country as Hindu, Muslim, Sikh & 
Christians. (Durgesh) 
 
The national category is invoked as Hindustan, and the composition of this nation 
is also clearly stated as people who are committed towards the country. ‘Labour’ is the 
defining characteristic for membership. Religion is not. The nation is emphasized a 
product of whoever toils for the country. The ownership of the nation, in a sense, is 
bestowed back to the people who have been the victims of religious violence, and out 
from the hands of the communalists. The violence is clearly condemned as communal 
violence. The national identity is constructed as bound in multiplicities, by another 
speaker in the following way:  
 
Our country has different languages, different communities, different religions… this is the 
language of our country. This is our beauty. It is not people of just one religion who live here. I 
would also like to say that it is all these people from different religions, different communities 
and different languages together who have given this country… fought against the British 
imperialists, to give us our freedom. Only all of them united can bring about the development 
and progress of our country.’ (AB Bardhan) 
 
The speaker frames a common national identity defined and constituted by diverse 
multiplicities: different linguistic categories, regional differences, but bound by a 
common destiny that has been anchored in the freedom of the nation in the shared 
struggle by all members of the nation. The history of the Indian freedom struggle is 
alluded to as a combined effort of all the people of India. Importantly, this unity is 
conceptualized as the thread that binds the citizens, in spite of the divides. The diversity 
of the Indian people is celebrated as it’s beauty; in other words, the strength and progress 
of the nation stems from the diversity.  
 
He further characterizes the victims of the violence not just in terms of the 
religious community that they belong to, but in a dimension that helps in realigning 
categorizations from religion to class relations.  
 
Who are our Christian friends who were in Kandhamal and were attacked upon? Very poor 
people. Very very poor people. Ordinary people. Village farmers and every day wage workers. 
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People with small trades, who earn their living on a daily basis. They were attacked. (AB 
Bardhan) 
 
The in-group is defined in multiplicities. The Indian in-group consists of plurality. 
Heterogeneity is the defining characteristic of the in-group. This in-group is under attack.  
This is a solidarity with the poor and disadvantaged, in a class-world. A lot of work is put 
into developing and harnessing the value system of the in-group. Here too, however, 
crucially the in-group is defined in terms of its multiplicities and diversity. The names 
Bharat and Hindustan are used interchangeably to denote the in-group. The in-group is 
particularly defined in qualities of commitment to the building of the nation and more the 
ownership of the nation is firmly placed with the people of India. That this in-group has 
been sullied by the violence in Kandhamal is clearly pointed in the next excerpt:  
 
Challenging the communal rhetoric within the framework of democratic 
functioning of India’s Constitution.  
 
When this violence had occurred, then I had gone to meet the Archbishop, because we knew that 
there was a conspiracy of silence around the attacks and especially attacks on women, - our 
sister who was raped. I had gone to meet the Archbishop and today I salute the nun and all our 
sisters in Kandhamal. It is their courage, courage to fight and the courage to not bow down. 
This is not a small thing my brothers and sisters. At that time, she was only standing with her 
religious convictions in such a backward area to help those poor people – if she can be raped, 
then this is a black mark on the entire Indian consciousness and that is why we have come 
together today. (Brinda Karat) 
 
The interpretation of violence is the pivotal story around which group identities 
are constructed in identifying the victims, the perpetrators and the bystanders. In this 
excerpt, the speaker makes the nun emblematic of the violence against the in-group of 
Indians. The act of violence of rape is constructed to have been committed against the 
consciousness of the whole country. Of importance is the characterization of the in-group 
as citizens of the country.  
 
Crucially, the victims are not just marked out as Christians, but also the class definitions 
are brought to the forefront. This recategorizes groups and subsequent construal of inter-
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group relations. The recategorization of relations is also brought about in this excerpt: in 
terms of class: It is the poor people who have been the victims of violence. In another 
excerpt, Kavita Krishnan recategorizes the in-group in terms of caste.  
 
The way caste has been used by these fascist communal elements where it is being said that you 
cannot convert. That this is forced conversion. If someone wants to become a Christian, then he 
would be under interrogation, and always under suspicion that somewhere someone must have 
tried lured him away by way of money from Hinduism. His personal choice of becoming a 
Christian will be under attack. What is the basis of this forced conversion? The entire Hindu 
society that revolves around caste-system, if the most exploited, and oppressed want to opt out of 
the caste system and whatever they want to do for their own dignity – they might want to become 
Christians, they might want to become revolutionary, whatever they want to. But that decision to 
leave this system, even Baba Saheb Ambedkar had also made this choice, is always under 
attack. That attack on personal choice is a caste-based attack which is exploited and used by 
communalist and fascist elements. (Kavita Krishnan) 
 
Out-group: 
The out-group is clearly marked out as the Sangh Parivar.  
 
We appeal to our comrades, to struggle for the banning of this Vishwa Hindu Parishad. This is 
like a virus, which is eroding our unity and our democratic structure slowly but steadily. Groups 
like the Bajrang Dal and the Shiv Sena are particularly dangerous for our country. On no 
account, must we tolerate them. (Durgesh) 
 
But, there is a certain organization in our country, whose belief is to fight on the lines of religion 
and religion-based politics. I would like to draw the attention of everyone towards that Sangh 
Parivar and their Bajrang Dal. From the past few decades, these people have been attacking 
minority communities in different places based on communal lines. They targeted the Muslims, 
they broke the Babri Masjid, in a lot of places they have been rioting, and now, they have also 
targeted and attacked our Christian brothers. (AB Bardhan) 
 
Inter-group relations:  
As shown in chapters 3 & 4, it is the way in which inter-group relations are construed that 
forms the basis of justification for proposed courses of actions against out-groups. While 
this is the key to understanding why genocide is sanctioned and how it is justified in the 
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discourse of hate; conversely, in the discourse of solidarity, the construal of inter-group 
relations becomes the central argument for rallying against brutalities. Consider the 
following example: 
 
Because, this is a fight. Today, there is an effort to take our country in the direction of 
communalism. Against that, this is the real fight – the one that we must stand by – to ensure that 
our country’s secularism remains safe. Today, when there was a tribunal here and a peace rally 
organized, we can decide upon one thing today’s tribunal – when Gujarat happened in 2002, 
and Kandhamal in 2007 and 2008 – then everyone felt the need for enactment of the communal 
violence bill. (Alvina Shakeel)  
 
There is a struggle to reinterpret the violence, and hence, the actors involved in the 
violence. The speaker posits it as a fight, but one that is between secularism against 
communalism. This is further explained in the next excerpt:                                                        
  
Comrades, Kandhamal is a big black stain on the secular nature of our Bharat, one that can 
never be erased. This is a stain that has been stamped by the very people who claim to be 
nationalists. In reality, these people are not nationalists – they are people who want to break the 
unity of our country. They do not know how to respect the Constitution of Bharat, they do not 
know how to respect the people of Bharat. (Durgesh) 
 
 
 Political rivals are construed as representative of the out-group or aligned with the out-
group. They are also shown to be in collusion with the out-group. Repeatedly, the 
Government at the Centre and at the State are incriminated for not acting fast enough, for 
not providing enough compensation, for keeping quiet, for not bringing the perpetrators 
to task, for not being concerned enough about the victims’ plight and eventually, for not 
upholding their constitutional duties as representatives of the people. Consider the 
following excerpts:  
 
I think it is time to give a clear memorandum from all the MP’s, no matter which party they 
belong to, except for the Sangh Parivar, with all their signatures that this reality, this reality 
must come in front of the public. (Brinda Karat) 
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I’d like to ask when is a peoples’ tribunal required? When the criminal justice system of our 
country… The criminal justice of our country that should come through as a matter of right, 
does not exist, then the people have to sit with the tribunal and have to remind the government 
of the laws. We have to remind the government of how many people were killed, how many 
women were raped, how many are still homeless – and they can not return to their homes, how 
few cases were registered and even fewer lodged as FIR’s, and for the ones that were registered 
– there the strong-arm brutal tactics of the VHP stopped people from getting justice from the 
court. (Alvina Shakeel) 
 
But according to our country’s constitution, if anyone knocks the door of justice, the Government 
should listen. But what happens is opposite: the Government sides with whoever is. The entire 
criminal system is with them. Whatever has been happening in Kandhamal from the past three 
years by the VHP and Sangh Parivar, I on the behalf of the Akhil Bharatiya Janwadi Mahili 
Samiti would like to say that all these challenges are in front of us. Will the Government protect 
secularism? Will the government protect the minorities? (Alvina Shakeel) 
 
It is shameful, a communalist party like BJP. Given their actions, the party should be blacklisted 
as a terrorist party. But neither did the Congress at the Centre ban this party and nor did the 
Naveen Patnaik Government in Orissa take a stern stance. (Durgesh) 
 
The BJP is typecast as communalist and at par with terrorism. Apart from the BJP 
that is the party responsible for the communal violence outbreak, the other political rivals 
are also indicted in their inability to stop the BJP. The Congress party at the centre is 
called ineffectual as is the regional party headed by Naveen Patnaik in the state of 
Odisha.  
 
However, since the CPI did align with the BJD headed by Naveen Patnaik after a 
decisive win in the state elections. The CPI cannot be seen to be too harsh against their 
partner with whom they form the state Government at the state and at the same time, they 
do need to be seen as condemning the violence without indicting the state Government 
too much. This calls for a fine balancing act, which would explain the cautious note with 
which the prominent leaders seek to frame the issue. Consider this excerpt:  
 
Self:  
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I’d definitely like to speak on behalf of my party, in our country different religions have always 
had the right to practise their own different rituals. I am neither a Christian, nor a Muslim nor 
a Hindu. I do not follow any religion. But this is my private and personal matter. I would like to 
state that in this country if somebody wants to go the church, or the mosque, or gurudwara or 
temple, that person has complete rights to do so and has every right to practise his or her 
religion. Nobody can stop him from doing so. (AB Bardhan) 
 
AB Bardhan of the Communist Party positions himself as not necessarily sharing 
the faith of the various religions groups of the Indian in-group, but, as a leader, of 
upholding the freedoms accorded by the Constitution of India.  The Constitution of India 
guarantees the freedom to practise to any religion to it’s citizens while the state remains 
secular, i.e. professes no religion. The speaker elevates his party to the same non-partisan 
values expounded by the Constitution. In other words, the message is twofold: One, he 
and the party he represents is above religious divides (as he speaks on behalf of the 
party.) And secondly, he embodies the values of non-partisan, above internal divides of 
the many groups in India, to represent ‘national’ whole of India.  
 
 Brinda Karat projects this a bit differently:  
 
We are here as citizens of India, we are demanding our dues and we demand to know what are 
you doing about the criminals who have committed crimes against us? (Brinda Karat) 
 
Aligning with the citizens of India, the entrepreneur speaks as a citizen of India, 
representing the whole country, and also becoming one with them. She speaks from the 
position of an ordinary person’s travails with the justice system of India. 
 
5.3 Discussion 
 
Comparing hate and solidarity discourse in defining the ingroup:  India here too is under 
threat, but the symbolism has changed and that makes the difference. The visual 
representation of the hate discourse was overwhelmingly about the sacralization of the in-
group, represented in holy and pious manifestations. For instance, in the analysis of the 
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posters (chapter 2, p. 40), cows were constructed as the sacred in-group (p. 98) and 
therefore, a threat to the cows in terms of meat consumption is construed as a threat to the 
Hindu in-group which sets up the ground for discrimination against the outgroup (p. 96).  
 
In the political speeches mobilising for hate, it is also seen that descriptive terms of 
‘Bharat’ and ‘Hindustan’ are defined and constituted with specific values till the building 
of this comes to a point where it is interchangeably used to denote the in-group (chapter 
3, p. 114). This is common to both discourses, however, the nature of the country in the 
solidarity discourse is diametrically opposed to the nation imagined in the communal 
discourse. In the solidarity discourse, the in-group is defined in qualities of commitment 
to the building of the nation and more the ownership of the nation is firmly placed with 
the people of India. The People of India are also defined in a multitude of ways, 
specifically countering the insular definition that is seen in the rhetoric of hatred. This 
analysis is also supported by previous studies that show that category construction is 
central to the way in which leaders mobilise people (Elcheroth & Reicher, 2014; Haslam, 
Reicher, & Platow, 2011; Herrera & Reicher, 1998; Klein & Licata, 2003; Reicher et al., 
2006; Reicher & Hopkins, 2001; Reicher & Hopkins, 1996b).  
 
The second step in analysis of the contents of the category constructions shows that the 
discourse of hate, the in-group is consistently anchored in ancient traditions and 
symbolisms of Hinduism, while the discourse of solidarity is based on the tenets of the 
Constitution of India. This looks like an obvious point when the nature of the ideologies 
are taken into account, the former as a resurgent Hindu India, the latter grounded in 
Marxist theory. Though this is an obvious ideological difference between the two 
discourses what is not so obvious is that this sets the framework for marking out very 
different out-groups. Mobilisation based on hate and solidarity institutes similar value-
systems with the in-group but differs on one crucial dimension that follows from the way 
in which the in-group has been defined. By definition, the Hindu in-group only allows for 
a monolithic. In contrast, an Indian in-group’s definition by the entrepreneurs of 
solidarity – insists on the in-group’s intrinsic plurality and heterogeneity. Differences are 
to be respected in the latter’s reasoning, while differences are sought to be homogenized 
in the former’s construct. 
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Out-group: Differences in the construction of the boundaries of the in-group lead to the 
construction of very different out-groups in the two discourses. So while it is the Muslim 
and the Christian who is the enemy in the Hindu right-wing discourse, for the 
entrepreneurs of solidarity it is the communal discourse itself and party that endorses the 
ideology. In the discourse of solidarity, there is an acknowledgement of the many diverse 
groups and these groups are not characterised as the enemy or the ‘out-group’ in the sense 
that the hate discourse necessarily situates the Christian and Muslim as the enemy out-
group(s). This accrues from the very different identity definitions of the in-group in the 
discourses. 
 
Inter-group relations: It is the construal of inter-group relations and the themes around 
which these are constructed that form the basis for proposed courses of action: the 
purported offence against the in-group and the appropriate reaction of the in-group 
against such offence.  
5.4 Limitations 
 
An obvious limitation of the data from the solidarity discourse is the relative lack of in-
depth study, both in the larger research context and specific to this thesis. For instance, 
Gandhi’s speeches34 could have been parsed for ideological content and structure of 
solidarity discourse. However, temporality and contemporary occurrence (the violence 
occurred in 2008, the tribunal was put together in 2010) was the rationale used for the 
particular data set that was chosen. It forms a coherent set of data from various speakers 
at one platform. Crucially, it was evidently a platform for raising voices against 
communalism as much as it was for expressing solidarity with the victims of the violence. 
 
This study was included in the thesis focussing almost exclusively on hate mobilization 
for two reasons; firstly, to acknowledge the existence of countervailing voices to the rabid 
discourse of hate.  Secondly, to give a flavour of the arguments presented within the 
mobilization perspective. A counter-intuitive notion that the categories used and the 
psychological engagement with both hate and solidarity discourse might both be the 
                                                
34 Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, famously known as Mahatma Gandhi was a prolific writer as much as a 
staunch pacifist.  
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same, the difference lies in the way entrepreneurs of identity construe a) the in-group, and 
b) the differentiation chosen for the out-group, i.e. the contents of the social identities.  
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6  General Discussion 
 
The thesis set out to research the processes of mobilisation using a critical perspective of 
the social identity approach on a situated analysis of inter-group relations in India. The 
studies in the thesis address the following questions: How is hate mobilized? Why is it 
mobilized? Does a configuration of ingroup virtue and outgroup threat lead to the 
sanction of violence against the outgroup? How is the rhetoric of hate countered? 
6.1 Studies: 
 The first three studies provided an in-depth investigation of hate mobilization (the 
first two are intensive qualitative studies and the third study is experimental), while the 
fourth study analysed the process of mobilisation used in solidarity discourse. 
 
In study 1, an analysis of a collection of 16 hand-drawn posters gathered from a 
VHP tent was presented. Each poster was analysed on two levels: the image and the texts 
with three questions guiding the analysis: what are the categories? How are they 
constituted? And what are the relations constructed among the different categories? The 
materials were constructed around several themes, which were around a particular story: 
about a virtuous in-group under threat from an inherently vicious out-group leading to the 
sanctification of violence as the defence of virtue. The additional layers of leadership 
tussles in the narrative eventually formed the backbone of the argument to the contention 
in the thesis.  
 
Study 2 explicated the processes of why hatred is mobilized. It was argued that the 
construction of inter-group relations around the theme of threat allows for intra-group 
struggles of leadership to play out. For example, if it is accepted that the pious in-group is 
under threat from a threatening out-group, it forms the perfect foil to project oneself as 
the ideal leader and the only leader strong enough to protect the in-group from 
desecration and annihilation from the out-group. Equally, political rivals are constructed 
to be leaders of the out-group who are ‘really’ of the out-group, and hence cannot have 
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either the best interests of the in-group at heart, nor can they truly represent the in-group 
as a leader.  
 
A note about the methods: The qualitative studies involved intensive analysis of an 
iterative nature. Frequently sifting through data, rearranging the themes, explaining 
divergent threads of analysis, thinking about how the thread incorporates into the larger 
framework (does it say anything more? Does it say anything different?) is an integral part 
of the refining process of qualitative data. Data informed the coding and then the theory, 
which was again used as a lens to understand the data. The ‘model of hate’ analysing the 
steps that convince people towards genocidal violence emerged after a second and third 
reading of the data. By the fifth reading, it was clear that there was another process at 
work too, one which we eventually come to argue would explain ‘why’ it is that 
particular stereotypes of out-groups are being put forward. This subsequently became the 
reason to investigate political speeches of a longer duration which by virtue of the nature 
of the communication mode would allow for more nuanced arguments by the 
entrepreneurs than the medium of posters could accord. The site of research for the 
second study, which was a 3-day gathering of ideologues and thousands of followers, was 
also distinctly different from the more inclusive version of the ‘Mela’. 
 
The third study (chapter 4) was an attempt at experimental verification of one of the 
many potential hypotheses that emerged from the previous two studies. The hypothesis 
predicted that under conditions of out-group threat, in-group virtue (the specific 
manipulation that was used was ‘tolerance’) will predict greater negativity against 
Muslims. In other words, the level of threat remaining constant, in-group virtue would 
determine the level of aggression sanctioned against the out-group (the higher the in-
group virtue the greater the aggression against the out-group). 
 
The final study analyses counter-hegemonic discourse and mobilizations against 
communalism, looking at the ways in which the groups are constituted and inter-group 
relations constructed. Through the rival and self, leadership is also briefly mentioned, the 
focus of this chapter was to analyse the ways in which the category-arguments of in-
group virtuousness and out-group threat is countered.  
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6.2 Theoretical implications: 
 
We shall start with inter-group differentiation as distinct from discrimination. The critical 
perspective on social identity in the introduction explained the need to refocus the lens of 
social identity on a clause that is usually lost in the postulates drawn from the general 
outline of the social identity theory, i.e. positive group distinctiveness is sought through 
differentiation between social groups (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001, p. 34). This means, that 
differentiation between groups is neither automatic nor is it necessarily discriminatory 
(like negative behaviour towards out-groups). This is the key principle to understanding 
the differences in the ways in which entrepreneurs of identity construct inter-group 
relations in discourses warranting hate as opposed to discourses leading to solidarity.  
 
In the introduction to this thesis, the term genocidal violence was introduced to describe 
the brutalities of Nazi Germany. While genocide is often understood in terms of the 
number of people killed, the definition itself as put forward by Raphael Lemkin “was 
referring to the intentional destruction of groups [emphasis added] as ‘genocide’(Hinton, 
2002, p. 4). It is worth remembering this quote again in light of the evidence that has been 
presented in the thesis, ie, the intention in the posters and the political speeches to 
preserve the in-group sanctity is tethered with the intentional destruction of the 
outgroups. Central to this thesis was an attempt to rethink the social psychological 
theorization of prejudice in two ways: firstly, as the pivot on which entrepreneurs 
mobilise for genocide. In this, specifically to put the research focus on the ways in which 
the in-group is defined and constituted by entrepreneurs of hate, for it is in the 
construction of the in-group that the out-group(s) is imagined, defined, constituted and 
comes to be ‘seen’ as threat or non-threat. The construction and constitution of the in-
group also provides clues towards inter-group relations, groups that are marked out as 
enemies, construction of potential leaders, discrediting political rivals, and the suggested 
action.  
 
We have argued that hostility and/or solidarity is the end-point or conclusion of socially 
available racial categories that are made salient and accepted in the relevant context, and 
not an offshoot of the process of categorisation (Herrera & Reicher, 1998; Leach, 1998; 
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Reicher, 2001).  Identities are not static constructs and that the boundaries, meanings and 
contents of the social identities are fiercely contested. Hostility is contingent on the 
acceptance of certain categories, and these are categories that are fiercely debated, 
constructed and ultimately, contested as well. (Elcheroth & Reicher, 2014; Haslam et al., 
2012, 2011; Herrera & Reicher, 1998; Reicher, Haslam, & Hopkins, 2005; Reicher & 
Hopkins, 1996b) 
 
A five-step model of hate was explicated and researched in the qualitative analyses 
(Reicher et al., 2008). The following elements are discussed with the understanding that 
the model is only deterministic in so far as the specific conditions are met in the 
configured set of relationships: 
 
The in-group was defined and sacralized. The in-group is constituted in terms of sacred 
and virtuous. The present status of the in-group is defined and constructed in many ways 
in terms of family, pride, the spiritual core, humanitarian values, tolerant. Such ‘moral’ 
characterisations pave the way for subsequent ways in which actions are taken against 
perceived harm (Gill, 2006; Koonz, 2003; Skitka, 2010; Tileaga, 2007).  Experimental 
studies indicate that such characterisations also have implications for the ways in which 
ingroup members will condone or condemn actions taken in their name (Leidner, 
Castano, Zaiser, & Giner-Sorolla, 2010). The ingroup has also been positioned as a 
victim. Much of the work in the political speeches and almost all the characterisations in 
the posters studied in the thesis characterise the in-group as helpless. In the poster study, 
the helpless cow was prominently sketched as the victim of torture inflicted upon by 
various outgroups. The constitution of the ingroup as the ‘real victim’ has some 
substantial resonance with studies on competitive victimhood (Noor, Shnabel, Halabi, & 
Nadler, 2012; Sehgal, 2007) and the consequences of when the threat is construed to be 
‘unjust’ (Bar-Tal et al., 2009). However, studies using the social identity perspective for 
researching the Alevi identity in shared victimhood also show that the consequences of 
collective victimhood do not necessarily lead to violence against outgroups (Yildiz & 
Verkuyten, 2011). The analysis on solidarity discourse also corroborates the point that the 
ways in which categories are constructed are central to the ways in which subsequent 
action can be called upon. This also consequently demarcates the out-group with sharp 
contours. However, the additional layer that this thesis brings to the work is in showing 
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that entrepreneurs of identity actively work towards building this sense of victimhood in 
groups they wish to lead as this has consequences for the ways in which the leaders can 
then construe the ‘correct course of action’ for the in-group. It was argued that genocide 
becomes possible, indeed, celebrated when annihilation of an out-group is construed as 
virtuous. And it can only be construed as moral and virtuous if it is called in the service 
of saving the ‘sacred’ in-group. These processes in and of themselves can be seen as 
harmless, or can be construed as positive (virtuous), but when put together it forms a 
potent and lethal combination that sanctions violence. 
 
It was argued through the thesis that the interpretation of inter-group violence and the 
inter-groups hostilities are in fact critical products of an entrepreneur or leader’s strategy 
in mobilizing hate to sustain and project themselves as strong leaders. In other words, the 
answer to why is hatred mobilised is entrepreneurs gaining social power through being 
seen to act for the in-group and marginalising rivals to power by showing how they 
ignore the in-group and collude with the threatening out-group. Rivals by their silence at 
the atrocities directed towards the in-group by the out-group, making policies that 
appease the out-group, allowing the out-groups to attack the in-group’s sacred places, 
actively creating opportunities for the out-group to outnumber in-group are all 
constructed to progressively and logically argue that rivals are not truly ‘representative’ 
of the in-group but rather represent the out-group. They are prototypical of the out-group 
and hence, by default lose the authority to even belong to the in-group, let alone lead it or 
protect its interests. By contrast, the positioning of the leader is sketched as taking strong 
authoritarian positions against the out-group, recommending and carrying out swift 
military action in the interests of the in-group, urging members of the in-group to be more 
vigilant, and leading from the front of this aggression.   
  
Why is hatred mobilised? The reasons gleaned from the analysis include the policing of 
the in-group, entrepreneurs gaining social power through being seen to act for the in-
group and marginalising rivals to power by showing how they ignore the in-group or 
collude with threats to the out-group. It was argued that these are well thought-out 
strategies of political subversion. The various strategies that leaders use have been 
studied and the category constructions that leaders use with the nuances of the of the 
contents have consequences for public action (Burns & Stevenson, 2013; Herrera & 
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Reicher, 1998; Reicher & Hopkins, 2001; Reicher & Hopkins, 1996b). In this case, we 
argue that the techniques have been used to legitimate one’s authority as leader, or show 
oneself to be prototypical of the group, and at the same time to delegitimize the claim of 
potential rival leaders. As noted in the procedure with concepts drawn from diverse 
fields, hate rhetoric is not specific to either the RSS/VHP or to India in particular 
(Hayden, 1996; Lindquist, 2012; Mamdani, 2004; Schabas, 2000; Tabaire, 2008). 
 
The experimental study provided in some measures a support to the hypothesis of out-
group threat and in-group virtue effects, specifically on demands for greater cultural 
suppression measures against the out-group. It was particularly counter-intuitive since, 
the in-group norm that was manipulated was ‘tolerance’. The more tolerant the in-group’s 
norms, under conditions of perceived aggression, there is a greater call for punitive 
measures than where tolerance has not been emphasized or made salient as an in-group 
norm. Though further studies with better experimental controls are required for stronger 
significance levels in the study itself, in its present form the results of the study can still 
reasonably lend support to an existing body of literature on inter-group threat 
(Branscombe, Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999; Maddux, Galinsky, Cuddy, & Polifroni, 
2008; Moskalenko, McCauley, & Rozin, 2006; Stephan et al., 2009; Wagner, Christ, 
Pettigrew, Stellmacher, & Wolf, 2006; Zárate, Garcia, Garza, & Hitlan, 2004) in 
proposing an  interlocked premise of outgroup threat and ingroup virtue for prediction of 
violence against the outgroup. It also adds to the body of social psychological 
experimental work in India with a focus on Hindu-Muslim relations (Ghosh & Kumar, 
1991; Tausch et al., 2009) in developing relevant visual instruments for specifying 
ingroup (Hindu) virtue and realistic (Muslim) threats for experimental manipulation.  
 
A short study of the solidarity discourse with a comparison of the hate discourse 
confirmed the contention that there is nothing inherently good or bad about categorization 
process. The psychological processes that lead to actions of solidarity or annihilation are 
the same, and has nothing to do with either biological impulses or personality traits and 
neither does it have anything to do with the ‘nature’ of groups. Rather, it has much to do 
with the way people define their groups and the subsequent choices they make. In other 
words, it is in the domain of ideology that lies the difference of whether the way forward 
is by murdering a group of people or of solidarity. The content of social identities 
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determine the direction of action, and the meaning of content is contested by 
entrepreneurs because social identities are the basis of collective action and social 
influence (Elcheroth, Doise, & Reicher, 2011; Herrera & Reicher, 1998; Reicher et al., 
2006, 2005; Reicher & Hopkins, 2001; Reicher & Hopkins, 1996a) 
 
On a general note, the thesis proposes an integration of intra-group processes and inter-
group relations to understand how hate is mobilised to sanction genocidal violence. An 
analysis of the hostilities between groups needs to be refocused within dynamics of 
leadership struggles, i.e, intra-group power struggles on leadership as an epiphenomenon 
of inter-group hostilities. Specifically, as a prescriptive note of warning, in any morality 
discourse of hate and solidarity, we ask for a serious look at how the in-group is defined 
the boundary and the content, over and above the out-group threat. Seen in isolation in-
group virtue is a positive aspect, the elements of the model by itself are not sinister, yet 
we have demonstrably shown that when put together in a particular combination, it has 
the potential to lay the conditions for extremely hostile actions. 
6.3 Limitations & Potential: 
 
An obvious limitation of the hate discourse is the representativeness of the data to be able 
to talk of impact on dimensions of a country as huge and diverse as India. The posters and 
the political speeches clearly give a general overview of the ideology, the specific 
dynamics of which are localised for regional contexts. However, ‘Hindutva’s war’ as 
journalists have noted has also shifted focus from the blatant discourse that we find in the 
studies to subtler nuances (Ramakrishnan, 2012). The characteristics we identify of the 
hate discourse may come with a qualification that some of the hate discourse takes the 
form that we have proposed and explored in the thesis. Our argument is not that 
necessarily all hate discourse is about virtue and threat, but rather that threat and virtue 
constituted in different groups together constitute a warrant for hate. In the context of 
majority-minority relationships, when the majority begins to feel righteously under threat 
from a minority outgroup, the potential for genocidal violence becomes terrifying.   
 
This leads to another limitation: In the argument we have sought to go further and argue 
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that the discourse is not only a warrant for hate from the perspective of the leader, it is 
also effective in producing hate amongst the population. That is the point of the 
experimental study. But the study is only one small preliminary investigation. A 
methodological limitation in terms of the experimental research is the issue of reliability 
with the scales and an excess of dependent variable items. The sample of engineering 
students in a college in Bhubaneshwar (a place where relatively less political mobilization 
against Muslims has taken place) could be a contributing factor too. Had this been 
administered in universities in Delhi, Gujarat or any of the Northern India cities, the 
results might have portrayed a more belligerent picture. The political environment in a 
University set-up would also have made a difference than the usually ‘apolitical’ science 
students of engineering colleges. It has a sample of college students who may be atypical 
of those involved in acts of hate and the measures are problematic in terms of reliability. 
In terms of the DV's there is a considerable distance between writing about sanctioning 
violence and actual expressions of hatred. While it constitutes good preliminary evidence, 
there is obviously much more to do. 
 
The thread of the research that brings up the dynamics on leadership tussles and the ways 
in which self and rivals are positioned is in the discourse quite prominently. The 
formation of the arguments and the construction of the rivals’ alignment as protectors and 
facilitators of outgroup threat is a strategic concern for the leaders to position themselves 
as being the true representatives of the in-group. It would be interesting to experimentally 
show whether there is an effectiveness of the discourse in increasing support for the 
speakers over their rivals. It requires experimental study to identify if there are 
consequences to the discourse. 
 
In none of the studies can we make a claim about the timing of the violence that might 
unfold. So, while the research shows definite promise in understanding the dynamics of 
inter-group violence, a mobilisation of hatred and in particular the way in which 
prejudicial stereotypes of ‘outgroups’ are constructed is a warning bell to the way in 
which people might be preparing for the physical enactment of violence. Though 
arguably we can show the build up process, we cannot say when the given conditions will 
ignite the violence (Bohlken & Sergenti, 2010). 
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The potential of future research is substantial with the number of threads that emerge 
from the model and further refinement of our understanding of group processes and inter-
group violence. The thesis draws from work across academic disciplinary boundaries 
while retaining a social psychological perspective on the understanding of inter-group 
conflicts. This is a contribution to the interdisciplinary body of work on inter-group 
conflicts and dynamics of genocide (Abeysekara et al., 2003; Hinton, 2002; Schabas, 
2000) and is a feature that extends beyond the discipline of social psychology. For social 
psychological research in India, the thesis adds to the body of work by scholars of politics 
in understanding and identifying why leaders might use particular stereotypes in times of 
mobilisation.  
6.4 Conclusion: 
 
At the very least, this thesis raises questions about the supposed existence of an 
individual’s predispositions towards hatred, received wisdom of ‘ancient hatreds’ 
between groups and of seeing hate as an inescapable consequence of inter-group 
relations. We have demonstrated by way of qualitative and quantitative research that a 
considerable amount of time, energy and creativity is put into harnessing, sustaining and 
magnifying hatred between groups by entrepreneurs of identity for specific political 
goals. Ergo, hatred is neither congenital in individuals and nor is it an inevitable 
consequence of group-life. Rather, it is linked to specific group ideologies that are made 
by people and can be unmade by them – and the consequences for which they are, 
therefore, to be held accountable.  
 
The mobilisation perspective in the tradition of social identity approaches is a process 
theory (Reicher & Hopkins, 2004) and it explicates the conditions and the configurations 
of a set of inter-group relationships in which the most likely pathway of moral logic 
would lead to seemingly inevitable genocidal consequences. In other words, if an insular 
ingroup with values it considers uniquely sacred is convinced of an evil outgroup that 
threatens the very sacredness of the ingroup, it can become a matter of duty and pride for 
the ingroup to eliminate the outgroup. This is an understanding that is proposed and 
effectively used by leaders to forward their political purposes of establishing a ‘strong’ 
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leadership profile. This is also used to discredit and devalue the strength of political rivals 
in their claim for leadership of the group. Therefore, prejudice in the form of hatred must 
be analysed and critically understood in the framework of mobilisation, if we are to 
counter the rhetoric of hate, effectively.  
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8  Appendices: 
 
Materials with reference to Chapter 4 
 
Appendix 4-a: Experimental Study Ethical approval  
 
Appendix 4-b: Booklet for Condition 1 (Virtue-absent, Threat-absent) 
 
Appendix 4-c: Booklet for Condition 2 (Virtue-present, Threat-absent) 
 
Appendix 4-d: Booklet for Condition 3 (Virtue-absent, Threat-present) 
 
Appendix 4-e: Booklet for Condition 4 (Virtue-present, Threat-present) 
 
Appendix 4-f:  Participant debriefing form 
 
 

Appendix 4-b 
Guidelines:  
 
I’d like to thank you for your time and participation in this research. There are separate 
guidelines provided for each section, please read them carefully and answer as truly 
as you feel. We emphasize that there are no right or wrong responses. We aim to find out 
the way people generally feel. Your identity will remain anonymous and your responses 
will only be used to find out the average response pattern. Thank you for your co-
operation. 
 
This is a survey designed to understand the social attitudes of Indians.  
 
But before we start the actual survey, I was hoping you would also kindly help me with 
another project, which is to design a webpage. I would appreciate some feedback on the 
images that I have developed for the webpage. 
 
The webpage will showcase the importance of Textiles in the traditional Indian way of 
life. According to the Rig Veda and the Upanishads, the universe is a continuous fabric 
with a grid pattern upon which cycles of life are painted.  
 
Indian textiles have evolved with the development of Hindu civilisation and its 
significance is hallowed by tradition. With this ethos, these three banners have been 
designed to represent our Vedic civilization through Indian textiles.  
 
To help me choose the banner that would best represent Indian textiles for the webpage, 
please rate the banners on the criteria scale of 0-5, where 0=least, and 5=most.  
  
1 The banner represents the theme of Indian Textiles well.  0 1 2 3 4 5 
2 The banner showcases Textiles as an aesthetic part of Indian culture.   0 1 2 3 4 5 
3 The colours/ image of the banner illustrates Indian Textiles.  0 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
 
1 The banner represents the theme of Indian Textiles well.  0 1 2 3 4 5 
2 The banner showcases Textiles as an aesthetic part of Indian culture. 0 1 2 3 4 5 
3 The colours/ image of the banner illustrates Indian Textiles.  0 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
  
1 The banner represents the theme of Indian Textiles well.  0 1 2 3 4 5 
2 The banner showcases Textiles as an aesthetic part of Indian culture. 0 1 2 3 4 5 
3 The colours/ image of the banner illustrates Textiles well.  0 1 2 3 4 5 
Survey on the Social Attitudes of Indians: 
In this research, we are interested in understanding what people think and feel about the role of 
Muslims in India. This has been an issue of considerable concern, and has been the subject of a 
high level Government committee report. First of all, we shall tell you something about this report 
and then we ask you for your opinions on a range of questions.  
 
 
 
The report indicates three important things:  
1. A substantial increase in the contribution of Muslims to India,  
2. Muslim contribution in areas of social, economic, political and cultural life of India  
3. Muslim contribution to India’s pride and prestige in the international arena 
Given below are the names of 10 Indian Muslims cited in the report, whose pictures have been 
shown above. On a scale of 0-5 where 0=least and 5=most, please put a tick on the number that 
you think indicates their level of contribution to India’s excellence.  
 
 
1 
Shabana Azmi: Padma Shri, One of India’s finest actors (record of 5 
National Film awards); Goodwill ambassador for India of the UN 
Population Fund, Rajya Sabha MP. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
 2 Hamid Ansari: Vice-President of India. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
 
3 
Azim Premji: Business tycoon, Philanthropist and Chairman of Wipro 
Technologies Limited. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
 
4 SY Qureshi: Chief Election Commissioner of India.  
0 1 2 3 4 5 
 
5 
Yusuf Pathan: Cricketer, powerful right-handed batsman and a right-
arm off-break bowler of the Indian cricket team.  
0 1 2 3 4 5 
 
6 M.J. Akbar: Distinguished journalist, Editorial Director of India Today 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
 
7 
Javed Akhtar: Padma Shri, Padma Bhushan, "National Integration 
Award" from All India Anti-Terrorist Association, Avadh Ratan from UP 
Govt. Poet, Activist 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
 
8 
Shah Rukh Khan: One of the world's biggest movie stars with a fan 
following numbering in the billions. Newsweek named him one of the 
50 most powerful people in the world.  
0 1 2 3 4 5 
 
9 
A. R. Rehman: Oscar-winning composer, described as the world's 
most prominent and prolific film composer by Time.  
0 1 2 3 4 5 
 
10 
APJ Abdul Kalam Azad: former President of India and scientist who 
played a pivotal technical and political role in India’s nuclear program. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In this section, we ask about the way people generally feel about the Muslim community in India. 
We are investigating how, given the prevailing scenario, Indians feel about the Muslim 
community.  
 
Please read the statement and answer on a scale that ranges from 0-9, where 0=not at all, and 9 
= completely.  
 
Please tick the number that indicates the intensity of that particular emotion.  
 
When I think of the Muslim community, I feel 
No. FEELING Not at all Completely 
 
1 
Happy  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
2 
Vulnerable 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
3 Annoyed 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
4 Nervous 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
5 Disdain  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
6 Angry  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
7 
Intimidated 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
8 
Contempt  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
9 Upset 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
10 Frightened 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
11 Apprehensive 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8 
 9 
 
12 
Relaxed 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
13 
Cheated 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
14 
Infuriated 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
15 Cheerful 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
In this section, we ask questions about the way people generally think about the Muslim 
community in India. We are investigating how, given the prevailing scenario, Indians think 
about the Muslim community. Once again, there are no right or wrong responses.  
Please read the statements carefully and answer on a scale that ranges from 
- - - - = completely disagree to + + + + = completely agree.  
- - - - = disagree 100%,     - - - = disagree 75%,     - - = disagree 50%,     - = disagree 25% 
+ + + + = agree 100%,     + + + = agree 75%,        + + = agree 50%,       + = agree 25%  
Please tick the box indicating your level of agreement or disagreement with the statements. 
Statements: Completely  
Disagree 
Completely 
agree 
1 Muslims have contributed positively to Indian culture. 
   ----      ---      --         -              +        ++     +++     ++++ 
                     
2 The Muslim call for prayers (Azaan) through loud-speakers should be prohibited. 
   ----      ---      --         -              +        ++     +++     ++++ 
                     
3 We need strong anti-terror laws to protect our country against Muslim terrorism.  
   ----      ---      --         -              +        ++     +++     ++++ 
                     
4 Islamic educational institutions like Madrassahs should be allowed to function.  
   ----      ---      --         -              +        ++     +++     ++++ 
                     
5 
For national security, it is not reasonable for 
the Army and Police to use strong methods to 
interrogate Muslims suspected of terrorism 
   ----      ---      --         -              +        ++     +++     ++++ 
                     
6 
In general, I sympathise when some Indians 
use violence against Muslims, even though I 
do not condone violence itself. 
   ----      ---      --         -              +        ++     +++     ++++ 
                     
7 For Indian democracy, Islamic religious teachings by Mullahs should not be tolerated. 
   ----      ---      --         -              +        ++     +++     ++++ 
                     
8 Most Muslims are willing to live in peace with others Indians.  
   ----      ---      --         -              +        ++     +++     ++++ 
                     
9 
I understand the reasons given by some 
Indians for the use of violence, even though I 
do not condone violence itself. 
   ----      ---      --         -              +        ++     +++     ++++ 
                     
10 Some Muslims have contributed greatly to India’s excellence in science and technology  
   ----      ---      --         -              +        ++     +++     ++++ 
                     
11 
Since Muslims take advantage of Indian 
tolerance, our aggression against Muslims is 
an act of self-defence.  
   ----      ---      --         -              +        ++     +++     ++++ 
                     
12 
I support the reasons given by some Indians 
for the use of violence against Muslims even 
though I do not condone violence itself. 
   ----      ---      --         -              +        ++     +++     ++++ 
                     
Now we are interested in your views concerning the characteristics of different groups. First, on a 
scale of 0-9, where 0=not at all and 9=totally, please rate each the following traits for how much 
you think they describe Indians.  
 
1 
 
Peaceful 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
2 
 
Creative 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
3 
 
Non-violent 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
4 
 
Treacherous 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
5 
 
Tolerant 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
6 
 
Patriotic 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
Next, using the same scale (0 = not at all, 9 = totally) please rate each of the following traits for 
how much you think they describe the Muslim community.  
 
 
1 
 
Peaceful 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
2 
 
Creative 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
3 
 
Non-violent 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
4 
 
Treacherous 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
5 
 
Tolerant 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
6 
 
Patriotic 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
In this last section, please answer the questions on a scale of 1-7, (where 1= completely disagree, 
and 7 = completely agree). We would like to know how important Indian identity is to Indians. 
Please answer the following questions about the importance of being Indian.  
 
1. Being Indian is important to my self-concept 
 
Completely 
disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Completely 
agree 
 
2. I feel strong ties with other Indians 
 
Completely 
disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Completely 
agree 
 
3. I identify strongly with India.  
 
Completely 
disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Completely 
agree 
 
4. I identify strongly with Indian values.  
 
Completely 
disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Completely 
agree 
 
5. I am proud to be Indian. 
 
Completely 
disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Completely 
agree 
 
 
And finally, a few questions about you.  
Age: 
Gender: 
Are any of your relatives married to Muslims? 
Do you have any Muslim friends? 
 
 
 
 
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR TIME AND PARTICIPATION! 
Appendix 4-c 
Guidelines:  
 
I’d like to thank you for your time and participation in this research. There are separate 
guidelines provided for each section, please read them carefully and answer as truly 
as you feel. We emphasize that there are no right or wrong responses. We aim to find out 
the way people generally feel. Your identity will remain anonymous and your responses 
will only be used to find out the average response pattern. Thank you for your co-
operation. 
 
This is a survey designed to understand the social attitudes of Indians.  
 
But before we start the actual survey, I was hoping you would also kindly help me with 
another project, which is to design a webpage. I would appreciate some feedback on the 
images that I have developed for the webpage. 
  
The webpage will showcase the importance of Tolerance in the traditional Indian way 
of life. According to the Rig Veda and the Upanishads, the universe is a continuous cycle 
of karma, with tolerance being the sacred value upon which hinge the cycles of rebirth.  
 
Indian tolerance has evolved with the development of Hindu civilisation and its 
significance is hallowed by tradition. With this ethos, these three banners have been 
designed to represent our Vedic civilization through the sacred value of ‘tolerance’.  
 
To help me choose the banner that would best represent Indian tolerance the best for the 
webpage, please rate the banners on the criteria scale of 0-5, where 0=least, and 5=most.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 The banner represents the theme of Indian Tolerance well.  0 1 2 3 4 5 
2 The banner showcases Tolerance as an important part of Indian culture 0 1 2 3 4 5 
3 The colours/ image of the banner illustrates Tolerance well.  0 1 2 3 4 5 
 
  
 
1 The banner represents the theme of Indian Tolerance well.  0 1 2 3 4 5 
2 The banner showcases Tolerance as an important part of Indian culture 0 1 2 3 4 5 
3 The colours/ image of the banner illustrates Tolerance well.  0 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
 
1 The banner represents the theme of Indian Tolerance well.  0 1 2 3 4 5 
2 The banner showcases Tolerance as an important part of Indian culture 0 1 2 3 4 5 
3 The colours/ image of the banner illustrates Tolerance well.  0 1 2 3 4 5 
Survey on the Social Attitudes of Indians: 
In this research, we are interested in understanding what people think and feel about the role of 
Muslims in India. This has been an issue of considerable concern, and has been the subject of a 
high level Government committee report. First of all, we shall tell you something about this report 
and then we ask you for your opinions on a range of questions.  
 
 
 
The report indicates three important things:  
1. A substantial increase in the contribution of Muslims to India,  
2. Muslim contribution in areas of social, economic, political and cultural life of India  
3. Muslim contribution to India’s pride and prestige in the international arena 
Given below are the names of 10 Indian Muslims cited in the report, whose pictures have been 
shown above. On a scale of 0-5 where 0=least and 5=most, please put a tick on the number that 
you think indicates their level of contribution to India’s excellence.  
 
 
1 
Shabana Azmi: Padma Shri, One of India’s finest actors (record of 5 
National Film awards); Goodwill ambassador for India of the UN 
Population Fund, Rajya Sabha MP. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
 2 Hamid Ansari: Vice-President of India. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
 
3 
Azim Premji: Business tycoon, Philanthropist and Chairman of Wipro 
Technologies Limited. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
 
4 SY Qureshi: Chief Election Commissioner of India.  
0 1 2 3 4 5 
 
5 
Yusuf Pathan: Cricketer, powerful right-handed batsman and a right-
arm off-break bowler of the Indian cricket team.  
0 1 2 3 4 5 
 
6 M.J. Akbar: Distinguished journalist, Editorial Director of India Today 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
 
7 
Javed Akhtar: Padma Shri, Padma Bhushan, "National Integration 
Award" from All India Anti-Terrorist Association, Avadh Ratan from UP 
Govt. Poet, Activist 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
 
8 
Shah Rukh Khan: One of the world's biggest movie stars with a fan 
following numbering in the billions. Newsweek named him one of the 
50 most powerful people in the world.  
0 1 2 3 4 5 
 
9 
A. R. Rehman: Oscar-winning composer, described as the world's 
most prominent and prolific film composer by Time.  
0 1 2 3 4 5 
 
10 
APJ Abdul Kalam Azad: former President of India and scientist who 
played a pivotal technical and political role in India’s nuclear program. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In this section, we ask about the way people generally feel about the Muslim community in India. 
We are investigating how, given the prevailing scenario, Indians feel about the Muslim 
community.  
 
Please read the statement and answer on a scale that ranges from 0-9, where 0=not at all, and 9 
= completely.  
 
Please tick the number that indicates the intensity of that particular emotion.  
 
When I think of the Muslim community, I feel 
No. FEELING Not at all Completely 
 
1 
Happy  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
2 
Vulnerable 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
3 Annoyed 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
4 Nervous 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
5 Disdain  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
6 Angry  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
7 
Intimidated 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
8 
Contempt  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
9 Upset 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
10 Frightened 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
11 Apprehensive 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8 
 9 
 
12 
Relaxed 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
13 
Cheated 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
14 
Infuriated 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
15 Cheerful 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
In this section, we ask questions about the way people generally think about the Muslim 
community in India. We are investigating how, given the prevailing scenario, Indians think 
about the Muslim community. Once again, there are no right or wrong responses.  
Please read the statements carefully and answer on a scale that ranges from 
- - - - = completely disagree to + + + + = completely agree.  
- - - - = disagree 100%,     - - - = disagree 75%,     - - = disagree 50%,     - = disagree 25% 
+ + + + = agree 100%,     + + + = agree 75%,        + + = agree 50%,       + = agree 25%  
Please tick the box indicating your level of agreement or disagreement with the statements. 
Statements: Completely  
Disagree 
Completely 
agree 
1 Muslims have contributed positively to Indian culture. 
   ----      ---      --         -              +        ++     +++     ++++ 
                     
2 The Muslim call for prayers (Azaan) through loud-speakers should be prohibited. 
   ----      ---      --         -              +        ++     +++     ++++ 
                     
3 We need strong anti-terror laws to protect our country against Muslim terrorism.  
   ----      ---      --         -              +        ++     +++     ++++ 
                     
4 Islamic educational institutions like Madrassahs should be allowed to function.  
   ----      ---      --         -              +        ++     +++     ++++ 
                     
5 
For national security, it is not reasonable for 
the Army and Police to use strong methods to 
interrogate Muslims suspected of terrorism 
   ----      ---      --         -              +        ++     +++     ++++ 
                     
6 
In general, I sympathise when some Indians 
use violence against Muslims, even though I 
do not condone violence itself. 
   ----      ---      --         -              +        ++     +++     ++++ 
                     
7 For Indian democracy, Islamic religious teachings by Mullahs should not be tolerated. 
   ----      ---      --         -              +        ++     +++     ++++ 
                     
8 Most Muslims are willing to live in peace with others Indians.  
   ----      ---      --         -              +        ++     +++     ++++ 
                     
9 
I understand the reasons given by some 
Indians for the use of violence, even though I 
do not condone violence itself. 
   ----      ---      --         -              +        ++     +++     ++++ 
                     
10 Some Muslims have contributed greatly to India’s excellence in science and technology  
   ----      ---      --         -              +        ++     +++     ++++ 
                     
11 
Since Muslims take advantage of Indian 
tolerance, our aggression against Muslims is 
an act of self-defence.  
   ----      ---      --         -              +        ++     +++     ++++ 
                     
12 
I support the reasons given by some Indians 
for the use of violence against Muslims even 
though I do not condone violence itself. 
   ----      ---      --         -              +        ++     +++     ++++ 
                     
Now we are interested in your views concerning the characteristics of different groups. First, on a 
scale of 0-9, where 0=not at all and 9=totally, please rate each the following traits for how much 
you think they describe Indians.  
 
1 
 
Peaceful 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
2 
 
Creative 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
3 
 
Non-violent 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
4 
 
Treacherous 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
5 
 
Tolerant 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
6 
 
Patriotic 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
Next, using the same scale (0 = not at all, 9 = totally) please rate each of the following traits for 
how much you think they describe the Muslim community.  
 
 
1 
 
Peaceful 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
2 
 
Creative 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
3 
 
Non-violent 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
4 
 
Treacherous 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
5 
 
Tolerant 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
6 
 
Patriotic 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
In this last section, please answer the questions on a scale of 1-7, (where 1= completely disagree, 
and 7 = completely agree). We would like to know how important Indian identity is to Indians. 
Please answer the following questions about the importance of being Indian.  
 
1. Being Indian is important to my self-concept 
 
Completely 
disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Completely 
agree 
 
2. I feel strong ties with other Indians 
 
Completely 
disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Completely 
agree 
 
3. I identify strongly with India.  
 
Completely 
disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Completely 
agree 
 
4. I identify strongly with Indian values.  
 
Completely 
disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Completely 
agree 
 
5. I am proud to be Indian. 
 
Completely 
disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Completely 
agree 
 
 
And finally, a few questions about you.  
Age: 
Gender: 
Are any of your relatives married to Muslims? 
Do you have any Muslim friends? 
 
 
 
 
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR TIME AND PARTICIPATION! 
Appendix 4-d 
Guidelines:  
 
I’d like to thank you for your time and participation in this research. There are separate 
guidelines provided for each section, please read them carefully and answer as truly 
as you feel. We emphasize that there are no right or wrong responses. We aim to find out 
the way people generally feel. Your identity will remain anonymous and your responses 
will only be used to find out the average response pattern. Thank you for your co-
operation. 
 
This is a survey designed to understand the social attitudes of Indians.  
 
But before we start the actual survey, I was hoping you would also kindly help me with 
another project, which is to design a webpage. I would appreciate some feedback on the 
images that I have developed for the webpage. 
 
The webpage will showcase the importance of Textiles in the traditional Indian way of 
life. According to the Rig Veda and the Upanishads, the universe is a continuous fabric 
with a grid pattern upon which cycles of life are painted.  
 
Indian textiles have evolved with the development of Hindu civilisation and its 
significance is hallowed by tradition. With this ethos, these three banners have been 
designed to represent our Vedic civilization through Indian textiles.  
 
To help me choose the banner that would best represent Indian textiles for the webpage, 
please rate the banners on the criteria scale of 0-5, where 0=least, and 5=most.  
 
 
1 The banner represents the theme of Indian Textiles well.  0 1 2 3 4 5 
2 The banner showcases Textiles as an aesthetic part of Indian culture.   0 1 2 3 4 5 
3 The colours/ image of the banner illustrates Indian Textiles.  0 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
 
1 The banner represents the theme of Indian Textiles well.  0 1 2 3 4 5 
2 The banner showcases Textiles as an aesthetic part of Indian culture. 0 1 2 3 4 5 
3 The colours/ image of the banner illustrates Indian Textiles.  0 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
  
1 The banner represents the theme of Indian Textiles well.  0 1 2 3 4 5 
2 The banner showcases Textiles as an aesthetic part of Indian culture. 0 1 2 3 4 5 
3 The colours/ image of the banner illustrates Textiles well.  0 1 2 3 4 5 
 
Survey on the Social Attitudes of Indians: 
In this research, we are interested in understanding what people think and feel about the role of 
Muslims in India. This has been an issue of considerable concern, and has been the subject of a 
high level Government committee report. First of all, we shall tell you something about this report 
and then we ask you for your opinions on a range of questions.  
 
 
 
The report indicates three important things:  
1. A disproportionate emergence of Muslim influence in India,  
2. Muslim authority in areas of social, economic, political and cultural life.  
3. A commitment to reshaping the cultural landscape of India.  
Given below are the names of 10 Indian Muslims cited in the report, whose pictures have been 
shown above. On a scale of 0-5 where 0=least and 5=most, please put a tick on the number that 
you think indicates their level of intent to take over India.   
 
1 
Asiya Andrabi: Leader of an Islamic group (Dukhtaran-E-Millat) that 
demands the imposition of Islamic Sharia Law in Kashmir as well as 
separation from India. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
 
2 
Hamid Ansari: Vice-President of India, former Chairman of the 
National Commission for Minorities 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
 3 
Azim Premji: Business tycoon, Philanthropist and Chairman of Wipro 
Technologies Limited 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
 
4 SY Qureishi: Chief Election Commissioner of India. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
 
5 
Yusuf Pathan: Cricketer, powerful and aggressive right-handed 
batsman and a right-arm off-break bowler of the Indian cricket team. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
 
6 
M.J. Akbar: Distinguished journalist and writer, current Editorial 
Director of India Today 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
 
7 
APJ Abdul Kalam: former President of India and scientist who played 
a pivotal technical and political role in Pokhran-II nuclear test. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
 
8 
Dawood Ibrahim: Underworld leader and crime boss, and the alleged 
mastermind behind the 1993 Mumbai bombings. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
 
9 
M. F. Hussain: Controversial painter who among other things, painted 
nude Hindu gods 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
 
10 
Syed Shah Geelani: Leader of the Hurriyat, political leader of J&K, 
separatist leader calling for Kashmir to merge with Pakistan. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In this section, we ask about the way people generally feel about the Muslim community in India. 
We are investigating how, given the prevailing scenario, Indians feel about the Muslim 
community.  
 
Please read the statement and answer on a scale that ranges from 0-9, where 0=not at all, and 9 
= completely.  
 
Please tick the number that indicates the intensity of that particular emotion.  
 
When I think of the Muslim community, I feel 
No. FEELING Not at all Completely 
 
1 
Happy  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
2 
Vulnerable 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
3 Annoyed 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
4 Nervous 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
5 Disdain  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
6 Angry  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
7 
Intimidated 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
8 
Contempt  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
9 Upset 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
10 Frightened 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
11 Apprehensive 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8 
 9 
 
12 
Relaxed 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
13 
Cheated 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
14 
Infuriated 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
15 Cheerful 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
In this section, we ask questions about the way people generally think about the Muslim 
community in India. We are investigating how, given the prevailing scenario, Indians think 
about the Muslim community. Once again, there are no right or wrong responses.  
Please read the statements carefully and answer on a scale that ranges from 
- - - - = completely disagree to + + + + = completely agree.  
- - - - = disagree 100%,     - - - = disagree 75%,     - - = disagree 50%,     - = disagree 25% 
+ + + + = agree 100%,     + + + = agree 75%,        + + = agree 50%,       + = agree 25%  
Please tick the box indicating your level of agreement or disagreement with the statements. 
Statements: Completely  
Disagree 
Completely 
agree 
1 Muslims have contributed positively to Indian culture. 
   ----      ---      --         -              +        ++     +++     ++++ 
                     
2 The Muslim call for prayers (Azaan) through loud-speakers should be prohibited. 
   ----      ---      --         -              +        ++     +++     ++++ 
                     
3 We need strong anti-terror laws to protect our country against Muslim terrorism.  
   ----      ---      --         -              +        ++     +++     ++++ 
                     
4 Islamic educational institutions like Madrassahs should be allowed to function.  
   ----      ---      --         -              +        ++     +++     ++++ 
                     
5 
For national security, it is not reasonable for 
the Army and Police to use strong methods to 
interrogate Muslims suspected of terrorism 
   ----      ---      --         -              +        ++     +++     ++++ 
                     
6 
In general, I sympathise when some Indians 
use violence against Muslims, even though I 
do not condone violence itself. 
   ----      ---      --         -              +        ++     +++     ++++ 
                     
7 For Indian democracy, Islamic religious teachings by Mullahs should not be tolerated. 
   ----      ---      --         -              +        ++     +++     ++++ 
                     
8 Most Muslims are willing to live in peace with others Indians.  
   ----      ---      --         -              +        ++     +++     ++++ 
                     
9 
I understand the reasons given by some 
Indians for the use of violence, even though I 
do not condone violence itself. 
   ----      ---      --         -              +        ++     +++     ++++ 
                     
10 Some Muslims have contributed greatly to India’s excellence in science and technology  
   ----      ---      --         -              +        ++     +++     ++++ 
                     
11 
Since Muslims take advantage of Indian 
tolerance, our aggression against Muslims is 
an act of self-defence.  
   ----      ---      --         -              +        ++     +++     ++++ 
                     
12 
I support the reasons given by some Indians 
for the use of violence against Muslims even 
though I do not condone violence itself. 
   ----      ---      --         -              +        ++     +++     ++++ 
                     
Now we are interested in your views concerning the characteristics of different groups. First, on a 
scale of 0-9, where 0=not at all and 9=totally, please rate each the following traits for how much 
you think they describe Indians.  
 
1 
 
Peaceful 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
2 
 
Creative 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
3 
 
Non-violent 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
4 
 
Treacherous 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
5 
 
Tolerant 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
6 
 
Patriotic 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
Next, using the same scale (0 = not at all, 9 = totally) please rate each of the following traits for 
how much you think they describe the Muslim community.  
 
 
1 
 
Peaceful 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
2 
 
Creative 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
3 
 
Non-violent 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
4 
 
Treacherous 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
5 
 
Tolerant 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
6 
 
Patriotic 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
In this last section, please answer the questions on a scale of 1-7, (where 1= completely disagree, 
and 7 = completely agree). We would like to know how important Indian identity is to Indians. 
Please answer the following questions about the importance of being Indian.  
 
1. Being Indian is important to my self-concept 
 
Completely 
disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Completely 
agree 
 
2. I feel strong ties with other Indians 
 
Completely 
disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Completely 
agree 
 
3. I identify strongly with India.  
 
Completely 
disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Completely 
agree 
 
4. I identify strongly with Indian values.  
 
Completely 
disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Completely 
agree 
 
5. I am proud to be Indian. 
 
Completely 
disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Completely 
agree 
 
 
And finally, a few questions about you.  
Age: 
Gender: 
Are any of your relatives married to Muslims? 
Do you have any Muslim friends? 
 
 
 
 
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR TIME AND PARTICIPATION! 
Appendix 4-e 
Guidelines:  
 
I’d like to thank you for your time and participation in this research. There are separate 
guidelines provided for each section, please read them carefully and answer as truly 
as you feel. We emphasize that there are no right or wrong responses. We aim to find out 
the way people generally feel. Your identity will remain anonymous and your responses 
will only be used to find out the average response pattern. Thank you for your co-
operation. 
 
This is a survey designed to understand the social attitudes of Indians.  
 
But before we start the actual survey, I was hoping you would also kindly help me with 
another project, which is to design a webpage. I would appreciate some feedback on the 
images that I have developed for the webpage. 
  
The webpage will showcase the importance of Tolerance in the traditional Indian way 
of life. According to the Rig Veda and the Upanishads, the universe is a continuous cycle 
of karma, with tolerance being the sacred value upon which hinge the cycles of rebirth.  
 
Indian tolerance has evolved with the development of Hindu civilisation and its 
significance is hallowed by tradition. With this ethos, these three banners have been 
designed to represent our Vedic civilization through the sacred value of ‘tolerance’.  
 
To help me choose the banner that would best represent Indian tolerance the best for the 
webpage, please rate the banners on the criteria scale of 0-5, where 0=least, and 5=most.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 The banner represents the theme of Indian Tolerance well.  0 1 2 3 4 5 
2 The banner showcases Tolerance as an important part of Indian culture 0 1 2 3 4 5 
3 The colours/ image of the banner illustrates Tolerance well.  0 1 2 3 4 5 
 
  
 
1 The banner represents the theme of Indian Tolerance well.  0 1 2 3 4 5 
2 The banner showcases Tolerance as an important part of Indian culture 0 1 2 3 4 5 
3 The colours/ image of the banner illustrates Tolerance well.  0 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
 
1 The banner represents the theme of Indian Tolerance well.  0 1 2 3 4 5 
2 The banner showcases Tolerance as an important part of Indian culture 0 1 2 3 4 5 
3 The colours/ image of the banner illustrates Tolerance well.  0 1 2 3 4 5 
Survey on the Social Attitudes of Indians: 
In this research, we are interested in understanding what people think and feel about the role of 
Muslims in India. This has been an issue of considerable concern, and has been the subject of a 
high level Government committee report. First of all, we shall tell you something about this report 
and then we ask you for your opinions on a range of questions.  
 
 
 
The report indicates three important things:  
1. A disproportionate emergence of Muslim influence in India,  
2. Muslim authority in areas of social, economic, political and cultural life.  
3. A commitment to reshaping the cultural landscape of India.  
Given below are the names of 10 Indian Muslims cited in the report, whose pictures have been 
shown above. On a scale of 0-5 where 0=least and 5=most, please put a tick on the number that 
you think indicates their level of intent to take over India.   
 
1 
Asiya Andrabi: Leader of an Islamic group (Dukhtaran-E-Millat) that 
demands the imposition of Islamic Sharia Law in Kashmir as well as 
separation from India. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
 
2 
Hamid Ansari: Vice-President of India, former Chairman of the 
National Commission for Minorities 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
 3 
Azim Premji: Business tycoon, Philanthropist and Chairman of Wipro 
Technologies Limited 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
 
4 SY Qureishi: Chief Election Commissioner of India. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
 
5 
Yusuf Pathan: Cricketer, powerful and aggressive right-handed 
batsman and a right-arm off-break bowler of the Indian cricket team. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
 
6 
M.J. Akbar: Distinguished journalist and writer, current Editorial 
Director of India Today 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
 
7 
APJ Abdul Kalam: former President of India and scientist who played 
a pivotal technical and political role in Pokhran-II nuclear test. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
 
8 
Dawood Ibrahim: Underworld leader and crime boss, and the alleged 
mastermind behind the 1993 Mumbai bombings. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
 
9 
M. F. Hussain: Controversial painter who among other things, painted 
nude Hindu gods 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
 
10 
Syed Shah Geelani: Leader of the Hurriyat, political leader of J&K, 
separatist leader calling for Kashmir to merge with Pakistan. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In this section, we ask about the way people generally feel about the Muslim community in India. 
We are investigating how, given the prevailing scenario, Indians feel about the Muslim 
community.  
 
Please read the statement and answer on a scale that ranges from 0-9, where 0=not at all, and 9 
= completely.  
 
Please tick the number that indicates the intensity of that particular emotion.  
 
When I think of the Muslim community, I feel 
No. FEELING Not at all Completely 
 
1 
Happy  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
2 
Vulnerable 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
3 Annoyed 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
4 Nervous 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
5 Disdain  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
6 Angry  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
7 
Intimidated 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
8 
Contempt  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
9 Upset 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
10 Frightened 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
11 Apprehensive 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8 
 9 
 
12 
Relaxed 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
13 
Cheated 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
14 
Infuriated 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
15 Cheerful 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
In this section, we ask questions about the way people generally think about the Muslim 
community in India. We are investigating how, given the prevailing scenario, Indians think 
about the Muslim community. Once again, there are no right or wrong responses.  
Please read the statements carefully and answer on a scale that ranges from 
- - - - = completely disagree to + + + + = completely agree.  
- - - - = disagree 100%,     - - - = disagree 75%,     - - = disagree 50%,     - = disagree 25% 
+ + + + = agree 100%,     + + + = agree 75%,        + + = agree 50%,       + = agree 25%  
Please tick the box indicating your level of agreement or disagreement with the statements. 
Statements: Completely  
Disagree 
Completely 
agree 
1 Muslims have contributed positively to Indian culture. 
   ----      ---      --         -              +        ++     +++     ++++ 
                     
2 The Muslim call for prayers (Azaan) through loud-speakers should be prohibited. 
   ----      ---      --         -              +        ++     +++     ++++ 
                     
3 We need strong anti-terror laws to protect our country against Muslim terrorism.  
   ----      ---      --         -              +        ++     +++     ++++ 
                     
4 Islamic educational institutions like Madrassahs should be allowed to function.  
   ----      ---      --         -              +        ++     +++     ++++ 
                     
5 
For national security, it is not reasonable for 
the Army and Police to use strong methods to 
interrogate Muslims suspected of terrorism 
   ----      ---      --         -              +        ++     +++     ++++ 
                     
6 
In general, I sympathise when some Indians 
use violence against Muslims, even though I 
do not condone violence itself. 
   ----      ---      --         -              +        ++     +++     ++++ 
                     
7 For Indian democracy, Islamic religious teachings by Mullahs should not be tolerated. 
   ----      ---      --         -              +        ++     +++     ++++ 
                     
8 Most Muslims are willing to live in peace with others Indians.  
   ----      ---      --         -              +        ++     +++     ++++ 
                     
9 
I understand the reasons given by some 
Indians for the use of violence, even though I 
do not condone violence itself. 
   ----      ---      --         -              +        ++     +++     ++++ 
                     
10 Some Muslims have contributed greatly to India’s excellence in science and technology  
   ----      ---      --         -              +        ++     +++     ++++ 
                     
11 
Since Muslims take advantage of Indian 
tolerance, our aggression against Muslims is 
an act of self-defence.  
   ----      ---      --         -              +        ++     +++     ++++ 
                     
12 
I support the reasons given by some Indians 
for the use of violence against Muslims even 
though I do not condone violence itself. 
   ----      ---      --         -              +        ++     +++     ++++ 
                     
Now we are interested in your views concerning the characteristics of different groups. First, on a 
scale of 0-9, where 0=not at all and 9=totally, please rate each the following traits for how much 
you think they describe Indians.  
 
1 
 
Peaceful 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
2 
 
Creative 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
3 
 
Non-violent 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
4 
 
Treacherous 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
5 
 
Tolerant 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
6 
 
Patriotic 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
Next, using the same scale (0 = not at all, 9 = totally) please rate each of the following traits for 
how much you think they describe the Muslim community.  
 
 
1 
 
Peaceful 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
2 
 
Creative 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
3 
 
Non-violent 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
4 
 
Treacherous 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
5 
 
Tolerant 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
6 
 
Patriotic 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
In this last section, please answer the questions on a scale of 1-7, (where 1= completely disagree, 
and 7 = completely agree). We would like to know how important Indian identity is to Indians. 
Please answer the following questions about the importance of being Indian.  
 
1. Being Indian is important to my self-concept 
 
Completely 
disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Completely 
agree 
 
2. I feel strong ties with other Indians 
 
Completely 
disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Completely 
agree 
 
3. I identify strongly with India.  
 
Completely 
disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Completely 
agree 
 
4. I identify strongly with Indian values.  
 
Completely 
disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Completely 
agree 
 
5. I am proud to be Indian. 
 
Completely 
disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Completely 
agree 
 
 
And finally, a few questions about you.  
Age: 
Gender: 
Are any of your relatives married to Muslims? 
Do you have any Muslim friends? 
 
 
 
 
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR TIME AND PARTICIPATION! 
  
Appendix 4-f 
 
 
Participant Debriefing 
Form 
 
Project Title 
Under conditions of threat, do moral values of the in-group lead to stronger endorsement of negative 
behavior towards out-groups? 
 
Researcher(s) Name(s) 
Rakshi Rath 
Email – rr95@st-andrews.ac.uk 
Supervisor’s Name 
Professor Stephen D. Reicher 
Email: sdr@st-andrews.ac.uk 
 
Nature of Project 
 
This research project was conducted to investigate what leads Hindus to believe that violence against 
Muslims is acceptable. So, for some people we stressed that India is distinctive due to its virtue and in other 
conditions we stressed that India is distinctive for its textiles (virtue manipulation). In both conditions we 
also conflated India with Hindu values. After that we either stressed that Muslims contribute to the strength 
of the nation or else that they threaten Hindu values in India (threat manipulation). Our hunch was that when 
we think of Hindus as virtuous, and when we also think of Muslims as a threat to Hindus, then we are more 
likely to endorse violence. Due to the nature of the study, we were required to withhold the true aim of the 
study until both manipulations (virtue and threat) were completed.  
 
We hope that you found the study interesting. It may be unsurprising that when Muslims are portrayed as a 
threat we become more hostile. What might be less expected is the idea that, when we think of ourselves as 
virtuous, we feel more justified in treating those who threaten us in harsh ways.  So we hope that you have 
found the experience valuable in helping you to think about the things that create conflict in our country. We 
hope it has also helped you think more deeply about the images and ideas that are presented to us every day 
in paper, magazines and television programs. 
 
Storage of Data 
 
Your data may be used for future scholarly purposes without further contact or permission if you have given 
permission on the Consent Form. 
 
What should I do if I have concerns about this study? 
 
A full outline of the procedures governed by the University Teaching and Research Ethical Committee are 
outline on their website://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/utrec/complaints/ 
 
Contact Details 
 
Researcher:  Rakshi Rath 
Contact Details: Email: rr95@st-andrews.ac.uk 
 
Supervisor:  Prof. Stephen D. Reicher 
Contact Details: Email: sdr@st-andrews.ac.uk 
